EBK MICROECONOMICS
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134524931
Author: List
Publisher: YUZU
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 13, Problem 5P
(a)
To determine
Reason for the men’s choice to not be a Nash equilibrium.
(b)
To determine
All men pursuing the same attractive woman is not a case of Nash equilibrium.
(c)
To determine
Reason for Nash equilibrium occurring when only one man asks the beautiful woman to dance.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solutionStudents have asked these similar questions
Two roommates John and Joe are playing a simultaneous game of cleaning the apartment. If neither of them clean, the apartment gets filthy and both get a utility of 2. If John cleans and Joe doesn’t, John gets a utility of 1 and Joe gets a utility of 4. If Joe cleans and John doesn’t, Joe gets a utility of 1 and John gets a utility of 4 and if both clean up the apartment, they each get a utility of 3.What is the Nash equilibrium of this game?
Group of answer choices
Joe cleans, John doesn’t
John cleans, Joe doesn’t
Both of them clean the apartment
Neither of them clean the apartment
Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain two units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose two units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each one unit of utility. Diagram a game in which they choose whether to vote or not to vote, and determine the Nash Equilibrium.
Find all equilibria of the following game with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences:
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- You have just played rock, paper, scissors with your friend. You chose scissors and he chose paper, so you won. Is this a Nash equilibrium? Explain why or why not.arrow_forwardIf a player does not have a dominant strategy, can the game still have a Nash equilibrium? No. At least one player must have a dominant strategy for the outcome to be a Nash equilibrium. Yes. There is no need for a dominant strategy to exist in order to have a Nash equilibrium. The outcome is a Nash equilibrium because each player has made his or her optimal choice based on the optimal choice of the other player. No. If there is no dominant strategy, there is no predictable outcome and therefore no Nash equilibrium. Yes. A Nash equilibrium is possible only if neither player has a dominant strategy. If a dominant strategy exists, it is no longer a Nash equilibrium.arrow_forwardWithin a voluntary contribution game, the Nash equilibrium level of contribution is zero, but in experiments, it is often possible to sustain positive levels of contribution for a long period. How might we best explain this? A) Participants are altruistic, and so value the payoff which other participants receive, benefiting (indirectly) from making a contribution. B) Participants believe that if they make a contribution, then other participants will be more likely to make a contribution. C) Participants in experiments believe that they have to make contributions in order to receive any payoff from their participation. D) Participants have experience of working in situations in which cooperation can be sustained for mutual benefit and so have internalised a social norm of cooperationarrow_forward
- Two roommates John and Joe are playing a simultaneous game of cleaning the apartment. If neither of them clean, the apartment gets filthy and both get a utility of 2. If John cleans and Joe doesn’t, John gets a utility of 1 and Joe gets a utility of 4. If Joe cleans and John doesn’t, Joe gets a utility of 1 and John gets a utility of 4 and if both clean up the apartment, they each get a utility of 3. If the apartment owner decides to fine both the roommates if the apartment is dirty, such that now if neither of them clean they each get a 5 utility loss, what would the new equilibrium be now? a. John cleans, Joe doesn’t b. Joe cleans, John doesn’t c. Neither of them clean the apartment d. Both A&Barrow_forwardConsider a game where player A moves first, choosing between Left and Right. Then, after observing player A’s choice, player B moves next choosing between Up and Down. Which of the following is true? This is a game where players A and B have the same number of strategies. Player A will get a higher payoff than player B as A moves first. This is game will only have one Nash equilibrium. This is a game of perfect information.arrow_forwardThe chicken game has often been used to model crises. Recall that in this game, the two players drive straight at each other. They can choose to swerve or keep going straight. If one swerves, and the other goes straight, assume that the one that swerves gets -10 utility and the one that goes straight gets 10 utility, since the one that swerves is deemed the loser. If both swerve, both get 0 utility. If both go straight, they crash and get -50 utility. Assume both players have a discount rate of 0.9 Draw the stage game of date night List all pure strategy Nash equilibria of the single stage game Consider an infinite horizon version of Chicken. Can you get an SPNE in which the both players swerve using a grim trigger type strategy? Consider the following strategies: both players swerve, as long as neither ever went straight. If one player ever plays straight, in all subsequent rounds the player that swerved goes straight and the player that went straight swerves. Can you think…arrow_forward
- For the game given, find a Nash equilibrium in which both players randomize.arrow_forwardTwo players bargain over 1 unit of a divisible object. Bargaining starts with an offer of player 1, which player 2 either accepts or rejects. If player 2 rejects, then player 1 makes another offer; if player 2 rejects once more, then player 2 makes an offer. If player 1 rejects the offer of player 2, then once more it is the turn of player 1 where he makes two consecutive offers. As long as an agreement has not been reached this procedure continues. For example, suppose that agreement is reached at period 5, it follows that player 1 makes offers in period 1,2 then player 2 makes an o er in period 3, then player 1 makes offers in 4,5. Negotiations can continue indefinitely, agreement in period 't' with a division (x, 1- x) leads to payoffs ( , (1-x)).(The difference from Rubinstein's alternating offer bargaining is that player one makes two consecutive offers, whereas player 2 makes a single offer in her turn.) a. Show that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which player 2's…arrow_forwardThe prisoner illustrates that rational, self-interested individuals will natuarally avoid the Nash equilibrium, because it is worse for both of them, true or false and why ?arrow_forward
- NASH EQUILIBRIUMarrow_forwardTwo roommates John and Joe are playing a simultaneous game of cleaning the apartment. If neither of them clean, the apartment gets filthy and both get a utility of 2. If John cleans and Joe doesn't, John gets a utility of 1 and Joe gets a utility of 4. If Joe cleans and John doesn't, Joe gets a utility of 1 and John gets a utility of 4 and if both clean up the apartment, they each get a utility of 3. If the roommates played the game repeatedly where one roommate not cleaning this time would trigger the other roommate not cleaning next time, the Nash equilibrium is most likely to be: a) Joe cleans, John doesn't b) John cleans, Joe doesn't c) Both of them clean d) Neither of them clean Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.arrow_forwardConsider the following game. There are two payers, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 chooses a row (10, 20, or 30), and Player 2 chooses a column (10/20/30). Payoffs are in the cells of the table, with those on the left going to Player 1 and those on the right going to player 2. For example, a payoff 100/200 would mean Player 1 receives 100 and Player 2 receives 200.What is [are] the Nash Equilibrium [Equilibria] of this game?A) (10/10) and (20/20)B) (30/30)C) (10/20) and (20/10)D) (20/20)E) (30/30)arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
- Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving ApproachEconomicsISBN:9781337106665Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike ShorPublisher:Cengage LearningManagerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:Cengage Learning