Player Rhas a $2, a $5, and a $10 bill. Player Chas a $1, a $5, and a $10 bill. Each player selects andshows (simultaneously) one of his or her three bills. If the total value of the two bills shown is even,Rwins Cs bill; if the value is odd, Cwins Rs bill. (Which player would you rather be?)(A) Set up the payoff matrix for the game.(B) Solve the game using the simplex method discussed in this section. (Remove any recessive rowsand columns, if present, before you start the simplex method.)

A payout matrix in the game theory is a table in which one player's strategies are written in rows…

Answered: Player Rhas a $2, a $5, and a $10 bill.…

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter18: Auctions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.1IP

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Given the both answer..
. Ayça and Barış are playing a game and following payoff matrix is for the payoffs of Ayça. Answer the questions according to the following payoff matrix. a) What is the probability that the value of the game is 10?
Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?
onsider the game described by the ff table. what is thE best response for the column player if he/she knows that the row player will make the Y move?
Mohamed and Kate each pick an integer number between 1 and 3 (inclusive). They make their choices sequentially.Mohamed is the first player and Kate the second player. If they pick the same number each receives a payoff equal to the number they named. If they pick a different number, they get nothing. What is the SPE of the game? a. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate is indifferent between 1, 2 and 3. b. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2, and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. c. Mohamed chooses 1 and Kate chooses 1 if Mohamed chooses 1, 2 if Mohamed chooses 2 and 3 if Mohamed chooses 3. d. Mohamed chooses 3 and Kate chooses 3.
2. Kier, in The scenario, wants to determine how each of the 3 companies will decide on possible new investments. He was able to determine the new investment pay off for each of the three choices as well as the probability of the two types of market. If a company will launch product 1, it will gain 50,000 if the market is successful and lose 50,000 if the market is a failure. If a company will launch product 2, it will gain 25,000 if the market is successful and lose 25,000 if the market will fail. If a company decides not to launch any of the product, it will not be affected whether the market will succeed or fail. There is a 56% probability that the market will succeed and 44% probability that the market will fail. What will be the companies decision based on EMV? What is the decision of each company based on expected utility value?
ONLY SOLVE D An investor with a total wealth of $100 is faced with the following opportunities. First, he may invest $100 now and receive $144 if there are good times, but receive $64 if there are bad times. The investor estimates that good times happen with 50% probability.He can also buy an investor newsletter whether good times or bad times will occur. (a) Draw the decision tree that illustrates the options available to the investor and the payoffs to the different options. Define P as the price of the newsletter. (b) If the investor is risk-neutral with U(M) = M, where M is income, how much would he be willing to pay for the subscription to the newsletter? (c) If the investor is risk-averse with utility U(M) = M0.5, where M is income, how much would this investor be willing to pay for the subscription to the newsletter? (d) Suppose that the owner of the newsletter estimates that there are 75 risk-averse investors like those of part (c) and 25 investors like those of part(b). If…
Determine the optimum strategies and the value of the game with the followingpayoff matrix of player A where A1, A2 are the strategies for player A and B1, B2 are for player B.B1 B2A1 5 1A2 3 4
(a) Find all subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies (if any).(b) Find all SPE where at least one of the players uses a mixed strategy (if any)
First Fiddler's Bank has foreclosed on a home mortgage and is selling the house at auction. There are three bidders for the house, Ernie, Teresa, and Marilyn. First Fiddler's does not know the willingness to pay of these three bidders for the house, but on the basis of its previous experience, the bank believes that each of these bidders has a probability of 1/3 of valuing it at $600,000, a probability of 1/3 of valuing at $500,000, and a probability of 1/3 of valuing it at $200,000. First Fiddler's believes that these probabilities are in de pendent among buyers. If First Fiddler's sells the house by means of a second- bidder, sealed- bid auction (Vickrey auction), what will be the bank's expected revenue from the sale? (Choose the closest option.) The closest option is 448, 148. Please explain in details thank you.
Choose the correct answer. A strategy AA is "dominant" for a player X if: A. Every outcome under strategy AA generates positive payoffs. B. Irrespective of any of the possible strategies chosen by the other players, strategy AA generates a higher payoff than any other strategy available to player X. C. Strategy AA is the best response to every strategy of the other player. D. Strategy AA contains among its outcomes the highest possible payoff in the game. E. Strategy AA is the best response to the best strategy of the other player.
w= 7 To which strategy t2 is the strategy t1 = 4 a best response? (If your answer is afraction, report it in lowest terms.)

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