LABOR ECONOMICS LL W/ ACCESS >IC<
7th Edition
ISBN: 9781260144772
Author: BORJAS
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Question
Chapter 10, Problem 15P
(a)
To determine
Explain the number of played games.
(b)
To determine
Explain the expanding size of the team rosters.
(c)
To determine
Explain the team salary cap.
(c)
To determine
Explain the rookie salary cap.
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Every year, management and labor renegotiate a new employment contract by sending their proposals to an arbitrator who chooses the best proposal (effectively giving one side or the other $1 million). Each side can choose to hire, or not hire, an expensive labor lawyer (at a cost of Employer Low Salary Offer High Salary Offer Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employer gets 100 Employee gets 75 Employee Walks Employer gets 0 Employee gets 0 Employee Accepts Employee gets 100 Employer gets 75 $200,000) who is effective at preparing the proposal in the best light. If neither hires lawyers or if both hire lawyers, each side can expect to win about half the time. If only one side hires a lawyer, it can expect to win three-quarters of the time. 1. Diagram this simultaneous-move game. 2. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game? 3. Would the sides want to ban lawyers?
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Chapter 10 Solutions
LABOR ECONOMICS LL W/ ACCESS >IC<
Ch. 10 - Prob. 1RQCh. 10 - Prob. 2RQCh. 10 - Prob. 3RQCh. 10 - Prob. 4RQCh. 10 - Prob. 5RQCh. 10 - Prob. 6RQCh. 10 - Prob. 7RQCh. 10 - Prob. 8RQCh. 10 - Prob. 9RQCh. 10 - Prob. 10RQ
Ch. 10 - Prob. 11RQCh. 10 - Prob. 1PCh. 10 - Prob. 2PCh. 10 - Prob. 3PCh. 10 - Prob. 4PCh. 10 - Prob. 5PCh. 10 - Prob. 6PCh. 10 - Prob. 7PCh. 10 - Prob. 8PCh. 10 - Prob. 9PCh. 10 - Prob. 10PCh. 10 - Prob. 11PCh. 10 - Prob. 12PCh. 10 - Prob. 13PCh. 10 - Major League Baseball players are not eligible for...Ch. 10 - Prob. 15P
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- The market for plumbers in Boston is currently in equilibrium. Labor supply is given by Ls = 3 x W and labor demand is given by Ld = 45 - W (where L = quantity of workers, Ls quantity of workers supplied, Ld = quantity of workers demanded, and W = wage). The plumbers have just unionized and have negotiated a wage of $25 for all plumbers in Boston. How many plumbers do you expect to be unemployed as the result of this change? Please round your answer to the nearest integer. %3D %3D %3Darrow_forwardConsider a third pricing scheme that the union in Solved Problem 12.2 might use. It sets a wage, , and lets the firms hire as many workers as they want (that is, the union does not set a minimum number of hours), but requires a lump-sum contribution to each worker’s retirement fund. What is such a pricing scheme called? Can the union achieve the same outcome as it would if it perfectly price discriminated? (Hint: It could set the wage where the supply curve hits the demand curve.) Does your answer depend on whether the union workers are identical? Solved Problem 12.2 Competitive firms are the customers of a union, which is the monopoly supplier of labor services. Show the union’s “producer surplus” if it perfectly price discriminates. Then suppose that the union makes the firms a take-it-or-leave-it offer: They must guarantee to hire a minimum of hours of work at a wage of , or they can hire no one. Show that by setting appropriately, the union can…arrow_forwardThe Aguiar et al. (2017) study concluded that a revolution in the video game market-better games at a lower price-dramatically increased the amount of time young men spend playing video games and shifted their labour supply curve. In 2015, young men played video games for 3.2 hours per week on average. From 2000 through 2015, average annual hours of work for men aged 21-30, excluding full time students, dropped by 10% . Suppose the labour demand function is L = 200-w, and the supply curve is L = 50 + w-2V, where L is the hours worked, w is the wage, and V is a measure of the quality of video games. By how much do the equilibrium hours and wage vary as V increases?arrow_forward
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- According to the Economics Policy Institute (Mishel and Wolfe, 2019) CEO pay has grown 940% since 1978 while the compensation of the average worker has only risen 12%. While you can easily find sources that provide statistics that conflict with these numbers, you would be hard pressed to find any credible source that refutes the idea that the rate of pay of CEO’s and other upper-level managers has not dramatically increased relative to an organization’s lower-level employees in just about any 10 or more year period over the past 60 years. In the world of Adam Smith, the “invisible hand” of the free market capitalistic model would address inequities/out of balances. Are the forces represented by the “invisible hand” working? Why or why not? Is there an ethical dimension to the discussion of upper-level manager compensation? Why or why not? How does (or does it?) levels of pay of upper management impact the rest of us commoners?arrow_forwarddarsh is tasked with projecting financial compensation policy strategies for new hires in his relatively successful medium sized distillery. Given that the labor market seems steady and stable, the most likely strategy darsh will utilizie for compensation policy is: market lead market match market lag pay mixarrow_forward
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