EBK PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (SECON
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780393616149
Author: Mateer
Publisher: W.W.NORTON+CO. (CC)
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Chapter 13, Problem 3SP
To determine
Method of responding to the game of the alarm timing.
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Alcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make.
Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. Kaiser’s manager ignores the time-value of money and does not discount future benefits or costs.
Will Kaiser cooperate or cheat? Explain.
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EBK PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS (SECON
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- Alcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make. Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. Kaiser’s manager ignores the time-value of money and does not discount future benefits or costs. 4. Suppose you were asked to manage a golf course that was currently charging a uniform price. Would you suggest that the course continue…arrow_forwardAlcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make. Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. Kaiser’s manager ignores the time-value of money and does not discount future benefits or costs. What is the monthly gain to Kaiser from cheating? What is the present value of the benefit from cheating for the two months of cheating?arrow_forwardAlcoa and Kaiser, duopolists in the market for primary aluminum ingot, choose prices of their 500 foot rolls of sheet aluminum on the first day of the month. The following payoff table shows their monthly payoffs resulting from the pricing decisions they can make. Suppose Alcoa and Kaiser repeat their pricing decision on the first day of every month. Suppose they have been cooperating for the past few months, but now the manager at Kaiser is trying to decide whether to cheat or to continue cooperating. Kaiser’s manager believes Kaiser can get away with cheating for two months, but he also believes that Kaiser would be punished for the next two months after cheating. After punishment, Kaiser’s manager expects the two firms would return to cooperation. What is the monthly cost of punishment to Kaiser? What is the present value of the cost of cheating for the two months of punishment?arrow_forward
- Suppose there is a remote stretch of highway along which two restaurants, Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner, operate in a duopoly. Neither restaurant invests in keeping up with health code regulations, but regardless they both have customers as they are the only dining options along a 79-mile portion of the road. Both restaurants know that if they clean up and comply with health codes they will attract more customers, but this also means that they will have to pay workers to do the cleaning. If neither restaurant cleans, each will earn $10,000; alternatively, if they both hire workers to clean, each will earn only $7,000. However, if one cleans and the other doesn't, more customers will choose the cleaner restaurant; the cleaner restaurant will make $15,000, and the other restaurant will make only $3,000. Complete the following payoff matrix using the information just given. (Note: Last Chance Café and Desolate Diner are both profit-maximizing firms.) Desolate Diner…arrow_forwardCan you explain what the Pure Coordination Game is and provide an example of one?arrow_forwardDoes each individual in a prisoner’s dilemma benefit more from cooperation or from pursuing selfinterest? Explain brieflyarrow_forward
- You and a classmate are assigned a project on which you will receive one combined grade. You each want to receive a good grade, but you also want to avoid hard work. In particular, here is the situation: • If both of you work hard, you both get an A, which gives each of you 40 units of happiness. • If only one of you works hard, you both get a B, which gives each of you 30 units of happiness. • If neither of you works hard, you both get a D, which gives each of you 10 units of happiness. • Working hard costs 25 units of happiness. Complete the following payoff matrix given the previous information. In each cell, your classmate's payoff is on the left and yours is on the right. Your Decision Work Shirk Classmate's Decision Work , , Shirk , , The likely outcome is that your classmate and you . If you get this classmate as your partner on a series of projects throughout the year, rather than only once, you are…arrow_forwardYou and a classmate are assigned a project on which you will receive one combined grade. (You each want to receive a good grade, but you also want to avoid hard work. In particular, here is the situation:• If both of you work hard, you both get an A, which gives each of you 40 units of happiness.• If only one of you works hard, you both get a B, which gives each of you 30 units of happiness.• If neither of you works hard, you both get a D, which gives each of you 10 units of happiness.• Working hard costs 25 units of happiness. a. Fill in the payoffs in the following decision box: REFER IMAGE b. What is the likely outcome? Explain your answer.c. If you get this classmate as your partner on a series of projects throughout the year, rather than only once, how might that change the outcome you predicted in part (b)?d. Another classmate cares more about good grades: She gets 50 units of happiness for a B and 80 units of happiness for an A. If this classmate were your partner (but your…arrow_forwardYou and a classmate are assigned a project on which you will receive one combined grade. (You each want to receive a good grade, but you also want to avoid hard work. In particular, here is the situation:• If both of you work hard, you both get an A, which gives each of you 40 units of happiness.• If only one of you works hard, you both get a B, which gives each of you 30 units of happiness.• If neither of you works hard, you both get a D, which gives each of you 10 units of happiness.• Working hard costs 25 units of happiness.a. Fill in the payoffs in the following decision box: b. What is the likely outcome? Explain your answer.c. If you get this classmate as your partner on a series of projects throughout the year, rather than only once, how might that change the outcome you predicted in part (b)?d. Another classmate cares more about good grades: She gets 50 units of happiness for a B and 80 units of happiness for an A. If this classmate were your partner (but your preferences…arrow_forward
- American Airlines and Braniff Airways are the two airlines operating flights from your region. Suppose that each company can charge either a high price for tickets or a low price. First, American Airlines will choose the price level. Following this, Braniff Airways will observe its competitor’s decision and choose the price level for its tickets. If both of the companies choose High, they earn $25,000 each. If they both choose Low, they earn $18,000 each. If the companies choose different levels of prices, the one choosing the high price will earn $15,000 and the one choosing Low will earn $30,000. a) Draw the game three. b) Solve the game by using backwards induction. c) If Braniff Airlines makes a promise to choose High if American Airlines chooses High, should American Airlines trust this promise? Explain.arrow_forwardTwo firms are playing an infinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma pricing game of the following form: Firm 1 Firm 2 Low price High Price Low price 4, 4 20, 0 High price 0, 20 12,12 Consider the decision to cheat ONLY ONCE for a firm in this game against the opponent that is a Tit-for-Tat player. Cheating firm gets an extra in payoffs for the first round, but has to face $0 payoffs for the second round in order to be able to bring the opponent to the collusive outcome again in the third round. What is the minimum rate of return (r) that would make defecting only once? Show your calculations.arrow_forwardWhich of the following is true of a prisoner's dilemma? Players will be best off if they cooperate, but they have an incentive to follow their individual self-interest. Players will be best off if they cooperate, and they will have enough incentive to do so. Players will be best off if they follow their individual self-interest, but they have an incentive to cooperate. Players will have no incentive to take any particular action.arrow_forward
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