Myeconlab With Pearson Etext -- Access Card -- For Microeconomics
9th Edition
ISBN: 9780134143071
Author: PINDYCK, Robert, Rubinfeld, Daniel
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 11, Problem 15E
(a)
To determine
Optimal prices and profits when the goods are sold separately and as pure and mixed bundles.
(b)
To determine
Optimal pricing strategy for profit maximization with MC of $30.
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A firm faces two types of consumers. Consumer A has an inverse demand of P = 120-10 Q and consumer B has an inverse demand of P = 60-2Q. The firm has a constant marginal cost of $20.
Assume the firm does not know which type a given consumer is. She offers to sell the good at a price of 70$ per unit. However, if the customer buys 10 or more units, she will offer a quantity discount and charge only 40$ per unit (including the first 10).
Which consumer will use the price discount?
Question 7 options:
Neither costumer will purchase from this firm at all.
Customer A will choose the quantity discount and customer B will not choose the quantity discount.
Both consumers will chose the quantity discount.
Neither of the two consumers will opt for the quantity discount. Instead, both will purchase at the higher price of 70 and buy less than 10 units each.
Customer B will choose the quantity…
Chapter 11 Solutions
Myeconlab With Pearson Etext -- Access Card -- For Microeconomics
Ch. 11.A - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 1RQCh. 11 - Prob. 2RQCh. 11 - Prob. 3RQCh. 11 - Prob. 4RQCh. 11 - Prob. 5RQCh. 11 - Prob. 6RQCh. 11 - Prob. 7RQCh. 11 - Prob. 8RQCh. 11 - Prob. 9RQ
Ch. 11 - Prob. 10RQCh. 11 - Prob. 11RQCh. 11 - Prob. 12RQCh. 11 - Prob. 13RQCh. 11 - Prob. 14RQCh. 11 - Prob. 15RQCh. 11 - Prob. 1ECh. 11 - Prob. 2ECh. 11 - Prob. 3ECh. 11 - Prob. 4ECh. 11 - Prob. 5ECh. 11 - Prob. 6ECh. 11 - Prob. 7ECh. 11 - Prob. 8ECh. 11 - Prob. 9ECh. 11 - Prob. 10ECh. 11 - Prob. 11ECh. 11 - Prob. 12ECh. 11 - Prob. 13ECh. 11 - Prob. 14ECh. 11 - Prob. 15ECh. 11 - Prob. 16ECh. 11 - Prob. 17E
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