Economics, Student Value Edition (7th Edition)
7th Edition
ISBN: 9780134739229
Author: R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O'Brien
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 14, Problem 14.2.18PA
To determine
The reason for increasing the price by three manufactures.
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Suppose two companies, Apples and Dell, are a competing duopoly.
If both companies charge the high price, they each earn $700 million in economic profit.
If both companies charge the low price, they each earn $500 million in economic profit.
If one company charges a high price and the other a low price, the company charging the higher price earns $450 million in economic profit and the company charging the lower price earns $800 million in economic profit.
1. What is the Nash equilibrium? Select all possible answers from the answer list.
2. Thinking back to your answer for the Nash equilibrium, can firms do better than the outcome you identified? Explain.
Once upon a time, there was a one and only Versace beer seller supplying beer exclusively for the entire market in John's land. After hearing beer drinkers' complaints, Judge Bacchus ordered the Versace Beer Company to be split into three companies, including Versace, Bud and Hein brands. Each would have their own unique taste.
1. Describe the market before the split and after the split in the beer industry.
2. Suppose that the three beer makers engage in collusive behavior after the split and that Versace Beer is the biggest of the three companies. Describe the possible price policies that could result.
PLease write in your own words. Thank you
2. Four firms (A, B, C, and D) play a pricing game (i.e. Bertrand). Each firm (i) may choose any price Pi from 0 to ¥, with the goal of maximizing its own profit. Firms A and B have MC = 10, while firms C and D have MC = 20.
The firms serve a market with the demand curve Q = 100 – P. All firms produce exactly the same product, so consumers purchase only from the firm with the lowest price. If multiple firms have the same low price, consumers divide their quantities evenly among the low-priced firms. Assume the firms choose price simultaneously.
a. There are many equilibria in this simultaneous-move pricing game. Provide one equilibrium combination of prices, and argue that no firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from these prices.
Now assume firm A chooses price first. Firm B observes this choice and then chooses its own price second. Firm C chooses price third, and firm D chooses price last.
b. Again, there are many equilibria in this sequential-move pricing game.…
Chapter 14 Solutions
Economics, Student Value Edition (7th Edition)
Ch. 14 - Prob. 14.1.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.9PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.1.10PA
Ch. 14 - Prob. 14.2.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.3RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.4RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.9PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.10PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.11PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.12PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.13PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.14PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.15PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.16PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.17PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2.18PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.3PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.3.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.1RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.2RQCh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.3PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.4PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.5PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.6PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.7PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.4.8PACh. 14 - Prob. 14.2CTECh. 14 - Prob. 14.3CTE
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