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True/False: If a health insurance company could somehow monitor everything a customer
does and thinks, it could create a full-insurance contract with no moral hazard.
X. When is the social loss the lowest
a. A 20% coinsurance and high deductible
b. A 20% coinsurance and low deductible
c. A 20% coinsurance, low co-pays and high deductible
d. A 20% coinsurance, high co-pays and high deductible
XI. Calculate the out of pocket spending in the following insurance plan - A co-pay for $20,
coinsurance of 0% and deductible of 500. Assume that the doctor’s visit cost $1000
a. 520
b. 500
c. 820
d. 800
XII. Which of the following is not an example of adverse selection
a. Increasing use of health care for health services like preventive care services
b. Developing asthma that is the outcome of a mining job
c. Not reporting a hereditary heart disease when signing up for insurance
d. Increasing the number of cigarettes smoked once you get employer based health
insurance
Please answer all 3 questions. Thanks
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- Government provided social insurance is most beneficial in the cases where the probability of adverse events is _____ to calculate and the costs of the adverse events are _____. a.hard/low b.easy/high c.easy/low d.hard/high10. A deductible reduces ________ in exactly the same way as ________. Question 10 options: a) moral hazard; cancellation of insurance b) moral hazard; coinsurance c) adverse selection; restrictive provisions d) adverse selection; limits on the amount of insuranceTom, who has a utility-of-wealth function U(w) = ln(w + 10), has $500 of income before tax and is taxed at a rate of 25% of earned income. If he is caught underreporting his income he will have to pay the taxes owed and in addition will pay a fine of $2 for every dollar of income he failed to report. How much income will he conceal (i.e., fail to report) if the probability of being caught is 0.1? Also find the market opportunity line and determine the minimum amount of fine such that there is no tax evasion at all.
- If your worker works hard there is a 3/5 possibility that revenues will be $150 and a 2/5 probability that revenues will be $50. If she works at a lower level of effort, there is a 50% chance of each revenue outcome. Working hard costs her $6. Working moderately costs $3. Her outside utility is zero. She is risk-neutral, with utility equal to W - C , where W is the wage and C is the Cost of Effort (3 or 6 depending on whether she works with low or high effort, resp.) If you could contract for effort, would it be profitable to induce high effort? Explain why. What would your profits be? If you cannot contract for effort, find an incentive-compatible pay scheme that will induce high effort. Set up the incentive and participation constraints and find the z (payment when revenue is 150) and y (payment when revenue is 50) where both are exactly satisfied. Would it be profitable to use this scheme? Why? Now suppose that y can never be negative. What incentive compatible scheme will give…1) Suppose incomes at sick-state and healthy-state become perfect substitutes and the probability to become sick is 0.3. Using a diagram, explain which insurance contract (full or partial) will maximize this client’s utility.1. We should expect to see more people in a group to purchase insurance as the probability of illness ___________ and the costs of an illness ____________.
- 1. Assume that there are two types of driver: One is careful and has a 0.1% of being in an accident. The other type is careless and has a 1% chance of being in an accident. Assume that each type represents 50% of the population. If there is a law mandating that all drivers buy insurance that would cover $100,000 in damages, the actuarially far premium for all drivers would be ________ while if there were no such law, the fair premium would be __________. Group of answer choices A) $100, $1,000 B) $100, somewhere between $100 and $1,000 C) $550, somewhere between $550 and $1,000 D) $550, 1,000 2. The term(s) used to describe the problem(s) that make the actuarially fair premiums different in the two cases in the question above is(are) Group of answer choices A) Asymmetric information B) Moral hazard C) Adverse selection D) A, B, and C E) A and C ( Please solve Both the question I will definitely rate positive )Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game under a rule of no liability? Question…An individual has 40,000 in income per year. The person will get sick with probability 0.1. If he does get sick, the medical bills will total 30,000. The following tables shows the utility derived from certain amounts of income: Income Utility40,000 20037,000 19535,000 19030,000 17020,000 14010,000 100Considering the probability of illness, what is the expected utility of income without insurance? Show your work.
- Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $250. If I spends $40 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $175. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $50 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $50 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $20 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially‐optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially‐optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. 1. Under a negligence standard, what is I’s dominant strategy? a) I does not have a…1. More fun with cost-sharing. (You may want to review Exercise 15 before proceeding, although it is not necessary.) A consumer’s demand for a medical service is Q = 100 − PP where PP is the out-of-pocket price she actually faces. She is considering four different insurance options: uninsurance, full insurance, a 50% coinsurance plan, and a copayment plan with a $25 copay. a. Assume this service has a list price of PL = $70. Calculate Q under each insurance plan. b. Calculate the amount of social loss under a copayment plan with a $25 copay.Imagine a market for used computers. There are two types of computers: good and bad. Also imagine that there are 50% of each on the market. Buyers can imagine paying 5,000 for a good computer and 1,000 for a bad computer Sellers want at least 4000 for a good computer and 1500 for a bad computer -What would happen in the market if the buyer thinks that there is a 50% probability that the computers are of poor quality? What type (s) would be sold and what would the price be?
