MICROECONOMICS W/CONNECT
18th Edition
ISBN: 9781307253085
Author: McConnell
Publisher: Mcgraw-Hill/Create
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Question
Chapter 4.A, Problem 1AP
Subpart (a):
To determine
Impact of asymmetric information on the price.
Sub Part b:
To determine
Impact of asymmetric information on the price.
Sub Part (c):
To determine
Impact of asymmetric information on the price.
Sub Part (d):
To determine
Impact of asymmetric information on the price.
Sub Part (e):
To determine
Impact of asymmetric information on the price.
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Suppose that a person’s demand curve for physician office visits is P = 200 – 20Q, where P is the price of an office visit, and Q is the number of physician visits per year. Also, suppose that the marginal cost of an office visit is always $60. c. Suppose this person obtains health insurance. The policy has no deductible, but has a coinsurance rate of 50 percent. How many visits will occur now? d. Suppose that the policy has no deductible but has a $20 co-payment. How many visits will occur now? e. Suppose the policy has a $20 co-payment and a $500 deductible. How many visits will occur now? f. Calculate the deadweight losses in the policies described in parts c, d, and e.
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Plan A costs $200 per month in premiums while Plan B costs $80.
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Preventive care is not always cost-effective. Suppose that it costs $100 per person to administer a screening exam for a particular disease. Also suppose that if the screening exam finds the disease, the early detection given by the exam will avert $1,000 of costly future treatment. a. Imagine giving the screening test to 100 people. How much will it cost to give those 100 tests? Imagine a case in which 15 percent of those receiving the screening exam test positive. How much in future costly treatments will be averted? How much is saved by setting up a screening system? b. Imagine that everything is the same as in part a except that now only 5 percent of those receiving the screening exam test positive. In this case, how much in future costly treatments will be averted? How much is lost by setting up a screening system?
Chapter 4 Solutions
MICROECONOMICS W/CONNECT
Ch. 4.A - Prob. 1ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1APCh. 4 - Prob. 1DQCh. 4 - Prob. 2DQCh. 4 - Prob. 3DQ
Ch. 4 - Prob. 4DQCh. 4 - Prob. 5DQCh. 4 - Prob. 6DQCh. 4 - Prob. 7DQCh. 4 - Prob. 8DQCh. 4 - Prob. 9DQCh. 4 - Prob. 1RQCh. 4 - Prob. 2RQCh. 4 - Prob. 3RQCh. 4 - Prob. 4RQCh. 4 - Prob. 5RQCh. 4 - Prob. 6RQCh. 4 - Prob. 7RQCh. 4 - Prob. 1PCh. 4 - Prob. 2PCh. 4 - Prob. 3PCh. 4 - Prob. 4PCh. 4 - Prob. 5PCh. 4 - Prob. 6PCh. 4 - Prob. 7P
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