You are one of five risk-neutral bidders participating in an independent private values auction. Each bidder perceives bidders' valuations for the item are evenly distributed between $20,000 and $50,000. For each of the following auct determine your optimal bidding strategy if you value the item at $35,000. a. First -price, sealed-bid auction. O Bid $20,000. O Bid $50,000. O Bid $35,000. O Bid $32,000.
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- Consider a first-price, sealed-bid auction, and suppose there are only three feasible bids: A bidder can bid 1, 2, or 3. The payoff to a losing bidder is zero. The payoff to a winning bidder equals his valuation minus the price paid (which, by the rules of the auction, is his bid). What is private information to a bidder is how much the item is worth to him; hence, a bidder’s type is his valuation. Assume that there are only two valuations, which we’ll denote L and H, where H > 3 > L > 2. Assume also that each bidder has probability .75 of having a high valuation, H. The Bayesian game is then structured as follows: First, Nature chooses the two bidders’ valuations. Second, each bidder learns his valuation, but does not learn the valuation of the other bidder. Third, the two bidders simultaneously submit bids. A strategy for a bidder is a pair of actions: what to bid when he has a high valuation and what to bid when he has a low valuation. a. Derive the conditions on H and L…A famous local baker has approached you with a problem. She is only able to make one wedding cake each day and 5 people have requested a wedding cake on the same day. Rather than pick randomly which person she will sell the cake to, she decides to have an auction. Is this auction more representative of a private value or common value auction? Why? Which auction method(s) do you recommend the baker choose to maximize the amount of money she can make, and why?Two bidders compete in a second price auction (i.e., the winning bidder pays the losing bidder’s bid, and the losing bidder does not pay anything). They submit sealed bids, and the one with the highest bid wins the contract and pays the other bidder’s bid. Each bidder i’s private valuation is vi and is distributed independently and uniformly between 0 and 50. 1. For any given bidder, prove that he has a dominant strategy bid and show what it is. 2. Assuming each bidder bids his dominant strategy noted above, if a bidder with vi = 40 wins, what price does he expect to pay?
- Suppose your firm is in need of cash and plans to auction off a subsidiary to the highest bidder. Which type of auction will maximize your firm’s revenues from the sale if (1) The bidders are risk neutral and have independent private valuations? (2) The bidders are risk neutral and have affiliated value estimates?We’ll now show how a college degree can get you a better job even if itdoesn’t make you a better worker. Consider a two-player game between aprospective employee, whom we’ll refer to as the applicant, and an employer. The applicant’s type is her intellect, which may be low, moderate,or high, with probability 1/3 , 1/2 , and 1/6 , respectively. After the applicantlearns her type, she decides whether or not to go to college. The personalcost in gaining a college degree is higher when the applicant is less intelligent, because a less smart student has to work harder if she is to graduate. Assume that the cost of gaining a college degree is 2, 4, and 6 for an applicant who is of high, moderate, and low intelligence, respectively.The employer decides whether to offer the applicant a job as a manageror as a clerk. The applicant’s payoff to being hired as a manager is 15,while the payoff to being a clerk is 10. These payoffs are independent ofthe applicant’s type. The employer’s payoff from…A4 The Suboptimality of Lower-Than-Cost Reserve Prices: A seller chooses to sell an object by means of a Vickrey auction. If trade occurs, the seller incurs a positive opportunity cost (i.e. c > 0). There are n > 1 bidders participating in the auction. Suppose that the all of the bidders play according to a symmetric and increasing BNE strategy. Show that the seller is always better off by setting the reserve price equal to her cost (i.e. r = c) than by setting the reserve price below her cost (i.e. r < c).
- Suppose two bidders compete for a single indivisible item (e.g., a used car, a piece of art, etc.). We assume that bidder 1 values the item at $v1, and bidder 2 values the item at $v2. We assume that v1 > v2. In this problem we study a second price auction, which proceeds as follows. Each player i = 1, 2 simultaneously chooses a bid bi ≥ 0. The higher of the two bidders wins, and pays the second highest bid (in this case, the other player’s bid). In case of a tie, suppose the item goes to bidder 1. If a bidder does not win, their payoff is zero; if the bidder wins, their payoff is their value minus the second highest bid. a) Now suppose that player 1 bids b1 = v2 and player 2 bids b2 = v1, i.e., they both bid the value of the other player. (Note that in this case, player 2 is bidding above their value!) Show that this is a pure NE of the second price auction. (Note that in this pure NE the player with the lower value wins, while in the weak dominant strategy equilibrium where both…Consider a medieval Italian merchant who is a risk averse expected utility maximiser. Their wealth will beequal to y if their ship returns safely from Asia loaded with the finest silk. If the ship sinks, their incomewill be y − L. The chance of a safe return is 50%. Now suppose that there are two identical merchants, A and B, who are both risk averse expected utilitymaximisers with utility of income given by u(y) = ln y. The income of each merchant will be 8 if theirown ship returns and 2 if it sinks. As previously, the probability of a safe return is 50% for each ship.However, with probability p ≤ 1/2 both ships will return safely. With the same probability p both willsink. Finally, with the remaining probability, only one ship will return safely.(iv) Compute the increase in the utility of each merchant that they could achieve from pooling theirincomes (as a function of p). How does the benefit of pooling depend on the probability p? Explainintuitively why this is the case.You and a rival are engaged in a game in which there are three possible outcomes: you win, your rival wins (you lose), or the two of you tie. You get a payoff of 50 if you win, a payoff of 20 if you tie, and a payoff of 0 if you lose. What is your expected payoff in each of the following situations? (a) There is a 50% chance that the game ends in a tie, but only a 10% chance that you win. (There is thus a 40% chance that you lose.) (b) There is a 50–50 chance that you win or lose. There are no ties. (c) There is an 80% chance that you lose, a 10% chance that you win, and a 10% chance that you tie.
- 5 Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction in which bidders valuations are independently and identically distributed according to the Uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Explain what the rules of the First Price Sealed bid auction are. Set it up as a Bayesian game. Compute a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the two bidder case.Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game:• Suppose that the Player 1 (row player) has a single type, Normal.• Player 2 (column player) has two types Normal and Simple.• A player of Normal type plays this zero-sum game as we studied in class whereas a player of type Simple always play P.• Player 2 knows whether he is Normal or Simple, but player 1does not.a) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 1/3 and of type Simple with probability (2/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.b) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 2/3 and of type Simple with probability (1/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.You are evaluating the possibility that your company bids $150,000 for a particular construction job. (a) If a bid of $150,000 corresponds to a relative bid of 1.20, what is the dollar profit that your company would make from winning the job with this bid? Show your work. (b) Calculate an estimate of the expected profit of the bid of $150,000 for this job. Assume that, historically, 55 percent of the bids of an average bidder for this type of job would exceed the bid ratio of 1.20. Assume also that you are bidding against three other construction companies. Show your work.