Consider a setting of two competing firms F1 and F2. Both firms maximize their profits and provide a homogeneous ouput qi with (i = 1, 2) at market price p. Assume market clearing prices and non-negative outputs. Assume further, that the firms engage in quantity competition. The inverse market demand function is: p(q) = 41 - q, where q = q₁ + q2. The cost functions are: C1 = 2q1, C2 = q22. Assume F2 is the dominant firm. a) Should F2 prefer to play Cournot duopoly or Stackelberg competition in a one shot game?
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Consider a setting of two competing firms F1 and F2. Both firms maximize their profits and provide a homogeneous ouput qi with (i = 1, 2) at market price p. Assume market clearing prices and non-negative outputs. Assume further, that the firms engage in quantity competition.
The inverse
a) Should F2 prefer to play Cournot duopoly or Stackelberg competition in a one shot game?
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- Suppose the Boston to Philadelphia airline route is serviced by three airlines – US Airways (Firm A) and JetBlue (Firm B) and Continental (Firm C). The demand for airline travel between these two cities is Q = 150 – p. The cost function is C(Q) = 30Q. The cost function is the same for all three airlines. Assume that the three airlines are making investments in airline capacity. In other words, they are simultaneously choosing quantity. (Cournot Competition) Derive US Airways’ residual demand function given JetBlue’s output, qB, and Continental’s output, qC. What is the Marginal Revenue for US Airways? Derive US Airways reaction function Derive the market equilibrium quantity, Q*, price, p*, and Profit.Suppose two firms are the sole producers of widget in West Africa, and they are faced with a market demand function given as P = 40 - 20Q While Dally Limited is located in Nigeria, Joy Manufacturing operates from Ghana. The firms' total cost function is given as TC = 12 + Q a.) Determine the output and profit for each firm under Cournot's assumptions. b.) To aid Joy Manufacturing increase its output to the Stackelberg leader's output level, the Ghanaian government plans to support the firm with subsidies. In monetary terms what should be the value of the subsidy that will make Joy Manufacturing the leading firm in the market? c.) Assume the fims now operates under Stackelberg' s assumptions, with Joy Manufacturing as the leader, determine output and profit for each firm.Exercise 6.8. Two companies with cost functions C1 (q1 )=5q1 and C2 (q2)= 0.5 q2 ² supply the to the same market. If the inverse market demand function is given by P = 100 - 0,5Q , where Q = q₁ + q₂ , find a) The production level of each firm, the price and the profits if the companies compete according to the Cournot model. (b) The level of production of each undertaking, the price and the profits if the undertakings agree to jointly maximise their profits. Show the results with the help of graphs.
- Consider the following market demand function: Q= 20-2P, where P is the market price. Suppose there are two firms- A,B in the market and they have the same cost function: the per unit cost of producing output is 4. The firms compete by choosing quantities. Find the reaction functions for both the firms if they are maximizing profits. What is the profit maximizing output for each firm and corresponding market price? If there was only one firm in the market how would your answer change?Pizza Hut and Dominoís are considering to open a shop in a new shopping precinct in Burwood. Suppose both charge $10 for a pizza (price competition is ignored here), and the aggregate local demand for pizza at this price is Q: If both Örms open a shop in the shopping precinct, Q is shared equally between the two shops. On the other hand, if there is only one pizza shop in the shopping precinct, the total demand Q goes to that shop. The total cost function for Pizza Hut is TC P(Q) = 5Q + 6000 and the total cost function for Dominos is TCD(Q) = 5Q+ 6000: Each has two strategies: Open a shop or Not, and they make their decisions simultaneously. The payoff is zero for a firm that does not open a shop in the shopping precinct. Suppose Q= 3000: Construct a 2 X 2 payoff matrix for this entry game between Pizza Hut and Dominoís and Önd the NE of the game. Suppose Q = 2000:Construct a 2x2 payoff matrix for this entry game between Pizza Hut and Dominoís and Önd the NE of the game.…The market demand and supply function for Pizza in New Town were: Qd = 10,000 – 100P Qs = - 2,000 + 100P A. Determine the equilibrium price and quantity of the Pizza. B. Plot the market and demand curves, label the equilibrium point E, and draw the demand curve faced by a single Pizza shop in this market on the assumption that the market is perfectly competitive. Show also the marginal revenue of the firm on the figure. C. If the total cost function of the firm is TC = 500 + 2Q + Q2, determine the price-quantity combination that will maximize the firm’s profit. D. Determine the profit. What adjustments should be anticipated in the long run?
