Principles of Macroeconomics
6th Edition
ISBN: 9780073518992
Author: Robert H. Frank, Ben Bernanke Professor, Kate Antonovics, Ori Heffetz
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 1, Problem 3P
To determine
Explain the decision of attending the game.
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Suppose that there are three beachfront parcels of land available for sale in Astoria, and six people who would each like to purchase one parcel. Assume that the parcels are essentially identical and that the selling price of each is $745,000. The following table states each person's willingness and ability to purchase a parcel.
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Principles of Macroeconomics
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