EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 15, Problem 10RQ
To determine
To explain:
Whether workers and firms will be benefitted for the test and real world markets will use strategies or not.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution
Students have asked these similar questions
Some economists maintain that the returns to additional years of education is actually quite small but that there is a substantial “sheepskin” effect whereby one receives a higher salary with the successful completion of degrees or the earning of diplomas (i.e., sheepskins).Explain how the sheepskin effect is analogous to a signaling model.
Imagine a signaling model where there are two types of workers, low-productivity workers with a productivity of 10, and high-productivity workers with a productivity of 30. The proportion of low-productivity workers is .5.
Firms are competitive and obtain profit equal to the productivity of the worker they hire.
Workers can obtain one of three levels of education: e1, e2, and e3. Workers get utility equal to their wage minus the cost of education. Wages must be between 10 and 30.
The cost of getting an education for low-productivity workers is e1 = 0, e2 = 9, e3 = 18.
The cost of getting an education for high-productivity workers is e1 = 0, e2 =4, e3 = 8.
Are there any separating equilibria in this model? If so, find them, if not show why they do not exist.
Imagine a signaling model where there are two types of workers, low-productivity workers with a productivity of 10, and high-productivity workers with a productivity of 30. The proportion of low-productivity workers is .5.
Firms are competitive and obtain profit equal to the productivity of the worker they hire.
Workers can obtain one of three levels of education: e1, e2, and e3. Workers get utility equal to their wage minus the cost of education. Wages must be between 10 and 30.
The cost of getting an education for low-productivity workers is e1 = 0, e2 = 9, e3 = 18.
The cost of getting an education for high-productivity workers is e1 = 0, e2 =4, e3 = 8.
A) Are there any pooling equilibria in this model? If so find all of them, if not, show why they do not exist.
Chapter 15 Solutions
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
Ch. 15.2 - Prob. 1TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 2TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 1MQCh. 15.2 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 15.2 - Prob. 2.1MQCh. 15.2 - Prob. 1.1TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 2.1TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 1.2TTACh. 15.2 - Prob. 2.2TTACh. 15.3 - Prob. 1MQ
Ch. 15.3 - Prob. 2MQCh. 15.4 - Prob. 1MQCh. 15.4 - Prob. 1.1MQCh. 15.4 - Prob. 2.1MQCh. 15.5 - Prob. 1TTACh. 15.5 - Prob. 2TTACh. 15.5 - Prob. 1MQCh. 15.5 - Prob. 2MQCh. 15 - Prob. 1RQCh. 15 - Prob. 2RQCh. 15 - Prob. 3RQCh. 15 - Prob. 4RQCh. 15 - Prob. 5RQCh. 15 - Prob. 6RQCh. 15 - Prob. 7RQCh. 15 - Prob. 8RQCh. 15 - Prob. 9RQCh. 15 - Prob. 10RQCh. 15 - Prob. 15.1PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.2PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.3PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.4PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.5PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.6PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.7PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.8PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.9PCh. 15 - Prob. 15.10P
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- Consider the St. Petersburg Paradox problem first discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738. The game consists of tossing a coin. The player gets a payoff of 2^n where n is the number of times the coin is tossed to get the first head. So, if the sequence of tosses yields TTTH, you get a payoff of 2^4 this payoff occurs with probability (1/2^4). Compute the expected value of playing this game. Next, assume that utility U is a function of wealth X given by U = X.5 and that X = $1,000,000. In this part of the question, assume that the game ends if the first head has not occurred after 40 tosses of the coin. In that case, the payoff is 240 and the game is over. What is the expected payout of this game? Finally, what is the most you would pay to play the game if you require that your expected utility after playing the game must be equal to your utility before playing the game? Use the Goal Seek function (found in Data, What-If Analysis) in Excel.arrow_forwardConsider the following claim: “If a decision maker prefers one given lottery that yields $x with probability 1 over another given lottery whose expected return is $x, then we can fully characterize the agent's risk attitude. That is, this information comparing two given lotteries is enough to determine if the decision maker is risk averse, risk loving or risk neutral.” If this claim is TRUE, then provide a proof. If it is FALSE, then prove your argument by providing an explanation.arrow_forwardWho detected the endowment effect first? Tell us about the design of the experiment and its main conclusions.arrow_forward
