Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Access Card
7th Edition
ISBN: 9780136850045
Author: Hubbard, Glenn, O'Brien, Anthony
Publisher: PEARSON
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Chapter 18, Problem 18.1.6PA
To determine
Is the median voter theorem useful to analyze the election.
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Briefly explain why the principle that the majority of voters should decide an election outcome may not always make logical sense.
The following table shows how three voters ranked Policy A, Policy B, and Policy C. Which policy is preferred by the
majority?
Voter 1
Voter 2
Voter 3
Policy A
Policy B
Policy C
First Choice
Policy B
Policy C
Policy A
Policy C
Policy A
Policy B
Second Choice
Third Choice
Select the correct answer below:
O Policy B
O Policy C
one policy is not preferred by the majority
O Policy A
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election.
Voter Id
Preference(1-9)
A
4
B
5
C
6
True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6.
Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference?
Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences?
If the tax in C induces 100%…
Chapter 18 Solutions
Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Access Card
Ch. 18 - Prob. 18.1.1RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.2RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.3RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.4RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.5PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.6PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.7PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.8PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.9PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.1.10PA
Ch. 18 - Prob. 18.1.11PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.1RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.2RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.3RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.4RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.5PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.6PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.7PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.8PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.9PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.10PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.11PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.12PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.2.13PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.1RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.2RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.3PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.4PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.5PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.6PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.7PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.8PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.9PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.10PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.3.11PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.1RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.2RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.3RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.4RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.5RQCh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.6PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.7PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.8PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.9PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.10PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.11PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.12PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.13PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.14PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.4.15PACh. 18 - Prob. 18.1CTE
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Similar questions
- Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? If the tax in C induces 100%…arrow_forwardPolitical Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B) Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C) Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D) If the tax in C induces…arrow_forwardWhat is economic populism?arrow_forward
- We have heard of "Rock the Vote" or even "Vote or Die." What these ad campaigns are attempting to do is reduce the amount of voter apathy. What do economists call this situation? Using the principles of economics, please explain why there is such a lack of interest in being informed and voting. .arrow_forwardAll of the following statements are true about median voter theory, except: Select the correct answer below: The median voter is in the middle of the political spectrum. The effects of the U.S. sugar lobby supports median voter theory. Median voter theory suggests that if a candidate needs more than 50% to win an election, the best way to win is to have median preferences. The median voter theory argues that politicians will try to match policies to what pleases the median voter preferences.arrow_forwardExplain: “Politicians would make more rational economic decisions if they weren’t running for reelection every few years.”arrow_forward
- The graph illustrates the labor market in a country that does not tax labour income Suppose that the government introduces a Social Security tax on workers of $2 an hour. How many workers are employed? What is the wage rate paid by employers and what is the workers' after-tax wage rate? How many workers are no longer employed? The number of workers employed is 14.00 13.00 12.00- 11.00 10.00- 9.00- 8.00- 7.00 Wage rate (dollars per hour) 10.00 600 700 900 900 1000 1100 500 Quantity (workers) LS LD 1200 ouarrow_forwardThe table shows the distribution of market income. Suppose that the government redistributes income by taxing the 60 percent of households with the highest market incomes 10 percent, then distributing the tax collected as an equal benefit to the 40 percent with the lowest market income. If the people whose market incomes are taxed cut their work hours and their market incomes fall by 10 percent, what is the distribution of income after taxes and benefits? Complete the table to show the new distribution of income. (Ignore any cost of administrating the redistribution scheme.) >>> Answer to 1 decimal place. Search Households Lowest 20 percent Second 20 percent Third 20 percent Fourth 20 percent Highest 20 percent Market income (millions of dollars) 5 9 20 30 36 Income after tax and benef (percentage of tc income after ta and benefits) Nextarrow_forwardIn the budget presented by the government, far reaching tax rebates are provided to all classes of tax payers. A researcher therefore conducts a survey to examine whether these tax reductions have led to a change in the consumption patterns of various social classes in the country. What kind of study would this fall under? Explain your answer.arrow_forward
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