intry A has only öne submarien whith which it can target one (and only one) of three shipping convoys of country B. Country B has no Navy, but has a single helicopter armed whith anti-submarine missile that can be assigned to one of the convoys. The value of convoy, if the convoy is not defended by the anti-submarine helicopter and the submarine of country A attacks it. Countries A wants to maximize the expected value of damage to Country B and country B wants to minimize it. In particular, if the submarine targets convoy i, the payoffs of countries A and B are v, and -v; respectively in case the helicopter is assigned some other convoy j. If ihe submarine targets the convoy to which the helicopter isassigned, each country gets zero payoff. Formula the situation as a simultaneous may be strategic game and show that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria. You need to Navy

intry A has only öne submarien whith which it can target one (and only one) of three shipping convoys of country B. Country B has no Navy, but has a single helicopter armed whith anti-submarine missile that can be assigned to one of the convoys. The value of convoy, if the convoy is not defended by the anti-submarine helicopter and the submarine of country A attacks it. Countries A wants to maximize the expected value of damage to Country B and country B wants to minimize it. In particular, if the submarine targets convoy i, the payoffs of countries A and B are v, and -v; respectively in case the helicopter is assigned some other convoy j. If ihe submarine targets the convoy to which the helicopter isassigned, each country gets zero payoff. Formula the situation as a simultaneous may be strategic game and show that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria. You need to Navy

Principles of Macroeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971509

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter3: Interdependence And The Gains Rrom Trade

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 9PA

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Similar questions

Are the following statemen ts true or false? Explain ineach case.a. ''1Wo countries can achieve gains from trade evenif one of the countries has an absolute advantagein the production of all goods."b. "Certain talented people have a comparativeadvantage in everything they do."c. ''U a certain trade is good for one person, it can'tbe good for the other one.''d. ''U a certain trade is good for one person, it isa lways good for the other o ne.''c . "U trade is good for a country, it must be goodfor everyone in the country.''
Suppose that in a year an American worker canproduce 100 shirts or 20 computers and a Chineseworker can produce 100 shirts or 10 computers.a. For each country, graph the productionpossibilities frontier. Suppose that without tradethe workers in each country spend half their timeproducing each good. Identify this point in yourgraphs.b. If these countries were open to trade, whichcountry would export shirts? Give a specificnumerical example and show it on your graphs.Which country would benefit from trade?Explain.c. Explain at what price of computers (in terms ofshirts) the two countries might trade.d. Suppose that China catches up with Americanproductivity so that a Chinese worker canproduce 100 shirts or 20 computers in a year. Whatpattern of trade would you predict now? Howdoes this advance in Chinese productivity affectthe economic well-being of the two countries’citizens?
Why isn’t trade between two countries like a game inwhich one country wins and the other loses?
Givenw: (1) two nations (1 and 2) which have the sametechnology but different factor endowments and tastes, (2)two commodities (X and Y) produced under increasingcosts conditions and (3) no transportation costs, tariffs orother obstructions to trade.Prove geometrically that mutually advantageous tradebetween the two nations is possible.Note: Your answer should show the autarky (no-trade) andfree-trade points of production and consumption for eachnation, show gains from trade of each nation and expressthe equilibrium condition that should prevail when trade Stop equilibrum
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Why do low-income countries like Brazil, Egypt, or Vietnam have lower environmental standards than high-income countries like the Germany, Japan, or the United States?
How can governments identify good candidates for infant industry protection? Can you suggest some key characteristics of good candidates? Why are Industries like computers not good candidates for infant industry protection?
In Japan, one worker can make 5 tons of rubber or 80 radios. In Malaysia, one worker can make 10 tons of rubber or 40 radios. Who has the absolute advantage in the production of rubber or radios? How can you tell? Calculate the opportunity cost of producing 80 additional radios in Japan and in Malaysia. (Your calculation may involve fractions, which is fine,) Which country has a comparative advantage in the production of radios? Calculate the opportunity cost of producing 10 additional tons of rubber in Japan and in Malaysia. Which country has a comparative advantage in producing rubber? In this example, does each country have an absolute advantage and a comparative advantage in the same good? In what product should Japan specialize? In what product should Malaysia specialize?
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia: Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…
In 1938, major powers met in Munich to discuss Germany’s demands to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Let us think of the issue as the proportion of Czechoslovak territory given to Germany. Possible outcomes can be plotted on a single dimension, where 0 implies that Germany obtains no territory and 1 implies that Germany obtains all of Czechoslovakia Most countries at Munich (“Allies” for short) wish to give nothing to Germany: their ideal point is 0, which gives them utility of 1. Their worst possible outcome is for Germany to take all of Czechoslovakia; hence an outcome of 1 gives them utility of 0. In between these extremes, the Allies could propose a compromise, X, which gives them utility of 1 – X. The question for the Allies is whether to propose a compromise or fight a war with Germany, which they are sure will ensue if they offer nothing. If they propose a compromise and Germany accepts, they get a payoff of 1 – X. If they fight, they win with probability p and lose with…