Pharmaceutical Benefits Managers (PBMs) are intermediaries between upstream drug manufacturers and downstream insurance companies. They design formularies (lists of drugs that insurance will cover) and negotiate prices with drug companies. PBMs want a wider variety of drugs available te their insured populations, but at low prices. Suppose that a PBM is negotiating with the makers of two nondrowsy allergy drugs, Claritin and Allegra, for inclusion on the formulary. The "value" or "surplus" created by including one nondrowsy allergy drug on the formulary is $228 million, but the value of adding a second drug is only $68 million. Assume the PBM bargains by telling each drug company that it's going to reach an agreement with the other drug company. Under the non-strategic view of bargaining, the PBM would earn a surplus of of s million, while each drug company would m million. Now sunnos

Pharmaceutical Benefits Managers (PBMs) are intermediaries between upstream drug manufacturers and downstream insurance companies. They design formularies (lists of drugs that insurance will cover) and negotiate prices with drug companies. PBMs want a wider variety of drugs available te their insured populations, but at low prices. Suppose that a PBM is negotiating with the makers of two nondrowsy allergy drugs, Claritin and Allegra, for inclusion on the formulary. The "value" or "surplus" created by including one nondrowsy allergy drug on the formulary is $228 million, but the value of adding a second drug is only $68 million. Assume the PBM bargains by telling each drug company that it's going to reach an agreement with the other drug company. Under the non-strategic view of bargaining, the PBM would earn a surplus of of s million, while each drug company would m million. Now sunnos

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.6IP

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Multiple Choice Adverse selection describes a situation where an individual's demand for insurance is positively correlated with the individual's risk of loss. Adverse selection occurs when someone increases their exposure to risk when insured. This can happen, for example, when a person takes more risks because someone else bears the cost of those risks. The relationship between smoking status and mortality provides a good illustration for adverse selection, especially in the case in which a life insurance company did not vary its premiums according to smoking status of its customers. To counter the effects of adverse selection, insurers may offer premiums that are proportional to a customer's risk.
When a famous painting becomes available for sale, it is often known which museum or collector will be the likely winner. Yet, the auctioneer actively woos representatives of other museums that have no chance of winning to attend anyway. Suppose a piece of art has recently become available for sale and will be auctioned off to the highest bidder, with the winner paying an amount equal to the second highest bid. Assume that most collectors know that Valerie places a value of $15,000 on the art piece and that she values this art piece more than any other collector. Suppose that if no one else shows up, Valerie simply bids $15,000/2=$7,500 and wins the piece of art. The expected price paid by Valerie, with no other bidders present, is $________.. Suppose the owner of the artwork manages to recruit another bidder, Antonio, to the auction. Antonio is known to value the art piece at $12,000. The expected price paid by Valerie, given the presence of the second bidder Antonio, is $_______. .
Q56 A Nash equilibrium is an outcome... a. Achieved by cooperation between players in the game. b. That is achieved by collusion where no party has an incentive to change their behaviour. c. Where each player's strategy depends on the behaviour of its opponents. d. That is achieved when players in the game have jointly maximized profits and divided those profits according to market share of each player. e. Where each player's best strategy is to maintain its present behaviour given the present behaviour of the other players.
The FCC has hired you as a consultant to design an auction to sell wireless spectrum rights. The FCC indicates that its goal of using auctions to sell these spectrum rights is to generate revenue. Since most bidders are large telecommunications companies, you rationally surmise that all participants in the auction are risk neutral. Which auction type—first-price, second-price, English, or Dutch—would you recommend if all bidders value spectrum rights identically but have different estimates of the true underlying value of spectrum rights? Explain
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has hired you as a consultant to design an auction to sell wireless spectrum rights. The FCC indicates that its goal of using auctions to sell these spectrum rights is to generate revenue. Since most bidders are large telecommunications companies, you rationally surmise that all participants in the auction are risk neutral. Which auction type—first-price, second-price, English, or Dutch—would you recommend if all bidders value spectrum rights identically but have different estimates of the true underlying value of spectrum rights?
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has hired you as a consultant to design an auction to sell wireless spectrum rights. The FCC indicates that its goal of using auctions to sell these spectrum rights is to generate revenue. Since most bidders are large telecommunications companies, you rationally surmise that all participants in the auction are risk neutral. Which auction type—first-price, second-price, English, or Dutch—would you recommend if all bidders value spectrum rights identically but have different estimates of the true underlying value of spectrum rights? Kindly give a brief one-page description as part of the assignment.
In Salop’s model of entry deterrence, the unconstrained monopoly earns profits (in present value terms) equal to some amount v0. Suppose v0 = 100. If entry were to occur, the two firms would share the market, each earning v1.(A) Why do we expect 2 v1 to be less than 100 ? (B) The incumbent monopoly can prevent entry by expending a fixed and irreversible amount C that the entrant must match. What conditions on the size of C will both successfully prevent entry, and equally importantly, result in greater profit for the incumbent than by allowing entry?
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Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport (YNG) has had a difficult time securing passenger service from a commercial airline. a.) A few years ago, the Port Authority offered an incentive to United with guaranteed revenue equal to approximately $1.5 million, but United declined saying it was not sufficient. Suppose United anticipated that it would cost $1 million to offer flights from Youngstown, so with a guaranteed revenue of $1.5 million, their anticipated profit would equal $500,000. Given that they still chose to decline offering service from YNG, what do you know must be true? Put this in terms of implicit costs and economic profit. b.) In 2019, YNG’s only commercial carrier, Allegiant Air stopped offering service from YNG, despite the fact that it was known to be profitable. Allegiant Air’s service from YNG was known to be profitable. Why would Allegiant Air pull service from YNG even if it had been their service from YNG had been generating a profit? Note, Allegiant started…
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Equity Group has launched a private sector focused stimulus package to accelerate economic recovery and resilience in the Eastern and Central Africa region as it recovers from the devastating health, social, humanitarian, and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Equity’s Eastern and Central Africa Recovery and Resilience plan is envisaged to provide financing of up-to 2% of the combined GDP of the six economies, in which the Group operates, to the private sector in the form of blended financing of short-term overdrafts, medium term loans and credit facilities which require long-term project and development financing. While launching the Recovery and Resilience Plan Dr. James Mwangi, Equity Group Managing Director and CEO said, “A total of Kshs 678 billion (USD 6 billion) will be available to 5 million MSMEs and 25 million individual borrowers for the next 5 years. The plan conceives that the 5 million businesses largely comprising MSMEs will create 50 million jobs, 25 million…
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