MRAP Program

Decent Essays

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protective (MRAP) program featured remarkable speed of development and mass production at the same time that the United States shifted its counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq. The main controversy over the MRAP program revolved around the three year delay from its initial identification as a need to its production. This paper asserts that while MRAP development and production speed was impressive, the slow realization of the enemy’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) capability and the lack of doctrine and concept development led to inaction. To support this position, this essay describes the strategic environment with its competing demands, and it highlights the roles of senior leaders, the Armed Services and the Combatant …show more content…

That is, capability requirements are informed by joint doctrine and high level strategy. By late 2005, U.S. Army Lieutenant General Petraeus among other senior military leaders felt that a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine was needed. Three efforts happened concurrently from early-to-mid 2005 to March of 2008. The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center rewrote COIN Doctrine and GEN Petraeus started implementing it in Iraq, the Joint IED Task Force later known as (JIEDDO) developed ways other than materiel solutions to defeat IEDs, and U.S. Military leaders continued to plea for IED defeat capabilities finally resulting in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) approval of thousands of MRAPs in late 2007. The MRAP program grew to an Acquisition Category (ACAT) Level I MDAP, which fell within the standard framework of Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), the and Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. The following paragraphs describe how the framework of these Department of Defense (DOD) Decision Support Systems were tailored for the MRAP program in comparison to more deliberate …show more content…

Military. It is a decision support system for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJSC) and the JROC chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) in order to fulfill their advisory responsibilities. The JCIDS process has four major parts. The Requirement Identification and Document Generation is the first step, where the Services, CCMDs, and other DOD Components conduct Capability Based Assessments (CBAs) to determine capability gaps and risks informed by National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QRD), Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) among others. The second step, Document Staffing and Validation, validates the Capability Development Document (CDD) or Capability Production Document (CPD) tailored for a materiel approach, similar documents for non-materiel approaches, as well as Joint Urgent and Emergent Operational Needs lesser than the MDAP level. In the third step of JCIDS, Post-Validation Process and Iterations, the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is conducted and the Materiel Development Decision (MDD) and other acquisition decisions are made. In the last step, Joint Prioritization, the CCMDs and Services provide assessment and weighting of the

Get Access