Accounting Information Systems
10th Edition
ISBN: 9781337619202
Author: Hall, James A.
Publisher: Cengage Learning,
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Chapter 12, Problem 8P
To determine
Explain the techniques which are used to prevent or detect the fraud.
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8. DIGITAL FRAUD In a financial fraud case, city employees in Brooklyn, New York, accessed digital databases to defraud the city of $20 million. Several employees, in collusion with the former deputy tax collector, completely erased or reduced $13 million in property taxes and $7 million in accrued interest that taxpayers owed. In exchange for this service, the taxpayers paid the employees involved bribes of 10 to 30 percent of their bills.
Required Discuss the control techniques that could prevent or detect this fraud.
In a financial fraud case, city employees in Brooklyn, New York, accessed digital databases to defraud the city of $20 million. Several employees, in collusion with the former deputy tax collector, completely erased or reduced $13 million in property taxes and $7 million in accrued interest that taxpayers owed. In exchange for this service, the taxpayers paid the employees involved bribes of 10 to 30 percent of their bills.
Required
Discuss the control techniques that could prevent or detect this fraud.
In a recent financial fraud case, city employees in Brooklyn, New York, accessed electronic databases to defraud the city of $20 million. Several employees in collusion with the former deputy tax collector completely erased or reduced $13 million in property taxes and $7 million in accrued interest that taxpayers owed. In exchange for this service, the taxpayers paid the employees involved bribes of 10 to 30 percent of their bills. Required Discuss the control techniques that could prevent or detect this fraud.
Chapter 12 Solutions
Accounting Information Systems
Ch. 12 - Prob. 1RQCh. 12 - Prob. 2RQCh. 12 - Prob. 3RQCh. 12 - Prob. 4RQCh. 12 - Prob. 5RQCh. 12 - Prob. 6RQCh. 12 - Prob. 7RQCh. 12 - Prob. 8RQCh. 12 - Prob. 9RQCh. 12 - Prob. 10RQ
Ch. 12 - Prob. 11RQCh. 12 - Prob. 12RQCh. 12 - Prob. 13RQCh. 12 - Prob. 14RQCh. 12 - Prob. 15RQCh. 12 - Prob. 16RQCh. 12 - Prob. 17RQCh. 12 - Prob. 18RQCh. 12 - Prob. 19RQCh. 12 - Prob. 20RQCh. 12 - Prob. 21RQCh. 12 - Prob. 22RQCh. 12 - Prob. 23RQCh. 12 - Prob. 1DQCh. 12 - Prob. 2DQCh. 12 - Prob. 3DQCh. 12 - Prob. 4DQCh. 12 - Prob. 5DQCh. 12 - Prob. 6DQCh. 12 - Prob. 7DQCh. 12 - Prob. 8DQCh. 12 - Prob. 9DQCh. 12 - Prob. 10DQCh. 12 - Prob. 11DQCh. 12 - What is a digital envelope?Ch. 12 - Prob. 13DQCh. 12 - Prob. 14DQCh. 12 - Prob. 15DQCh. 12 - Prob. 16DQCh. 12 - Prob. 17DQCh. 12 - Prob. 18DQCh. 12 - Prob. 19DQCh. 12 - Prob. 1MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 2MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 3MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 4MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 5MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 6MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 7MCQCh. 12 - A system of computers that connects the internal...Ch. 12 - Prob. 9MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 10MCQCh. 12 - Prob. 1PCh. 12 - Prob. 4PCh. 12 - Prob. 5PCh. 12 - Prob. 6PCh. 12 - VIRTUALIZATION Virtualization technology is...Ch. 12 - Prob. 8P
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