(d) Come up with an example of market shares in an industry with four firms, such that the 2-largest-firm concentration is no more than 50 (for example, if market shares are 10, 10, 30, 50, then the 2-largest-firm concentration is 80, which is more than 50. So this example is not an answer to the question). Come up with another example of market shares in an industry with ten firms, such that the HHI is no more than 1100.
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- 14. Company A and Company B are each telecommunications manufacturers. Both companies manufacture the same products, and they make their decisions based on the other's actions. Both companies are considering opening retail outlets to increase their profits. The payoff matrix shows the profits of the companies in millions of dollars if they choose to open retail outlets. The government imposes a new $5 million tax to open retail outlets. What is the expected outcome of the new payoff matrix, given the tax? The Nash equilibrium is for Company A to not open retail outlets and for Company B to open retail outlets. The Nash equilibrium is for Company A to open retail outlets and for Company B to not open retail outlets. The Nash equilibrium is for both Company A and Company B to open retail outlets. The Nash equilibrium is for both Company A and Company B to not open retail outlets. There is no Nash equilibrium after the change given in the scenario.…16-1 Newspaper Bargaining Two equal-sized newspapers have an overlap in circulation of 10% (10% of the subscribers subscribe to both newspapers). Advertisers are willing to pay $10 to advertise in one newspaper but only $19 to advertise in both, because they’re unwilling to pay twice to reach the same subscribers. What’s the likely bargaining negotiation outcome if the advertisers bargain by telling each newspaper that they’re going to reach an agreement with the other newspaper, so the gains to reaching agreement are only $9? Suppose the two newspapers merge. What is the likely post-merger bargaining outcome? these would be most advantageous from a bargaining position?Assume the market for a product can be described as a Cournot duopoly with two identical firms. The Nash-equilibrium in this market is that the two firms produce the same quantity. Hence, they will have identical market shares, each will have 50%. Assume that firm 1 decides to invest in a technology that reduces its marginal costs. a) What will happen to the two firms market shares? You must explain how you find the answer. b) What will happen to total production and the price of the product? Again, explain your answer.
- Consider a market of 6 firms that compete through production. Demand is given as P = 220 – 2Q. Each firm has a marginal cost of $20. a. What will be the equilibrium firm quantities, market price, and firm profits? b. Suppose two firms merge in this market to become a leader. What will be the new equilibrium firm quantities, market price, and firm profits? Was it profitable for the firms to merge into a leader? Note that n = 5 after the merger. c. Suppose another two firms merge to form a second leader in the market. What will be the new equilibrium firm quantities, market price, and firm profits? Was it profitable for the followers to merge into a co-leader? Note that n = 4 and L = 2 after the merger:(Cournot competition with different marginal costs) Our best estimate for total marketdemand in a given market is P 1000-2Q. Two firms (1 and 2) are competing in this market in quantities, choosing Q1 and Q2 simultaneously. Firm 1 has marginalcost equal to c1 = 100 and Firm 2 produces at marginal cost c2 = 200. (a) Write down the profits of both firms and and their best response functions. (b) Find the Cournot - Nash equilibrium in quantities, and calculate equilibrium profits for both firms. (c) Suppose that each firm has the option, at a previous stage, to invest in an R&D project that will reduce its marginal cost of production by 50% if successful. What is the value of this innovation to each firm? Given that R&D costs and successprobabilities are equal, which one has greater incentives to invest in R&D ? You can think in terms of per - period profits to set aside timing issues.[The soft drink industry is dominated by two cola firms- DEW and HEW. The market is worth $8 billion. Each firm can decide whether to advertise or not, but advertising costs $2 billion to any firm undertaking it. Moreover, advertising will create only negligible new demand as the market is already saturated. So, for the purpose of this question, assume that the market remains at $8 billion regardless of advertising. If one firm advertises and the other does not, then the former captures the whole market. If both firms advertise, then DEW captures 60% of the market and HEW captures 40% of the market, but the advertising must be paid for. If neither firm advertises, then the market is again split 60:40, with 60% going to DEW and 40% to HEW.] [Draw the payoff matrix for this game where each player’s payoff is equal to the value of market it captures less the cost of advertisement. [Do any of the firms have dominant strategies? If so, what are they? Is there a dominant strategy…
