2. Suppose the equilibrium price for an average hospital stay in the absence of insurance isS10,000. At that price, 1000 people are hospitalized each year. Now suppose an insurer offers apolicy to lower the out of pocket price of a stay to S100, and at that price, 1200 pcople arehospitalized.How much TOTAL premium revenue must be collected to finance thisarrangement? HINT: you arc trying to brcak even here to get revenucs to matchcosts. You are given information that indicates cost. Now you need to considerrevenues to balance that out. Keep in mind this is asking about premium revenue.There may be other revenue that you are receiving that you should consider whentrying to calculate premium revenue to get to break even.a.

The moral hazard is an important issue faced by the insurance firms while issuing the insurance to…

Answered: 2. Suppose the equilibrium price for an…

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4PA

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5 Suppose that a person’s demand curve for physician office visits is P = 200 – 20Q, where P is the price of an office visit, and Q is the number of physician visits per year. Also, suppose that the marginal cost of an office visit is always $60. c. Suppose this person obtains health insurance. The policy has no deductible, but has a coinsurance rate of 50 percent. How many visits will occur now? d. Suppose that the policy has no deductible but has a $20 co-payment. How many visits will occur now? e. Suppose the policy has a $20 co-payment and a $500 deductible. How many visits will occur now? f. Calculate the deadweight losses in the policies described in parts c, d, and e.
Suppose the demand for anxiety medication prescriptions is given by P = 300 – Q. Suppose the marginal cost for a prescription of anxiety medicine is constant at $100 per prescription. a. What is the quantity demanded in the absence of any insurance coverage for anxiety medication? b. Now, suppose there is full insurance coverage for anxiety medication (i.e. no cost-sharing at all). What is the new quantity demanded? c. Finally, suppose insurance covers anxiety medication, but there is 20% coinsurance, meaning that individuals must pay 20% of the cost of anxiety medication out of pocket. What is the new quantity demanded? d. Under the insurance structure given in part (c), what is the deadweight loss associated with the presence of insurance coverage?
18.5 Suppose there is a 50–50 chance that an individual with log- arithmic utility from wealth and with a current wealth of $20,000 will suffer a loss of $10,000 from a car accident. Insur- ance is competitively provided at actuarially fair rates. Compute the outcome if the individual buys full insurance. Compute the outcome if the individual buys only partial insurance covering half the loss. Show that the outcome in part (a) is preferred. Now suppose that individuals who buy the partial rather than the full insurance policy take more care when driv- ing, reducing the damage from loss from $10,000 to $7,000. What would be the actuarially fair price of the partial policy? Does the individual now prefer the full or the partial policy?
please answer all multiple choice question, thanks. 1. Suppose an insurance company wishes to separate out drivers based on whether they are high-risk or low-risk drivers. It can do this by offering two different pricing schemes: one the appeals to low-risk drivers and another that appeals to high risk drivers. Which of the following pricing schemes would best appeal to a high-risk driver? NB: a deductable is the amount that the driver would have to pay in the event of a claim: a high premium but low deductable b. a high premium and high deductible c. None, high risk drivers prefer not to take out insurance. d. a low premium and high deductable 2. The incentive of imperfectly monitored workers to shirk can be reduced by: a. lower levels of monitoring and lower wages b. lower levels of monitoring and offering year-end bonuses c. higher levels of monitoring and offering year-end bonuses d. higher levels of monitoring and lower wages 3. Research has shown that investors in the stock…
How can moral hazard lead to more costly insurance premiums than one was expected?
Why is there asymmetric information in the labor market? What signals can an employer look for that might indicate file traits they are seeking in a new employee?
A9 Describe an example of adverse selection that we may run into in the real world. How does adverse selection impact the policy holders for this specific type of insurance for: High risk participants? Low risk participants? What is one government regulation that has been enacted in the last 20 years that helps either high risk or low risk policy holders in the United States
Uncertainty and willingness to pay for insurance. Utility = (Wealth)1/3 Prob(flood) = .04 Prob(no flood) = .96 Total wealth if flood = $100,000. Total Wealth if no flood = $800,000. Find: (i) expected value, (ii) expected utility, (iii) certainty equivalent, and (iv) maximum willingness to pay for a policy that provides 100% flood insurance coverage. Draw the utility function and include all solved values on the diagram. What is the average gross profit per insurance customer, if each customer is charged his own maximum willingness to pay?
Give typing answer with explanation and conclusion Suppose that a consumer’s demand curve for medical care is QD = −3P +17 with P = $5. Suppose that the beneficiary obtains an insurance plan through an insurer with a 25% coinsurance rate. Under the insurance arrangement, find the following: (a) Equilibrium price and quantity of medical care? (b) Magnitude of deadweight loss? (c) Cost to the beneficiary? (d) Cost to the insurer?
1. Fun with cost-sharing. An important distinction in health insurance is between the list price (PL) and out-of-pocket price (PP) of a medical good or service. The list price is the official price that the provider charges the insurance company, while the out-of-pocket price is the price that the insurance customer faces. Sometimes, the out-of-pocket price depends on the list price. a. Suppose a consumer’s demand for a particular medical procedure is Q = 100 − PP. Draw her demand curve in PL–Q space under the assumption of no insurance and label it D1. You will have to think about the relationship between PL and PP to draw it correctly. b. Now assume the same consumer is fully insured. Think about how this affects the relationship between PL and PP and draw a full-insurance demand curve in PL– Q space. Label this curve D2. c. Finally, assume the consumer is part of a partial insurance plan with a copayment provision. Her insurance pays all expenses above and beyond her copayment of…
1. What assumptions of the perfectly competitive marketplace are violated in medical markets? How does each affect equilibrium price and quantity? 2. One of the significant problems in medical care markets may be the informationproblem. Asymmetric information has led to two important defects in the medicalmarketplace. What are they? How do these defects affect medical markets? 3. Explain how market failure can be used to justify government intervention in medical care markets.4. What are the three areas objectively used to evaluate the effectiveness of medical care delivery? Why are they important?
An important distinction in health insurance is between the list price (PL) and out-of-pocket price (PP) of a medical good or service. The list price is the official price that the provider charges the insurance company, while the out-of-pocket price is the price that the insurance customer faces. Sometimes, the out-of-pocket price depends on the list price. d. Now assume the consumer is part of a partial insurance plan with a coinsurance provision. Her insurance pays 50% of all medical expenses. Consider again the relationship between PL and PP and plot a coinsurance plan demand curve in PL - Q space. Label this curve D3. e. Finally, assume the consumer is part of a partial insurance plan with a copayment provision. Her insurance pays all expenses above and beyond her copayment of $25 for each unit of Q. Consider again the relationship between PL and PP and plot a copayment-plan demand curve in PL - Q space. Label this curve D4.

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