You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $4,500. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $500 and $9,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is: a. 2 bidders. Bid: $ b. 10 bidders. Bid: $ c. 100 bidders. Bid: $
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You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $4,500. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $500 and $9,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is:
a. 2 bidders.
Bid: $
b. 10 bidders.
Bid: $
c. 100 bidders.
Bid: $
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- You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $4,500. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $1,000 and $10,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is: a. 2 bidders.Bid: $ b. 10 bidders.Bid: $ c. 100 bidders.Bid: $You are a bidder in an independent private values auction, and you value the object at $4,000. Each bidder perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $1,500 and $9,000. Determine your optimal bidding strategy in a first-price, sealed-bid auction when the total number of bidders (including you) is: a. 2. b. 10. c. 100You are one of five risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives that all other bidders’ valuations for the item are evenly distributed between $10,000 and $30,000. For each of the following auction types, determine your optimal bidding strategy if you value the item at $22,000. a. First-price, sealed-bid auction. b. Dutch auction. c. Second-price, sealed-bid auction. d. English auction.
- Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction, and suppose there are only three feasible bids: A bidder can bid 1, 2, or 3. The payoff to a losing bidder is zero. The payoff to a winning bidder equals his valuation minus the price paid (which, by the rules of the auction, is his bid). What is private information to a bidder is how much the item is worth to him; hence, a bidder’s type is his valuation. Assume that there are only two valuations, which we’ll denote L and H, where H > 3 > L > 2. Assume also that each bidder has probability .75 of having a high valuation, H. The Bayesian game is then structured as follows: First, Nature chooses the two bidders’ valuations. Second, each bidder learns his valuation, but does not learn the valuation of the other bidder. Third, the two bidders simultaneously submit bids. A strategy for a bidder is a pair of actions: what to bid when he has a high valuation and what to bid when he has a low valuation. a. Derive the conditions on H and L…For each of the following scenarios, determine whether the decision maker is risk neutral, risk averse, or risk loving. a. A manager prefers a 20 percent chance of receiving $1,400 and an 80 percent chance of receiving $500 to receiving $680 for sure. b. A shareholder prefers receiving $920 with certainty to an 80 percent chance of receiving $1,100 and a 20 percent chance of receiving $200. c. A consumer is indifferent between receiving $1,360 for sure and a lottery that pays $2,000 with a 60 percent probability and $400 with a 40 percent probability.How to solve this question? Consider an antique auction where bidders have independent private values. There are two bidders, each of whom perceives that valuations are uniformly distributed between $100 and $1,000. One of the bidders is Sue, who knows her own valuation is $200. What is Sue's optimal bidding strategy in a Dutch auction?
- Q2.1 In the second round with two buyers remaining, the probability that a buyer with valuation v wins is vN-1, where N is the number of buyers in the first round. Use the revenue equivalence theorem to derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding function b(v) for the buyers in stage two. Show your work. Q2.2 At the end of the auction what is the value of the actual (not expected) revenue that the seller receives? Round your answer to at least three decimal spaces.Consider two bidders – Alice and Bob who are bidding for a second-hand car. Each of them knows the private value she/he assigns to the car, but does not know the exact value of others. It is common knowledge that the value of other bidders is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and $10000. Assume that Alice values the car at $8500 and Bob values the car at $4500. a) If Alice and Bob participated in the second-price sealed bid auction, what would they bid and what would be the result of the auction? Explain your answer. b) If they participate instead in a first-price sealed bid auction, what would they bid and what would be the result of the auction? Explain your answer. c) Calculate and compare the revenue of the seller in the above situations. Which type of auction should the seller use? Explain your answerFor each of the following scenarios, determine whether the decision maker is risk neutral, risk averse, or risk loving.a) A manager prefers a 10 percent chance of receiving $1,000 and a 90 percent chance of receiving $100 to receiving $190 for sure.b) A shareholder prefers receiving $775 with certainty to a 75 percent chance of receiving $1,000 and a 25 percent chance of receiving $100.c) A consumer is indifferent between receiving $550 for sure and a lottery that pays $1,000 half of the time and $100 half of the time.
- The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has hired you as a consultant to design an auction to sell wireless spectrum rights. The FCC indicates that its goal of using auctions to sell these spectrum rights is to generate revenue. Since most bidders are large telecommunications companies, you rationally surmise that all participants in the auction are risk neutral. Which auction type—first-price, second-price, English, or Dutch—would you recommend if all bidders value spectrum rights identically but have different estimates of the true underlying value of spectrum rights?The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has hired you as a consultant to design an auction to sell wireless spectrum rights. The FCC indicates that its goal of using auctions to sell these spectrum rights is to generate revenue. Since most bidders are large telecommunications companies, you rationally surmise that all participants in the auction are risk neutral. Which auction type—first-price, second-price, English, or Dutch—would you recommend if all bidders value spectrum rights identically but have different estimates of the true underlying value of spectrum rights? Kindly give a brief one-page description as part of the assignment.The preferences of agents A and B are representable by expected utility functions such that uA(x) = 5x^1/3 +30, and uB(x)= 1/5x - 20. Then, the following allocation of the expected returns of a risky joint investment of A and B as represented by lottery L = ((2/3);1500), (1/3);120)) is Pareto efficient: (a) xA = (500,100), xB = (1000,20) (b) xA = (100,100), xB= (1300,20) (c) xA= (80,80), xB = (1420,40) (d) xA = (750,60), xB= (750,60) (e) NOPAC