Two local ready-mix cement manufacturers, H and T, have combined demand given by Q = 105 − P. Their total costs are given by TCH = 5QH + 0.5QH^2, and TCT = 5QT + 0.5QT^2. If they successfully collude, what is their maximum joint profits?
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Two local ready-mix cement manufacturers, H and T, have combined demand given by Q = 105 − P.
Their total costs are given by
TCH = 5QH + 0.5QH^2, and
TCT = 5QT + 0.5QT^2.
If they successfully collude, what is their maximum joint profits?
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- Two ready-to-eat breakfast cereal manufacturers, Lots of Sugar and Buckets of Goo, face combined demand for their products given by Q = 75 - P. Their total costs are given by TCLots of Sugar = 0.1Q2Lots of Sugar and TCBuckets of Goo = 5QBuckets of Goo. If they successfully collude, their total profits will be: a. $62.50 b. $1,250.00 c. $125.00 d. $287.50 e. $1,287.50Why have European steel firms not been split with the inherent costs of having significant market power?Q1: What is the price-equillibrium under the assumption of the two companies colluding? What is the profit for each firm? Q2: Derive the output reaction curves for both firms and calculate the price-output equllibrium under this assumption. What is the profit for each firm?
- The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelburg duopoly is P=24000-5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower respectively are CL(QL)=3000QL and CF(QF)=4000QF. a) What is the followers reaction function? b) Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower. Leader output: Follower output: c) Determine the equilibrium markert price $ d) Determine the profits of the leader and the follower. Leader profits: $ Follower profits: $Two firms, A and B, face an inverse market demand function of P = 1200 - 4Q. Each firm has the same cost function Ci = 20qi. Assume the A and B are Stackelberg competitors, and that A is the leader. Derive from profit functions the equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits for A and B. How does the methodology for solving the Stackelberg problem differ from the method for solving the Cournot problem? Why?Consider a market with two firms. Call them firm 1 and firm 2. The demand function describing the market is P = 216 – 0.4Q. Firms are initially identical, with the cost function C(q) = 140 + 40q. Calculate the total profits in the market. Under what conditions, the two firms may succeed to collude? How much would each firm earn if they could collude?
- In the packaged energy drink industry, there are only two companies that have the same relative strength in the market, namely “Pocary” and “Ion-1000”. It is known that the demand function in the market for this industry is as follows: Q = 1000 - 0.1P. Where Q in the market is supplied by these 2 companies. It is known that the total cost of the company is TC = 2q2 while for Ion-1000 is TC = 2.5q2 a. If these 2 companies collude, what is the price and quantity offered in the market at equilibrium, and calculate the profit of each company? b. If these 2 companies compete, look for the best respond function of each company, and what is the price and quantity offered in the market at equilibrium, and calculate the profit of each company? c. Make it in the game theory form of the two strategies "Collusion" and "Compete" and look for "Nash Equilibrium" in just one game? (Note, if one is a collusion strategy, then the quantity produced collusion strategy is the same as the calculation result…Q)Firm A and B are Cournot competitors, who produce good x. Both firms have zero cost and demand is X = 215 – P, where P is market clearing price. If firm produces 90 units, then what is the optimal amount of output for firm A to produce. solve our if you know correct and clearsolution.The inverse demand for a homogeneous-product Stackelberg duopoly is P = 12,000 −5Q. The cost structures for the leader and the follower, respectively, are CL(QL) = 4,000QL and CF (QF) = 5,000QF.a. What is the follower’s reaction function? QF = − QLb. Determine the equilibrium output level for both the leader and the follower.Leader output: Follower output: c. Determine the equilibrium market price. $ d. Determine the profits of the leader and the follower.Leader profits: $ Follower profits: $
- Consider a duopoly with a leader (called L) and a follower (called F). The market demand is given as: P=500-0.25Q, where Q=QL+QF The total cost function for the leader is given as: TCL=0.03QL The total cost function for the follower is given as: TCF=0.1QF All variables are per day, per plant. What is the profit-maximizing quantity for the leader (per day, per plant)? (Note: Round your answer to two decimal pointsThe Able Manufacturing Company and Better Bettors, Inc. are rival firms in the production of a calculator used by horse racing fans for handicapping (determining betting strategies). Each firm has a fixed cost of $100 and a MC = $10 in producing calculators. The demand for the industry’s product is: Q = 900 – 5P, where P is the market price and Q = Q1 + Q2. If each firm must choose how many calculators to produce and sell without knowing of its rival’s production decision, what will be the Cournot equilibrium price and quantities produced? Calculate the profit for each firm.Cournot’s Model of Duopoly) Joe and Rebecca are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolists. The market demand function is Qd=5500-25P, where P is the price of a cubic metre of concrete and Qd is the number of cubic metres demanded every year. The marginal cost is $40 per cubic metre. Competition in this market is described by the Cournot model. (a)Given Rebecca’s output is 2000, what is Joe’s residual demand function? What is Joe's output so he maximizes his profit? (b)If Rebecca’s output is qR, what is Joe’s best response function? (c)If Joe’s output is qj, what is Rebecca’s best response function? (d)Plot both Joe and Rebecca’s best response functions on one graph, where the the horizontal axis represents Rebecca’s output qR and the vertical axis represents Joe's output qR. (e)What is the meaning of the interception of the two best response functions?