- Question 18 Job-specific human capital In this problem, based on a simplified version of the model in Bhattacharya and Sood (2006), we will explore how linking employment and health insurance provision can (partially) solve the adverse selection problem if the labor market is competitive. Suppose that there are two types of workers – sickly workers with probability ps of falling ill over the course of the next year, and robust workers with probability pr < ps of falling ill. Employers cannot observe whether a worker is sickly or robust, and because of US law they can only decide to offer health insurance to all of their workers, or none at all. We will assume that a just-hired employee is less productive than an employee who has more experience; let MPn be the marginal value product of new employees, and MPe > MPn be the marginal value product of experienced employees. In this simple model, marginal value product depends only on experience, not on whether a worker is sickly or…arrow_forwardPeer pressure is an important influence on the behavior of youngsters. For instance, many preteens begin smoking because their friends pressure them into being “cool” by smoking. Using utility theory, how would you explain peer pressure? How would this compare with the explanations provided by behavioral economics and neuroeconomics?arrow_forwardWhy might prospect theory-like behavior be rational? Why do many behavioral economists argue that such behavior irrational?arrow_forward
- Adapt the two-sided search model to include government activity as follows. Suppose that the government can operate firms, subject to the same constraints as private firms. In particular, the government must incur a cost k to post a vacancy. Supposing that the government operates G firms, then the number of matches in the economy as a whole is M = em (Q, A + G) , where A is the number of private firms that choose to post vacancies. Assume that the government pays the same wages as do private sector firms. Determine the effects of G on the unemployment rate, the vacancy rate, the labor force, the number of private firms, the total number of firms (private and government-run), aggregate output, and labor market tightness. Explain your results. (Here, G is an exogenous variable, and A is still an endogenous variable.)arrow_forwardUniversity Health System located in San Antonio, Texas implemented a patient navigation program to improve screening for colorectal for Hispanic males, 50 and older, who were members of CareLink (Bexar County’s financial assistance program), and who had not received colorectal cancer screening in the last 10 years. The program incorporated the principle of ____________ (i.e. mistakes are expected and opportunities are given for correction) by making calls to remind patients of their missed appointments. This is a behavioral economics principle under the behavioral concept of ____________. Availability, Judgement Allowance for errors, Choice architecture Framing effects, Decision-making Fairness, Decision-makingarrow_forwardWhat does it mean for a policy outcome to be a Pareto Improvement? What about a Potential Pareto Improvement? Is this a reasonable expectation for policy in most settings? Give an example where a Pareto Improvement (following redistribution) a.) might be achievable b.) seems incredibly unlikelyarrow_forward
- There is a telling joke about two economists walking down the street. They spot a $20 bill on the sidewalk. One stoops to pick it up, but the other one says, “Don’t bother; if the bill was real, someone would have picked it up already.” The lesson is clear. A strong belief in efficient markets can disable the investor and make it appear that no research effort can be justified. Do you think there are still enough anomalies in the empirical evidence to justify the search for overpriced/underpricedsecurities? Support your answer with examples and new theories in the context of Efficient Market Hypothesis.arrow_forwardYou have the following equation relating job risk R to wages W: W = .01*R + XB, where XB indicates control for the following confounders: education, job experience, and income. Assume W= annual wages=50,000 A. If the change in R = a 1 in 10,000 higher chance of death in a year, how much more would an individual need to be paid to be willing to assume this risk? B. What is the implied statistical value of a year of life based on this model? C. What do you think would happen to the estimated relationship between R and W if none of the three confounders were included in this model? Explain.arrow_forwardConsider a variant of the benchmark model of adverse selection. The types of workers (θ) are uniformly drawn from the unit interval [0,1]. A θ-type worker can produce θ units of some product if he is hired by firms. (Workers are the only input in the production.) The price of the product is normalised as 1. Before entering the labor market, workers decide whether to secure some certificate at a cost c ∈ (0, 1) or not. The certificate can fully reveal a worker’s type and he then decides whether to show it to firms or not. If a θ-type worker decides to quit the labor market, he can earn θ/4 from self-employment. Find the competitive equilibrium. (Hint, if a θ-type worker obtains the certificate and shows it to firms, he will receive a wage of θ from the market. For sure, he can also decide to join the labor market without obtaining or showing the certificate.)arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
