MRAP Program

The U.S. military made the same mistakes initially in the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. failed to allocate the proper number of troop strength, failed to adapt to the terrain, and failed to foresee the used of improvised explosive device (IED). The U.S. also lacked control of the civilian population, and the mistakes in Abu Ghraib became the rally cry for the insurgents, which the Iraqis rose to support the insurgency. (Montanus, 2005) However, the lessons learned from the British 200 years ago, the U.S. adapted and formed a concept to win the hearts of mine of the people into their counterinsurgency operation. The U.S. allocated more troops, adapted to the terrain, and employed new method to defeat IEDs. Furthermore, they opened dialogues with the Tribes, resolved conflicts, and addressed issues in order to win their support for the war. The U.S. assisted the Iraqi’s create a democratic government, provided logistic support, training

In order to gain a thorough understanding of Operation Eagle Claw, it is imperative to account for the historical context which governed the military at the time. Induced by public opinion and the economic state of the United States proceeding the Vietnam War, dramatic reductions in appropriations and personnel plagued the Department of Defense. Consequently, in the midst of the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the United States military was labeled as a “hollow force;” the cuts made to federal defense spending compromised the capabilities of most components of the military including the Special Operation Force, which proved to be critical to the rescue mission. Considering the unsatisfactory state of readiness, the disastrous conclusion of Operation Eagle Claw was inevitable. However, despite its tactical shortcomings, the operation has left a reclusive legacy as a constructive failure that catalyzed improvements to future implementations of Joint Task Forces in special operations.

While a commander’s staff conducts planning at any level, whether it is strategic, operational, or tactical, the importance of identifying both theirs and the adversary’s center of gravity (COG) is a critical part of the planning process. Three factors should be carefully analyzed in order to gain a full understanding of the COG; they are critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities (U.S. Office of the CJCS 11 August 2011, III-24). Although a COG can be attacked directly, the indirect approach which seeks to destroy or neutralize the COG by attacking an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities can be a more efficient use of available resources. The United States Marine Corps’ Warfighting publication MCDP 1 draws a direct correlation between a COG and its critical vulnerability by stating, “we should focus our efforts against a critical vulnerability, a vulnerability that, if exploited, will do the most significant damage to the enemy 's ability to resist us” (United States Marine Corps 1997, 47). The Marine Corps favors the indirect approach to defeating an adversary’s COG because the functions assigned to them by the Department of Defense (DoD) require expeditionary operations and expeditionary forces typically are limited in size, assets, and resources driving them to target an adversary’s critical vulnerabilities.

The Armed Forces of the United States stand at an inflection point. Fourteen years of sustained combat forged a seasoned force capable of success across the range of military operations from military engagement to joint and multinational major combat operations. Today, this seasoned force is tasked to reset from a decade plus of counterinsurgency operations and evolve capability and capacity to defend the Nation from an increasingly complex security environment. Furthermore, this transformation must be completed in the face of a stark fiscal federal budget.

The United States Army’s shift to counterinsurgency over the last 15 years directed changes in all aspects of the service. This shift directed the Army’s emphasis away from the large conventional conflicts to counterinsurgency. During this shift counterintelligence spent the last 15 years mastering its role. Now the Army is adapting again due to the ever changing conflicts in the world. The 39th US Army Chief of Staff, General Milley, stated that the US Army needs to “re-focus on conventional training”. Since counterintelligence supports the maneuver it is continuing to adapt. Counterintelligence support to combined arms maneuver throughout unified land operations is not completely new to counterintelligence. Pre-counterinsurgency doctrine covers specific tasks and duties for counterintelligence personnel and are applicable today. Discussed below are the aspects of counterintelligence support to unified land operations in the offense and defense against the conventional threat of a hybrid force.

Taking the field in 2003, the U.S Army, the most dominate fighting force in the world seized the initiative in Iraq. This paper outlines the staging of one command, the 101st Airborne Division, their commander Major General Petraeus, and the challenges of shifting rolls from combat to nation building and the effective transfer of power. Additionally, this paper will detail the Mission Command philosophy, specifically the describe action with the four step process of commander’s intent, planning guidance, critical information and friendly information as pertains to developing the commander’s intent during the initial occupation of Mosul, Iraq. While little was known about the current

After reviewing The AOC, TP 525-3-1, which describes how the United States Army will employ forces and capabilities in complex

Throughout history, The United States has been involved in many confrontations with various types of enemies. As a military force, we try to learn from the mistakes made. We have After Action Reviews in order to find out how we can change our plans for future battles. We change our Field Manuals and Army Regulations in order to fit those plans. However, there are rare instances when things work out perfectly. When the doctrine created for training and organization match perfectly to the battles we face. Unfortunately for us, when things go so well, we think we have the perfect plan. It isn’t until future confrontations that we learn how wrong we are.

Throughout history, the United States Government and Armed Forces have learned from devastating mistakes and decisive victories making the US Armed Forces superior to most, if not all, other militaries; however, the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia throughout Operation Restore Hope, Operation Provide Relief, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force missed the mark on such “lessons learned”. The inadequate intelligence; the ignorance of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and absence of reinforcements cost needless loss of US troops, and crippling a sophisticated, well-equipped military at the hands of an under-equipped militia using irregular warfare tactics. Even 24 years later, the impact resonating still weighs heavily on minds of key leaders in the government along with all echelons of military commanders.

On 22 January 2013, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released a white paper describing his vision for the Joint Information Environment (JIE) and how it would support operations in the years to come.1 This mandated transition is driving a reassessment of the most appropriate command and control (C2) structure to conduct operations within the domain. Attempts to achieve a standardized fully interoperable environment will only achieve limited success due to the innate variability and changing nature of technology, exacerbated by service unique capabilities and requirements as well as inconsistent funding. Existing C2 models either fail to address the uniqueness of operations in the cyber domain or otherwise fail to

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Just about anyone of working age has been around a new project at work. Everyone has an opinion on how it should be completed. Disagreements are almost guaranteed. How these are solved is usually by the supervisor considering all recommendations and determining the path. This is a fairly easy process, however when dealing with the Department of Defense (DoD) joint acquisition process, the development of a new weapons system is much more in depth. With a diminishing budget and higher costs associated with new weapons systems the DoD has leaned more towards joint acquisition programs. This decisions improves logistics, interoperability of the services, and saves money. The DoD’s supervisor in the above scenario is better known as the joint Program Manager (jPM). The jPM’s role is vital to the success of joint acquisitions, by utilizing His or Her special skills, and could be a dream job for someone with aspirations for greatness.

While working on the MRAP (Mine Restraint Ambush Protected) program for the Army, I came across a difficult issue to overcome. The main parts supplier did not have the proper paperwork filled out or even submitted for the company to even ship parts overseas let alone to a combat theater of operations. Rather than just sit around and wait for the shipping company to get all the paperwork filled out and submitted I called a meeting with all the leaders at the time and discussed the issue at great lengths. I brought up the idea of doing an end around the current shipping company by having myself fly the parts personally into theater. This way the parts would not have to go through customs but only the airline check point. I called the shipping

As seen through today’s prism of operational art and design, the U.S. military’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was not successful. This failure resulted from flaws in the planning process itself, and the conclusions that flowed from that process. The lack of adequate advance planning for Phase IV stability or transition operations proved especially problematic. This contributed directly to rising levels of violence in Iraq, and indirectly to increased public scrutiny of the war at home. Throughout 2006, the U.S. public, pundits and military planners debated the way forward in Iraq. The plan that emerged from this period, known as the surge, successfully overcame the deficiencies in the initial planning and execution