Economics (6th Edition)
6th Edition
ISBN: 9780134105840
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O'Brien
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 10, Problem 10.4.3RQ
To determine
Rules of thumb.
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What is the Nash equilibrium?
prove that the following strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium:For any 0 < x ≤1, player 1 offers x to player 2, player 2 accepts any offer greater than orequal to x and rejects any offer smaller than x.Is this strategy profile a subgame perfect equilibrium as well? Briefly explain why.
What is the distinctive characteristic of the Nash equilibrium?
Chapter 10 Solutions
Economics (6th Edition)
Ch. 10.A - Prob. 1RQCh. 10.A - Prob. 2RQCh. 10.A - Prob. 3RQCh. 10.A - Prob. 4PACh. 10.A - Prob. 5PACh. 10.A - Prob. 6PACh. 10.A - Prob. 7PACh. 10.A - Prob. 8PACh. 10.A - Prob. 9PACh. 10.A - Prob. 10PA
Ch. 10.A - Prob. 11PACh. 10.A - Prob. 12PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.1RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.2RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.3RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.4RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.5PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.6PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.7PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.8PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.9PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.10PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.11PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.1.12PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.1RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.2RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.3RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.4PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.5PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.6PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.7PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.8PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.9PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.10PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.2.11PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.1RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.2RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.3RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.4PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.5PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.6PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.7PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.8PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.3.9PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.1RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.2RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.3RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.4RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.5PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.6PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.7PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.8PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.9PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.10PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.11PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.12PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.13PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.14PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.15PACh. 10 - Prob. 10.4.16PA
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- How do you solve for the Nash equilibriumarrow_forwardA case study in the chapter describes a phoneconversation between the presidents of AmericanAirlines and Braniff Airways. Let’s analyze thegame between the two companies. Suppose thateach company can charge either a high price fortickets or a low price. If one company charges $300,it earns low profit if the other company also charges$300 and high profit if the other company charges$600. On the other hand, if the company charges $600,it earns very low profit if the other company charges$300 and medium profit if the other company alsocharges $600.a. Draw the payoff matrix for this game.b. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game?Explain.c. Is there an outcome that would be better than theNash equilibrium for both airlines? How could itbe achieved? Who would lose if it were achieved?arrow_forwardYour store sells an item desired by a consumer. The consumer is using an optimal search strategy; the accompanying graph shows the consumer’s expected benefits and costs of searching for a lower price. a. What is the consumer’s reservation price? b. If your price is $3 and the consumer visits your store, will she purchase the item or continue to search? Explain. c. Suppose the consumer’s cost of each search rises to $16. What is the highest price you can charge and still sell the item to the consumer if she visits your store? d. Suppose the consumer’s cost of each search falls to $2. If the consumer finds a store charging $3, will she purchase at that price or continue to search?arrow_forward
- How would you solve for the Nash equilibrium total output, and total market profit? (see image))arrow_forwardwhat is the Nash equilibrium to this problem? is the equilibrium efficient?arrow_forwardBriefly explain each of the following types of pricing strategy, and give an example of a good or service that is sold using that pricing strategy. bundling loss leadingarrow_forward
- Briefly explain the differences between the equilibrium concepts we discussed in game theory. What do we need to assume about people’s decision making to find equilibria?arrow_forwardDefine the Nash Equilibrium. Give examples.arrow_forwardYou work for a marketing firm that has just landed a contract with Run-of-the-Mills to help them promote three of their products: splishy splashers, raskels, and kipples. All of these products have been on the market for some time, but, to entice better sales, Run-of-the-Mills wants to try a new advertisement that will market two of the products that consumers will likely consume together. As a former economics student, you know that complements are typically consumed together while substitutes can take the place of other goods. Run-of-the-Mills provides your marketing firm with the following data: When the price of splishy splashers decreases by 8%, the quantity of raskels sold increases by 6% and the quantity of kipples sold decreases by 8%. Your job is to use the cross-price elasticity between splishy splashers and the other goods to determine which goods your marketing firm should advertise together. Complete the first column of the following table by computing the cross-price…arrow_forward
- Give me a basic explanation/description of game theory.arrow_forwardThe chicken game has often been used to model crises. Recall that in this game, the two players drive straight at each other. They can choose to swerve or keep going straight. If one swerves, and the other goes straight, assume that the one that swerves gets -10 utility and the one that goes straight gets 10 utility, since the one that swerves is deemed the loser. If both swerve, both get 0 utility. If both go straight, they crash and get -50 utility. Assume both players have a discount rate of 0.9 Draw the stage game of date night List all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the single stage game Consider an infinite horizon version of Chicken. Can you get an SPNE in which the both players swerve using a grim trigger type strategy? Consider the following strategies: both players swerve, as long as neither ever went straight. If one player ever plays straight, in all subsequent rounds the player that swerved goes straight and the player that went straight swerves. Can you think…arrow_forwardWhat is predatory pricing?arrow_forward
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