EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
EBK INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS
12th Edition
ISBN: 9781305176386
Author: Snyder
Publisher: YUZU
Question
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Chapter 16, Problem 16.2P

a

To determine

Total number of fish and nature of externality.

b)

To determine

Optimal level of fishing in lakes.

c)

To determine

License fee in term of fish.

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