- Consider Cournot competition with n identical firms. Suppose that the inverse demand function is linear with P(X) = a - bX, where X is total industry output, a; b > 0. Each firm has a linear cost function of the form C(x) = cx, where x stands for per firm output. It is assumed that a > c. a. At the symmetric equilibrium, what are the industry output and price levels? What are the equilibrium per firm output and profit levels? What is the equilibrium social welfare (defined as the difference between the area under the demand function and total cost)? b. Now let m out of n firms merge. Show that the merger is profitable for the m merged firms if and only if it involves a pre-merger market share of 80 percent. c. Show that each of the (n – m) non merged firms is better off after the merger. d. Show that the m-firm merger increases industry price and also lowers consumer welfare.Suppose a single firm produces all of the output in a contestable market. Analysts determine that the market inverse demand function is P = 400 -4Q, and the firm’s cost function is C(Q) = 16Q. Determine the firm’s equilibrium price and corresponding profits.Price: $ Profits: $I understand the other parts. Can you please answer part d and e below? Each of two firms, firms 1 and 2, has a cost function C(q) = 30q; the inverse demand function for the firms' output is p = 120-Q, where Q is the total output. Firms simultaneously choose their output and the market price is that at which demand exactly absorbs the total output (Cournot model).(a) Obtain the reaction function of a firm.(b) Map the function obtained in (a), and graphically represent the Cournot equilibrium in this market.(c) Repeat (b), this time analytically. (d) Now suppose that firm 1's cost function is C(q) = 45q instead, but firm 2's cost is unchanged. Analyze the new solution in the market. (e) Obtain the total surplus, consumer surplus, and industry profits in both cases, and compare. What is the effect of the worsening in firm 1's cost?
- A market consists of a dominant firm and a number of fringe firms. The followings are the information about these firms. Total market demand: QALL=300 – (2.5) P The competitive fringe supply function (total): QF=2P-12 The dominant firms marginal cost function: MC = 12 + (1⁄2) QD. a) What is the equilibrium price set by the dominant firm? b) How much will the competitive fringe supply to the market at the price found in question (a)? Show the answers graphically.Consider a homogeneous good industry (such as an agricultural product) with just two firms and a total market demand Q = 400−P, so the inverse demand is P = 400 − Q. Suppose both firms have a constant marginal cost equal to $100 per unit of output and a fixed cost equal to $10,000. Suppose that the firms compete by simultaneously setting price, not simultaneously setting output. That is, suppose we consider the Bertrand model instead of the Cournot. Show that the two firms must earn lower profits. Hint: Create a two-by-two game using two different prices for each firm. One price should be the Cournot price (the Cournot is price of the good when firms produce the Cournot output you found above, which is 100 and 100, so the price is P = 400 − 100 − 100 = 200). The second price should be under 200 and over 150. Then show that the Nash equilibrium of this game is the lower of the two prices. When calculating profits, assume that each firm has equal sales (one half of demand) if they charge…Two firms compete in a homogeneous product market where the inverse demand function is P = 20 − 5Q (quantity is measured in millions). Firm 1 has been in business for one year, while firm 2 just recently entered the market. Each firm has a legal obligation to pay one year’s rent of $2 million regardless of its production decision. Firm 1’s marginal cost is $2 and firm 2’s marginal cost is $10. The current market price is $15 and was set optimally last year when firm 1 was the only firm in the market. At present, each firm has a 50 percent share of the market. a. Why do you think firm 1’s marginal cost is lower than firm 2’s marginal cost? b. Determine the current profits of the two firms. c. What would happen to each firm’s current profits if firm 1 reduced its price to $10 while firm 2 continued to charge $15? d. Suppose that, by cutting its price to $10, firm 1 is able to drive firm 2 completely out of the market. After firm 2 exits the market, does firm 1 have an incentive to raise…