Equilibrium value of cars, assuming asymmetric information between buyers and sellers.

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Chapter 16, Problem 11P

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Equilibrium value of cars, assuming asymmetric information between buyers and sellers.

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Suppose the equilibrium price for good quality used cars is $20,000. And the equilibrium price for poor quality used cars is $10,000. Assume a potential used car buyer has imperfect information as to the condition of any given used car. Assume this potential buyer believes the probability a given used car is good quality is .60 and the probability a given used car is low quality is .40. Assume the seller has perfect information on all cars in inventory. How does the informational imbalance result in market failure? a. Only good quality cars are sold, hence the market under-provides used cars. b. Both poor and good quality cars are sold, hence the market over-provides used cars. c. Only poor quality cars are sold, hence the market under-provides used cars. d. Both poor and good quality cars are sold, hence the market efficiently provides used cars.

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