The following are the demand and supply functions for three competing mobile phone models of different manufacturers. qa1 = 46 – 10p1 + 2p2 + 2p3 9.1 3 12р, — 16 Яаг 3 30 + 2p1 — 6р2 + 4рз Is2 = 6p2 – 22 q43 = 38 + 2p1 + 4p2 – 8p3 Is3 = 6p3 – 10 Using Gaussian Elimination Method determine whether there are prices which would bring the supply and demand levels into equilibrium for each of the three mobile phone models. If so, what are the equilibrium demand and supply quantities? You may get the three equations of market equilibrium condition by equating qa1 with qs1, q42 with q,2 and q43with q,3.

The following are the demand and supply functions for three competing mobile phone models of different manufacturers. qa1 = 46 – 10p1 + 2p2 + 2p3 9.1 3 12р, — 16 Яаг 3 30 + 2p1 — 6р2 + 4рз Is2 = 6p2 – 22 q43 = 38 + 2p1 + 4p2 – 8p3 Is3 = 6p3 – 10 Using Gaussian Elimination Method determine whether there are prices which would bring the supply and demand levels into equilibrium for each of the three mobile phone models. If so, what are the equilibrium demand and supply quantities? You may get the three equations of market equilibrium condition by equating qa1 with qs1, q42 with q,2 and q43with q,3.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.9P

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