The evidence is overwhelming that obesity generates demand for more joint replacements. O .A) This is an ex-post moral hazard problem, user fees will solve the problem. O. B) This is an ex-ante moral hazard problem, incentives for obesity reduction, such as subsidies for exercise, may alleviate the problem. O. C) This is cherry-picking by orthopaedic surgeons. O. D) Since this is adverse selection, the total cost of a public insurance system will not be affected. OE) This is an ex-post moral hazard problem, co-insurance will solve the problem.

The evidence is overwhelming that obesity generates demand for more joint replacements. O .A) This is an ex-post moral hazard problem, user fees will solve the problem. O. B) This is an ex-ante moral hazard problem, incentives for obesity reduction, such as subsidies for exercise, may alleviate the problem. O. C) This is cherry-picking by orthopaedic surgeons. O. D) Since this is adverse selection, the total cost of a public insurance system will not be affected. OE) This is an ex-post moral hazard problem, co-insurance will solve the problem.

Exploring Economics

8th Edition

ISBN:9781544336329

Author:Robert L. Sexton

Publisher:Robert L. Sexton

Chapter8: Market Failure

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10P

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