- [The soft drink industry is dominated by two cola firms- DEW and HEW. The market is worth $8 billion. Each firm can decide whether to advertise or not, but advertising costs $2 billion to any firm undertaking it. Moreover, advertising will create only negligible new demand as the market is already saturated. So, for the purpose of this question, assume that the market remains at $8 billion regardless of advertising. If one firm advertises and the other does not, then the former captures the whole market. If both firms advertise, then DEW captures 60% of the market and HEW captures 40% of the market, but the advertising must be paid for. If neither firm advertises, then the market is again split 60:40, with 60% going to DEW and 40% to HEW.] Draw the payoff matrix for this game where each player’s payoff is equal to the value of market it captures less the cost of advertisement. (please explain how you calculate the payoff matrix)The total cost for a product-testing firm is C(q)=70 + 20q2 q= number of products tested Price of a product = average cost Each corporation purchases one product test per year from a product-testing firm in the same city. All other inputs are ubiquitous. Suppose five corporations are initially distributed uniformly, with one corporation in each city (A,B,C,D,E). Is the initial distribution a Nash Equilibrium? Demonstrate it is not by finding how much one corporation would pay if they deviate and move to another city? What is the average price of having two tests conducted? (Which is the price that the corporation would pay if they "live" in a city where two tests are conducted) The average price of moving and thus, having two tests is: $_____Economics - Game Theory & Business Strategy Inverse Market Demand for tires is P = 200 - .01Q We assume the manufacturer sets a Price, 'X', for the tires and the manufacrturer moves first, selecting 'X' before any sales decisions are made. In this variation, we assume there are 3 retail firms, each with Market Power. The firms (1,2,3) make their sales decisions (q1,q2,q3) simultaneously, taking the manufacturer's price X as given. Total market sales, Q, then equal q1 + q2 + q3. We assume the only cost for the retailers is the cost 'X' for each tire. Additionally, the manufacturer produces the tires at a Marginal Cost of $10 a tire. **** Write out the Extensive form of this game ****
- Suppose two Bertrand competitors, F1 and F2, make identical products for a market with inverse demand P = 600 – 0.5Q. Both firms have the same costs Ci = 20qi, and each firm has sufficient capacity to supply the entire market. a. What prices will the firms choose? How much might each produce and what profit would they make? Is the result a Nash equilibrium? Explain. b. Suppose F1 improves its efficiency, reducing its cost to C1 = 16q1. What will happen in this market? Explain. c. Assume now that the firms have their original identical costs, but that F1 has only 100 units of capacity and F2 has only 200 units of capacity. What prices will the firms choose now? Explain why neither firm will want to decrease its price at the equilibrium you identify. Why would neither firm want to increase its price? Prove this for F1.Problem II. Suppose a small town has only two firms (firm1 and firm 2) selling the same product. Each firm can either set a high price (H) or a low price (L) for its product. The payoff matrix below displays the profits per day given the combination of prices for both firms. The first entry shows firm1’s profits while the second entry shows the second firm’s profits. The information displayed in the playoff matrix are known by both firms. Firm 2 High price Low Price Firm 1 High price $210; $220 $80; $260 Low Price $240; $160 $150; $140 Does each firm have a dominant strategy to set a high price, a dominant strategy to set a low price, or does it have no dominant strategy? In other words, find the dominant strategy of each firm, if it exists. Explain your answer. Assuming that the two firms do not cooperate to set prices, what will be the profits of each firm? The local authorities of the…Poker players are known to bluff once in a while, meaning that they will make a large bet despite holding inferior cards in an effort to pressure other players to fold their hands. Would bluffing be considered a dominant strategy in poker? a) No, because if a player bluffs on every hand, other players will catch on and call his or her bluff. b) No, because bluffing is usually not successful and is therefore considered a secondary strategy. c) Yes, because it usually results in a winning hand. d) Yes, because it is the main strategy used by players.