Why can't safe drivers get lower rates by telling insurance companies that they are less likely to have an accident? Select one: a. because no one can really know if he or she is a safe driver Ob. because unsafe drivers would make the same claim O c. because accidents happen to everyone 0d. because insurance companies don't want to cut rates for anyone ge Finish attempt .

Why can't safe drivers get lower rates by telling insurance companies that they are less likely to have an accident? Select one: a. because no one can really know if he or she is a safe driver Ob. because unsafe drivers would make the same claim O c. because accidents happen to everyone 0d. because insurance companies don't want to cut rates for anyone ge Finish attempt .

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter19: The Problem Of Adverse Selection

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1MC

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Similar questions

Why is there asymmetric information in the labor market? What signals can an employer look for that might indicate file traits they are seeking in a new employee?
What is the problem of moral hazard?
True/False: If a health insurance company could somehow monitor everything a customerdoes and thinks, it could create a full-insurance contract with no moral hazard. X. When is the social loss the lowesta. A 20% coinsurance and high deductibleb. A 20% coinsurance and low deductiblec. A 20% coinsurance, low co-pays and high deductibled. A 20% coinsurance, high co-pays and high deductible XI. Calculate the out of pocket spending in the following insurance plan - A co-pay for $20,coinsurance of 0% and deductible of 500. Assume that the doctor’s visit cost $1000a. 520b. 500c. 820d. 800 XII. Which of the following is not an example of adverse selectiona. Increasing use of health care for health services like preventive care servicesb. Developing asthma that is the outcome of a mining jobc. Not reporting a hereditary heart disease when signing up for insuranced. Increasing the number of cigarettes smoked once you get employer based healthinsurance Please answer all 3 questions. Thanks
Dr. Wexler displays her medical degree in her officewaiting room, hoping patients will be impressed thatshe attended a prestigious medical school. This isan example ofa. moral hazard.b. adverse selection.c. signaling.d. screening.
Briefly explain what it means for information to be asymmetric. a. What is Moral Hazard? b. Identify and briefly explain three methods that insurance companies could use to off-set the moral hazard associated with their industry. c. What is Adverse Selection?
A consumer’s demand for a medical service is as follows: Q = 100 – P, where P is theout-of-pocket price she actually faces. Assume this medical service has a market price of $70.This consumer is considering four different insurance options: no insurance, full insurance, a 50% coinsurance plan, and a copayment plan with a $25 co-pay Calculate the deadweight loss under each insurance scheme and show iton each graph. What do you observe?
2. A consumer’s demand for a medical service is: Q = 100 - ?? where ?? is the out-of-pocket price she/he actually faces. She/he is considering four different insurance options: uninsurance, full insurance, a 50% coinsurance plan, and a copayment plan with a $25 copay. a. Assume this service has a list price of ??= $70. Calculate Q under each insurance plan. b. Calculate the amount of social loss under each insurance plan.
10. A deductible reduces ________ in exactly the same way as ________. Question 10 options: a) moral hazard; cancellation of insurance b) moral hazard; coinsurance c) adverse selection; restrictive provisions d) adverse selection; limits on the amount of insurance
In the RAND study, two plans had full coverage for spending within the hospital, but one had a $150 deductible for ambulatory care. Th e plan with the ambulatory care deductible had a lower probability of hospital admission (0.115) per year than did the plan with full coverage for everything (0.128), even though both plans covered hospital care fully. (See Table 5.4. Page 120 of the Textbook: Health Economics Charles) What does this tell you about the use of hospital and ambulatory. Table 5.4. Hospital use in HIS Plan Admissionsper Year Inpatient Cost(1984 Dollars) C = 0 0.128 409 C=0.5 0.092 450 C=0.95 0.099 315 $150 individual deductible 0.115 373
Because Elaine has a family history of significantmedical problems, she buys health insurance,whereas her friend Jerry, who has a healthier family,goes without. This is an example ofa. moral hazard.b. adverse selection.c. signaling.d. screening
New York Times columnist David Brooks wrote about the implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and described a possible adverse selection cascade: “the young may decide en masse that it is completely irrational for them to get health insurance that subsidizes others.” a. Why might it be irrational for young and healthy people to buy health insurance? b. In what sense do young and healthy people who buy health insurance provide a subsidy to people who are older or who are ill? c. What do you think Brooks meant by an adverse selection cascade? How might the actions of young and healthy people contribute to adverse selection problems in the health insurance system?
1. More fun with cost-sharing. (You may want to review Exercise 15 before proceeding, although it is not necessary.) A consumer’s demand for a medical service is Q = 100 − PP where PP is the out-of-pocket price she actually faces. She is considering four different insurance options: uninsurance, full insurance, a 50% coinsurance plan, and a copayment plan with a $25 copay. a. Assume this service has a list price of PL = $70. Calculate Q under each insurance plan. b. Calculate the amount of social loss under a copayment plan with a $25 copay.