Loose Leaf for Microeconomics
20th Edition
ISBN: 9780077660901
Author: Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. Brue, Sean Masaki Flynn Dr.
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Question
Chapter 13, Problem 3P
To determine
Profit, loss and market mechanism under monopolistic competition .
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Suppose that a monopolistically competitive restaurant is currently serving 230 meals per day (the output where MR = MC). At that output level, ATC per meal is $10 and consumers are willing to pay $12 per meal. What is the size of this firm’s profit or loss? Will there be entry or exit? Will this restaurant’s demand curve shift left or right? In long-run equilibrium, suppose that this restaurant charges $11 per meal for 180 meals and that the marginal cost of the 180th meal is $8. What is the size of the firm’s profit? Suppose that the allocatively efficient output level in long-run equilibrium is 200 meals. Is the deadweight loss for this firm greater than or less than $60
Suppose that a typical firm in a monopolistically competitive industry faces a demand curve given by: q = 60 − (1/2)p, where q is quantity sold per week. The firm’s marginal cost curve is given by: MC = 60. 1. How much will the firm produce in the short run? 2. What price will it charge? 3. Draw the firm’s demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost curves. Does this solution represent a long-run equilibrium? Why or why not?
Sometimes oligopolies in the same industry are very different in size. Suppose we have a duopoly where one firm (Firm A) is large and the other firm (Firm B) is small, as shown in the prisoner’s dilemma box in Table 5.Firm B colludes with Firm AFirm B cheats by selling more outputFirm A colludes with Firm BA gets $1,000, B gets $100A gets $800, B gets $200Firm A cheats by selling more outputA gets $1,050, B gets $50A gets $500, B gets $20Assuming that the payoffs are known to both firms, what is the likely outcome in this case?
In this assignment, we’re assuming you’re a manager of different types of buffalo wing restaurants. I’ll give different scenarios- some will require math and others will require writing.
Cournot Oligopoly
2. Now, assume your buffalo wing firm is in a Cournot oligopoly with 3 additional firms. The market elasticity of demand for buffalo wings is -0.70. Find your firm’s elasticity of demand.
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Chapter 13 Solutions
Loose Leaf for Microeconomics
Ch. 13.1 - Prob. 1QQCh. 13.1 - Prob. 2QQCh. 13.1 - Prob. 3QQCh. 13.1 - Prob. 4QQCh. 13.4 - Prob. 1QQCh. 13.4 - The D2e segment of the demand curve D2eD1 in graph...Ch. 13.4 - Prob. 3QQCh. 13.4 - Prob. 4QQCh. 13.A - Prob. 1ADQCh. 13.A - Prob. 2ADQ
Ch. 13.A - Prob. 3ADQCh. 13.A - Prob. 4ADQCh. 13.A - Prob. 1ARQCh. 13.A - Prob. 2ARQCh. 13.A - Prob. 3ARQCh. 13.A - Prob. 1APCh. 13.A - Prob. 2APCh. 13 - Prob. 1DQCh. 13 - Prob. 2DQCh. 13 - Prob. 3DQCh. 13 - Prob. 4DQCh. 13 - Prob. 5DQCh. 13 - Prob. 6DQCh. 13 - Prob. 7DQCh. 13 - Prob. 8DQCh. 13 - Prob. 9DQCh. 13 - Prob. 10DQCh. 13 - Prob. 11DQCh. 13 - Prob. 12DQCh. 13 - Prob. 13DQCh. 13 - Prob. 1RQCh. 13 - Prob. 2RQCh. 13 - Prob. 3RQCh. 13 - Prob. 4RQCh. 13 - Prob. 5RQCh. 13 - Prob. 6RQCh. 13 - Prob. 7RQCh. 13 - Prob. 8RQCh. 13 - Prob. 1PCh. 13 - Prob. 2PCh. 13 - Prob. 3P
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