MINDTAP: INTERMEDIATE MINCROECON -ACCES
MINDTAP: INTERMEDIATE MINCROECON -ACCES
12th Edition
ISBN: 9780357380833
Author: NICHOLSON
Publisher: CENGAGE L
Question
Book Icon
Chapter 13, Problem 13.10P

a)

To determine

To calculate: The amount of wage rate and associated risk to get the job.

a)

Expert Solution
Check Mark

Explanation of Solution

Given

  Utility=wlwhere,w is the hourly wage rateand l is the number of hours worked

(a).

Let u1 denote the utility of the first job. Since the first job gives a constant work hour of 8 hours at an hourly wage of $50, the utility would be:

  Utility(u1)=50×8Utility=400Utility=20

Let u2 denote the utility of the risky job. Sometimes the salesman gets 4 hours of work with probability 0.5 and sometimes he gets 12 hours of work with probability 0.5, then the expected utility from the risky job is:

  Utility(u2)=0.5w×4+0.5w×12

The risky job will be chosen ifu1 > u2

  0.5w×4+0.5w×12>20squaring both sides0.25×4×w+0.25×12×w+2×0.25×4w×3>400w+3w+2w×1.732>4007.464w>400w>53.6

Hence, for an hourly wage rate higher than 53.6, the risky job will be taken.

b)

To determine

To show: Whether the imposition of proportional tax on income will impacts decisions regarding choice of job.

b)

Expert Solution
Check Mark

Explanation of Solution

If the proportional tax is imposed on both the risky job and a certain job, then results do not change as the expected utility difference remains the same. Let us check:

Let the proportional tax rate be, t. Utility in case of a certain job will be:

  u1=50×8×(1t)

Utility in case of the risky job will be:

  u2=0.5w×l×(1t)+0.5w×l×(1t)

The risky job will be chosen if u1 > u2

  0.5w×4×(1t)+0.5w×12×(1t)>50×8×(1t)squaring both sides0.25×4×w×(1t)+0.25×12×w×(1t)+2×0.25×4w×(1t)×3>400(1t)(w+3w+2w×1.732)×(1t)>400(1t)(1t) cancels out7.464w>400w>53.6

The wage rate for both jobs remains the same so, the person’s choice will not be impacted.

c)

To determine

To calculate: Let us calculate the utility to decide whether the decision will be impacted or not:

c)

Expert Solution
Check Mark

Explanation of Solution

Utility in case of constant working hours:

In this case, 300 will not be taxed and 100 (400-300) will be taxed at the rate of 50%

  Utility(u1)=300+100×0.5Utility(u1)=350

Utility in case of random working hours:

In this case, also 300 will not be taxed and wages above 300 will be taxed at the rate of 50%

  Utility(u2)=0.5300+(4w300)0.5+0.5300+(12w300)0.5Utility(u2)=0.5150+2w+0.5150+6wNow let us compare the wages:0.5150+2w+0.5150+6w>350Squaring both sides0.25(150+2w)+0.25(150+6w)+2×0.2522500+1200w+12w2>3500.25(300+8w+2×25625+300w+3w2)>350300+8w+2×25625+300w+3w2>140045625+300w+3w2>11008w5625+300w+3w2>2752w5625+300w+3w2>(2752w)25625+300w+3w2>75625+4w21100ww21400w+70000>0

Since, in this case, the equation of wages has changed the decision will also change.

Want to see more full solutions like this?

Subscribe now to access step-by-step solutions to millions of textbook problems written by subject matter experts!
Students have asked these similar questions
Ten workers work jointly on a project. All 10 workers are equally skilled. The total value of the output produced is $100 times the sum of the number of hours worked by all 10 workers. Each worker's utility is equal to his income minus the square of the number of hours he works. Each worker is selfish. The employers have no way of keeping track of any individual's work effort, so they decide to let each person work as long as he wants to and they divide the total value of the output equally among the workers. How much income will each worker get?
Suppose a competitive firm can hire a new worker to produce 10 extra units of production by paying him $ 20. If the price of the good that is produced is $ 12, the income from the marginal product of this additional worker is:Response option group a) $ 60 b) $ 30 c) $ 120 d) $ 50 e) It is not possible to determine it with the information provided.
A firm’s board of directors wants to maximize its profits. If the firm’s manager puts in a high effort, the firm gets a high profit of 9 with probability 80%, but if the manager puts in a low effort, the firm gets a low profit of 4 with probability 80%.   The utility functions of both the board of directors and the manager are identical and are simply u(b)=b. High effort for the manager costs 2. The manager has an outside wage of 1.                 Calculate the optimal wage schedule under high and low realized profits.
Knowledge Booster
Background pattern image
Similar questions
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Text book image
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:Oxford University Press
Text book image
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:9780134078779
Author:Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:PEARSON
Text book image
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:9780134870069
Author:William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:PEARSON
Text book image
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:9781305585126
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Text book image
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Text book image
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-...
Economics
ISBN:9781259290619
Author:Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:McGraw-Hill Education