Finite Mathematics (11th Edition)
11th Edition
ISBN: 9780321979438
Author: Margaret L. Lial, Raymond N. Greenwell, Nathan P. Ritchey
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 11, Problem 24RE
To determine
Any saddle point in the game and identify the value of the game and any fair game.
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A game theorist is walking down the street in his neighborhood and finds $20. Just as he picks it up, two neighborhood kids, Jane and Tim, run up to him, asking if they can have it. Because game theorists are generous by nature, he says he’s willing to let them have the $20, but only according to the following procedure: Jane and Tim are each to submit a written request as to their share of the $20. Let t denote the amount that Tim requests for himself and j be the amount that Jane requests for herself. Tim and Jane must choose j and t from the interval [0,20]. If j + t ≤ 20, then the two receive what they requested, and the remainder, 20 - j - t, is split equally between them. If, however, j + t > 20, then they get nothing, and the game theorist keeps the $20. Tim and Jane are the players in this game. Assume that each of them has a payoff equal to the amount of money that he or she receives. Find all Nash equilibria.
I don't need to know the value of the game I need to know the optimal strategies for R and C please
Chapter 11 Solutions
Finite Mathematics (11th Edition)
Ch. 11.1 - In the following game, decide on the payoff when...Ch. 11.1 - Prob. 2ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 3ECh. 11.1 - In the following game, decide on the payoff when...Ch. 11.1 - Prob. 5ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 6ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 7ECh. 11.1 - Does it have a saddle point?Ch. 11.1 - Prob. 9ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 10E
Ch. 11.1 - Prob. 11ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 12ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 13ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 14ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 15ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 16ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 17ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 18ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 19ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 20ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 21ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 22ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 23ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 24ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 25ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 26ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 27ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 28ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 29ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 30ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 31ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 32ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 33ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 34ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 35ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 36ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 37ECh. 11.1 - APPLY IT Football When a football team has the...Ch. 11.1 - Prob. 39ECh. 11.1 - Prob. 40ECh. 11.1 - Children's Game In the children's game rock,...Ch. 11.2 - Suppose a game has payoff matrix [ 3452 ]. Suppose...Ch. 11.2 - Suppose a game has payoff matrix [ 041324110 ]....Ch. 11.2 - Find the optimum strategies for player A and...Ch. 11.2 - Find the optimum strategies for player A and...Ch. 11.2 - Prob. 5ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 6ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 7ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 8ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 9ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 10ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 11ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 12ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 13ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 14ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 15ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 16ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 17ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 18ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 19ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 20ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 21ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 22ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 23ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 24ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 25ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 26ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 27ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 28ECh. 11.2 - A reader wrote to the "Ask Marilyn" column in...Ch. 11.2 - Prob. 30ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 31ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 32ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 33ECh. 11.2 - Choosing Medication The number of cases of African...Ch. 11.2 - Prob. 35ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 36ECh. 11.2 - 37. Golf In a simplified variation of the Ryder...Ch. 11.2 - Prob. 38ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 39ECh. 11.2 - Prob. 40ECh. 11.2 - Finger Game Repeal Exercise 40 if each player may...Ch. 11.3 - Use the graphical method to find the optimum...Ch. 11.3 - Prob. 2ECh. 11.3 - Use the graphical method to find the optimum...Ch. 11.3 - Prob. 4ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 5ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 6ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 7ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 8ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 9ECh. 11.3 - Use the simplex method to find the optimum...Ch. 11.3 - Prob. 11ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 12ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 13ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 14ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 15ECh. 11.3 - In Exercises 1327, use the graphical method when...Ch. 11.3 - Prob. 17ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 18ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 19ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 20ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 21ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 22ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 23ECh. 11.3 - In Exercises 1327, use the graphical method when...Ch. 11.3 - In Exercises 13–27, use the graphical method when...Ch. 11.3 - Prob. 26ECh. 11.3 - Prob. 27ECh. 11 - 1. Since they like to eat out, each prefers a...Ch. 11 - If Linda likes French food more than Mel likes...Ch. 11 - Prob. 3EACh. 11 - 4. Suppose Linda knows that Mel is going to stick...Ch. 11 - Prob. 5EACh. 11 - Prob. 6EACh. 11 - Prob. 1RECh. 11 - Prob. 2RECh. 11 - Prob. 3RECh. 11 - Prob. 4RECh. 11 - Prob. 5RECh. 11 - Prob. 6RECh. 11 - Prob. 7RECh. 11 - Prob. 8RECh. 11 - Prob. 9RECh. 11 - Prob. 10RECh. 11 - 11. How can you determine from the payoff matrix...Ch. 11 - Prob. 12RECh. 11 - Prob. 13RECh. 11 - Prob. 14RECh. 11 - Prob. 15RECh. 11 - Prob. 16RECh. 11 - Prob. 17RECh. 11 - Prob. 18RECh. 11 - Prob. 19RECh. 11 - Prob. 20RECh. 11 - Prob. 21RECh. 11 - Prob. 22RECh. 11 - Prob. 23RECh. 11 - Prob. 24RECh. 11 - Prob. 25RECh. 11 - For the following games, find the strategies...Ch. 11 - Prob. 27RECh. 11 - For the following games, find the strategies...Ch. 11 - Prob. 29RECh. 11 - Prob. 30RECh. 11 - Prob. 31RECh. 11 - Prob. 32RECh. 11 - Prob. 33RECh. 11 - Prob. 34RECh. 11 - Prob. 35RECh. 11 - For each game, remove any dominated strategies,...Ch. 11 - Prob. 37RECh. 11 - Prob. 38RECh. 11 - Prob. 39RECh. 11 - Prob. 40RECh. 11 - Prob. 41RECh. 11 - Prob. 42RECh. 11 - Prob. 43RECh. 11 - Prob. 44RECh. 11 - Prob. 45RECh. 11 - Prob. 46RECh. 11 - Labor Relations In labor-management relations,...Ch. 11 - Prob. 48RECh. 11 - Prob. 49RECh. 11 - Prob. 50RECh. 11 - Prob. 51RECh. 11 - Prob. 52RECh. 11 - Prob. 53RECh. 11 - Prob. 54RECh. 11 - Politics Mary Wilkinson, a candidate for city...Ch. 11 - Prob. 56RECh. 11 - Prob. 57RECh. 11 - Prob. 58RECh. 11 - Prob. 59RECh. 11 - Prob. 60RECh. 11 - Prob. 61RECh. 11 - Prob. 62RECh. 11 - Prob. 63RECh. 11 - Newcomb's Paradox Suppose there are two boxes, A...
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