AT 481 Project

.pdf

School

Purdue University *

*We aren’t endorsed by this school

Course

481

Subject

Mechanical Engineering

Date

Dec 6, 2023

Type

pdf

Pages

Uploaded by KidDog2721

AT 48100-002 Project Draft Augustus Hickman, Caleb Probst, Johnny Gonsalez, Ella Blazek, and Graham Gardner November 7, 2023

1 Colgan Air Flight 3407, marketed as Continental Connection Flight 3407, was a Bombardier Q400 en route from Newark, NJ, to Buffalo, NY on February 12th, 2009. The aircraft entered an aerodynamic stall on approach to Buffalo, and crashed into a neighborhood, killing all 49 onboard. The official cause of the accident, according to the NTSB, was the pilot’s inappropriate response to stall warnings. In response to this accident, the victim’s families pushed Congress to enact stricter regulations for regional carriers and improve working conditions and scrutiny involving pilots. The flight was conducting an instrument approach, the ILS RNWY 13 into Buffalo. On this approach, the Q400 slowed to 145 KIAS, and the captain asked for 5º of flaps (first notch). Through transcripts from the cockpit voice recorder, as well as the flight data recorder, the captain successfully slowed the aircraft to its approach speed. However, instead of intercepting the localizer, the lateral guidance of the approach, and controlling his airspeed, he intercepted the localizer. He continued to slow the aircraft to a speed of 131 KIAS while asking for another notch of flaps (25º). At this airspeed, the aircraft’s stall identification system, the stick shaker, activated. In response to the stick shaker warning, the captain pitched up instinctively and increased his power. What he should have done, following proper stall recovery procedures, was lower his nose and increase his thrust. However, the captain continued to pitch up, and while he added full thrust, his first officer also raised the flaps, further inhibiting recovery. The aircraft’s FDR showed rapid and excessive movements of pitch and bank before it ultimately crashed, fatally killing all 49 occupants. The cause of the crash was the crew’s inability to properly monitor their aircraft’s instruments on the approach. The primary cause of this inattention was fatigue. Compounding upon this, the captain, although relatively experienced, was not quite comfortable in the aircraft,

2 and should have been grounded. Our research paper will analyze the specific events that led up to this accident, and how we could have prevented them. We will dissect the de-icing procedure at Newark, a non-standard system whose rehearsal may have distracted the flight crew, and prevented them from staying ahead of the aircraft during the flight. We will use new methods like the Pilot Records Database, and the FAA’s mandated fatigue period, to combat the catastrophic domino effect that resulted in this accident. It is clear that in response to the accident of Colgan Air Flight 3407 many different procedures need to be updated, especially pilot training and flight hour requirements, as pilot error was the main cause of the accident as reported by the National Transportation Safety Board. After such an accident it is crucial to put in place policies that would prevent this type of accident from happening in the future. Following the accident, Congress passed The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010 which details many of the procedures we would have implemented following the accident. However, we believe that there are ways to add and improve upon these policies to create a safer environment for air transportation. In the aftermath of the accident, it was discovered that there should have been red flags that should have prevented the captain from operating flight 3407 or required additional for the captain to operate safely. In records released following the incident, Colgan managers expressed concern with the captain’s ability to operate the Bombardier Dash-8 Q400, although the captain was still allowed to fly the aircraft. The captain had many issues while training including failing multiple check rides and struggling to upgrade to the aircraft he was flying; Colgate managers had every right to pull the captain from flying though they did not.

3 It is hard for managers to stop flights or send pilots back for additional training when their jobs are focused on increasing profits. To prevent this situation from occurring in the future a digital database of pilot flights and other reports should be required and managed by the FAA. The FAA’s main focus is not profit, unlike the private air carrier companies that need to make a profit. When a red flag comes up in pilot training or any other pilot discrepancy appears the FAA can take action by requiring that pilot to attend additional training. A program such as this has been implemented by the FAA in the previous few years called the Pilot Records Database. This program has made it easier for air carriers to verify pilot history. With constantly updating technology in the future the FAA should plan to use this system as a real-time system to prevent accidents. The FAA should create an algorithm to sort through pilot records and flight data to flag potential issues that need to be reviewed by human safety professionals. This would be a radical policy change, as the FAA would begin to have more of an every-moment role in preventing accidents, instead of having incidents reported to them and then responding. I believe that this change in safety policy could prevent a large number of accidents before they occur. The major policy change required to enact this would be requiring all air carriers, operating in the United States, to share real-time flight data with the FAA to be used in the database for detecting possible situations for accidents. Pilot training needed to be updated in response to the accident of flight 3407. The Captain of flight 3407 had amassed only 618 flight hours before being hired by Colgan Air. Following the accident, the FAA mandated that 1,500 flight hours would be required to become an Air Transport Pilot. The new mandate certainly made air transportation safer, though many critics saw the requirement as overkill and hurt many safe pilots’ abilities to become air transport pilots.

4 We would propose to create a more robust system that can respond differently to each case and scenario. The digital database of pilot flight data could be used to determine if pilots are fit to fly with their current training. If a pilot is flawless through training they could receive their air transport pilot license more soon. Pilots that struggle could have training that fits their deficiencies better. In the case of flight 3407, the pilots responded incorrectly to a stall, which could have been prevented with additional training. If a pilot is struggling with stall procedures the pilot database could suggest specific stall training that the pilot can do with the oversight of an instructor, so that the pilot can become proficient with stall procedures. Some pilots may be able to receive their ATP license after 500 flight hours while it may take another pilot 2500 flight hours, to have complete proficiency among all pilots. This policy to use a robust approach, aided by development in technology, could revolutionize the way pilots are trained. With more and more data in the database, the training could improve with time. These new policies are a good addition to the policies used by the FAA. In particular, the policy to make the FAA an increasingly active participant in the day-to-day safety procedure of air carrier flights. These new policies we would enact would mitigate an accident such as Colgate Air Flight 3407. A policy this system would have trouble correcting is pilot fatigue. Following the accident, the FAA increased the minimum rest time for pilots and required pilots to report their “fitness for duty.” To aid in fatigue management we would require all pilots of commercial flights to report their fatigue levels to the FAA system, as a new qualitative data point for the newly in-placed real-time system. This new self-reporting requirement would allow pilots to state their fatigue without fear of punishment from their companies; This would give the FAA increased oversight over airlines’ fatigue management

Your preview ends here

Eager to read complete document? Join bartleby learn and gain access to the full version