b) Two players, both with zero wealth, bargain over how to divide £X > 0 between them. Failure to reach agreement means both get nothing. Both players are expecled utility max- imisers. Player 1 has utility u(x) = x", where 0 < a < 1. Player 2 has utility u(x) = x, where 0< B <1. Determine the Nash solution for this problem and discuss.
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- a) Find the Nash equilibria in the game (in pure and mixed strategies) and the associated payoffs for the players. b) Now assume that the game is extended in the following way: in the beginning Player 1 can decide whether to opt out (this choice is denoted by O) or whether to play the simultaneous-move game in a) (this choice is denoted by G). If Player 1 opts out (plays O) then both Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of 4 each and the game ends. If Player 1 decides to play G, then the simultaneous-move game is played. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this extended version of the game. (Hint: note that Player 1 now has 4 strategies and write the game up in a 4x2 matrix.) c) Write the game in (b) up in extensive form (a game tree). Identify the subgames of this game.Consider the game of Chicken in which each player has the option to “get out of the way” and “hang tough” with payoffs: Get out of the way Hang tough Get out of the way 2,2 1,3 Hang tough 3,1 00 a. Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if they exist b. Let k be the probability that player 1 chooses “hang tough” and u be the probability that player two chooses “hang tough.” Find the mixed stragety Nash equilibria, if they existTwo players bargain over $20. Player 1 first proposes a split of(n, 20 - n), where n is an integer in {0, 1, ..., 20}. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20 - n). If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0. Question: Find two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and state clearly each player's equilibrium strategies (recall that in a dynamic game, a player's strategy is a complete-contingent plan). Explain why the strategy profiles form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
- on 8.1 Consider the following game: Player 1 A C D 7,6 5,8 0,0 Player 2 E 5,8 7,6 1, 1 F 0,0 1,1 4,4 a. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions. c. Compute players' expected payoffs in the equilibria found in parts (a) and (b). d. Draw the extensive form for this game.There are three players who must each choose an “effort” level from 1 to 7, that is, Si = {1, 2, 3, ..., 7}. The payoff for each player i is ui(si, s−i) = 10 max{s1, s2, s3} − si. How many pure- strategy Nash equilibria are there? Select one: a.2 b.4 c.none of the other answers d.3 e.1For the operating systems game, let us now assume the intrinsic superiorityof Mac is not as great and that network effects are stronger for Windows.These modifications are reflected in different payoffs. Now, the payoff fromadopting Windows is 50 X w and from adopting Mac is 15 + 5 X m;n consumers are simultaneously deciding between Windows and Mac.a. Find all Nash equilibria.b. With these new payoffs, let us now suppose that a third option exists,which is to not buy either operating system; it has a payoff of 1,000.Consumers simultaneously decide among Windows, Mac, and nooperating system. Find all Nash equilibria.
- if Y = 4 (a) If ⟨a,d⟩ is played in the first period and ⟨b,e⟩ is played in the second period, what is the resulting (repeated game) payoff for the row player? (b) What is the highest payoff any player can receive in any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game?Suppose that Teresa and Caroline are both in the public eye. They get offers to sell secrets of the other to tabloids. If both keep the secrets, they are both better off than if they get exposed. If only one is exposed, the other person is better off than if no one was exposed. Their payoffs from each option are given in the payoff matrix. Suppose that Caroline and Teresa play the game over four television seasons, where each season is a new game. Consider the scenarios. Remember, a tit‑for‑tat strategy is one where the person starts by cooperating and then plays whatever strategy the other firm played last. Over four seasons, how much will Caroline make if she and Teresa both play tit‑for‑tat? $_______ Over four seasons, how much does Caroline make if she always exposes and Teresa plays tit‑for‑tat? $________Suppose that Teresa and Caroline are both in the public eye. They get offers to sell secrets of the other to tabloids. If both keep the secrets, they are both better off than if they get exposed. If only one is exposed, the other person is better off than if no one was exposed. Their payoffs from each option are given in the payoff matrix. Suppose that Caroline and Teresa play the game over four television seasons, where each season is a new game. Consider the scenarios. Remember, a tit‑for‑tat strategy is one where the person starts by cooperating and then plays whatever strategy the other firm played last. Over four seasons, how much will Caroline make if she plays a tit‑for‑tat strategy and Teresa always exposes? $_______ Over four seasons, how much will Caroline make if she and Teresa both always expose? $_________ Does Caroline have a dominant strategy when she and Teresa play for four seasons? No, there is no dominant strategy…
- Suppose that Kim and Nene are both in the public eye. They get offers to sell secrets of the other to tabloids. If both keep the secrets, they are both better off than if they get exposed. If only one is exposed, the other person is better off than if no one was exposed. Their payoffs from each option are given in the payoff matrix. Suppose that Nene and Kim play the game over four television seasons, where each season is a new game. Consider the scenarios. Remember, a tit‑for‑tat strategy is one where the person starts by cooperating and then plays whatever strategy the other firm played last. Over four seasons, how much will Nene make if she and Kim both play tit‑for‑tat? $ Over four seasons, how much does Nene make if she always exposes and Kim plays tit‑for‑tat? $ Over four seasons, how much will Nene make if she plays a tit‑for‑tat strategy and Kim always exposes? $ Over four seasons, how much will Nene make if she and…Consider the following game. There are two payers, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 chooses a row (10, 20, or 30), and Player 2 chooses a column (10/20/30). Payoffs are in the cells of the table, with those on the left going to Player 1 and those on the right going to player 2. Suppose that Player 1 chooses his strategy (10, 20 or 30), first, and subsequently, and after observing Player 1’s choice, Player 2 chooses his own strategy (of 10, 20 or 30). Which of the following statements is true regarding this modified game? I. It is a simultaneous move game, because the timing of moves is irrelevant in classifying games.II. It is a sequential move game, because Player 2 observes Player 1’s choice before he chooses his own strategy.III. This modification gives Player 1 a ‘first mover advantage’. A) I and IIB) II and IIIC) I and IIID) I onlyE) II onlyE3 Bayesian Game]. Consider a Bayesian game described by a following payoff matrix. Please solve (show your solution). 1. Enumerate all pure strategies for each player. 2. Suppose that player 1 observes his type ?1 = 3. How does player 1 think of the probability of ?2? 3. Find a (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.