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York University *

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2320

Subject

Economics

Date

Apr 3, 2024

Type

xlsx

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42

Uploaded by AmbassadorFreedomOctopus37

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Q1. Firstly, the cost of acquiring information about the company's management performance and th Shareholders would need to invest time and resources in conducting thorough assessments, en against the company or its management. Secondly, even if an individual shareholder identifies poor management, their ability to effect c making power is often concentrated among institutional investors, such as mutual funds and pe directors. A bank that has made a large loan to the company is indeed in a different position. Unlike indiv over the companies to which they have lent money. In the event of poor management or deteri influence to demand changes in management, restructuring of debts, or even force the compan
he process of initiating changes can be significant. ngaging in shareholder activism, and potentially litigating change may be limited. In widely held companies, decision- ension funds, or corporate insiders like the board of vidual shareholders, banks often have substantial leverage iorating financial performance, banks can use their ny into bankruptcy proceedings.
Q2 Clients might prefer a contingency fee arrangement for several reasons: 1. No upfront costs: One of the primary advantages for clients is that they don't have to pay an beneficial for individuals who may not have the financial resources to cover legal fees upfront. 2. Risk-sharing: Clients may feel more confident pursuing legal action if they know their lawyer aligns the interests of the client and the lawyer, as both stand to gain from a successful settlem 3. Motivation for the lawyer: Lawyers working on contingency fees are typically motivated to se clients since their compensation depends on it. This can lead to more aggressive pursuit of the There can be an agency problem inherent in the contingency fee arrangement. The agency pro (principal) and the lawyer (agent) are not perfectly aligned. In a contingency fee arrangement: 1. Risk tolerance: The lawyer might be more risk-averse or risk-seeking than the client. For exa certain amount to minimize risk, while the lawyer might want to pursue a trial in hopes of a hig 2. Settlement decisions: The lawyer may push for a quicker settlement to secure their fee, ev could happen if the lawyer is more concerned about their own financial gain rather th 3. Cost-benefit analysis: The lawyer may prioritize cases with higher potential payouts over tho but offer lower financial incentives for the lawyer. This could lead to a misallocation of resource 4. Conflicts of interest: There could be conflicts of interest if the lawyer's financial incentives cla best interest. This could include advising the client to settle for less than they deserve or pursu To mitigate these agency problems, it's important for clients to carefully vet their la and ensure that the lawyer fully understands their preferences and priorities.
nything out of pocket. This can be especially is also financially invested in the outcome. It ment or verdict. ecure the best possible outcome for their case and potentially better results. oblem arises when the interests of the client ample, the client may prefer to settle for a gher payout. ven if it's not in the client's best interest. This han maximizing the client's recovery. ose that might be more beneficial to the client es and effort. ash with their ethical duty to act in the client's uing litigation unnecessarily. awyers, maintain open communication,
Q3
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