MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS (LOOSELEAF)
5th Edition
ISBN: 9781337571371
Author: FROEB
Publisher: CENGAGE L
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Question
Chapter 17, Problem 17.5IP
To determine
The expected value of the gamble.
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Suppose that you graduate from college next year and you have two career options: 1) You will start a job in an investment bank paying a $100,000 annual salary. 2) You will start a Ph.D. in economics and, as a student, you will receive a $20,000 salary. You are bad with decisions, so you are letting a friend of yours decide for you by flipping a coin. The probabilities of options 1 and 2 are, therefore, each 50%. a) Illustrate, using indifference curves, your preferences regarding consumption choices in the two different states of the world. Assume that you are risk-averse. [Include also the 45 degrees line in your figure] b) Now show how the indifference curves would change if you were substantially more risk averse than before. Explain. c) Now show the indifference curves if you are risk neutral and if you are risk loving. d) Show your expected utility preferences from point a) mathematically.
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wrong, their prize is decreased to $2,250,000. You believe you have a 25% chance of answering the
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A wheel of fortune in a gambling casino has 54 different slots in which the wheel pointer can stop. Four of the 54 slots contain the number 9. For a 1 dollar bet on hitting a 9, if he or she succeeds, the gambler wins 10 dollars plus the return of the 1 dollar bet. What is the expected value of this gambling game? What is the meaning of the expected value result?
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