MICROECONOMICS LLW/CNCT >BI<
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781260531350
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG CUSTOM
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Chapter 14, Problem 11DQ
To determine
Why large players settle closely.
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3) Indicate whether the following statement is TRUE or FALSE and explain your answer: If one player is the leader in a game it means that s/he has the first move in the game. The key thing is that this move can be observed by the follower before making his/her own decision, otherwise it would be a simultaneous move game that cannot be solved by backwards induction.
Game Theory
a) Consider the following game represented by the game tree below. If you observe Blue Bank playing medium and Green Bank playing bottom, would you be surprised by their choices? Carefully explain why or why not.
b) Now assume that Blue and Green Banks play the game with the same actions and payoffs as in a) but they make their choices simultaneously. What is the payoff matrix for this new game? What do you predict will happen in the game? Explain.
c) Assume that the game from part a) is played five times, i.e. Blue and Green Banks play a repeated game with the stage game described in a). What do you predict will happen in the game? Explain.
Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table:
Player 1
Player 2
Left
Right
Top
6 1
9 4
Bottom
2 4
5 3
where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2.
D) What is Player 1’s maximin strategy?E) What is Player 2’s maximin strategy?F) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose?
Chapter 14 Solutions
MICROECONOMICS LLW/CNCT >BI<
Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 1QQCh. 14.2 - The D2e segment of the demand curve D2eD1 in graph...Ch. 14.2 - Prob. 3QQCh. 14.2 - Prob. 4QQCh. 14 - Prob. 1DQCh. 14 - Prob. 2DQCh. 14 - Prob. 3DQCh. 14 - Prob. 4DQCh. 14 - Prob. 5DQCh. 14 - Prob. 6DQ
Ch. 14 - Prob. 7DQCh. 14 - Prob. 8DQCh. 14 - Prob. 9DQCh. 14 - Prob. 10DQCh. 14 - Prob. 11DQCh. 14 - Prob. 12DQCh. 14 - Prob. 13DQCh. 14 - Prob. 14DQCh. 14 - Prob. 1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 5RQCh. 14 - Prob. 6RQCh. 14 - Prob. 7RQCh. 14 - Prob. 8RQCh. 14 - Prob. 9RQCh. 14 - Prob. 10RQCh. 14 - Prob. 1PCh. 14 - Prob. 2PCh. 14 - Prob. 3P
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