Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Access Card
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780136849513
Author: Acemoglu, Daron, Laibson, David, List, John
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 18, Problem 4P
To determine
Equilibrium in an ultimatum game where rejection leads to the responder and the proposer receiving
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Students have asked these similar questions
Economics
CHOOSE THE CORRECT ANSWER.
Remember that in the equilibrium prediction of an
ultimatum game, the Proposer will offer the
smallest non-zero amount of money possible.
First-year Commerce students were asked to play an Ultimatum game where a choice had to be made over the division of R100. Offers could only be
made in R10 increments, and the results of the various offers made are reported in the table below.
Amount offered by Proposer
RO
R10
R20
R30
R40
R50
Proportion rejected
100%
60%
50%
30%
10%
0%
What is the equilibrium split of the R100 between the Proposer and the Responder?
O A. Proposer: R50, Responder: R50
O B. Proposer: R10, Responder: R90
O C. Proposer: R90, Responder: R10
O D. Proposer: R60, Responder: R40
O E. Proposer: R40, Responder: R60
Consider the game in the image attached below, which is infinitely repeated at t = 1, 2, ... Both players discount the future at rate: delta E (0, 1). The stage game is in the image attached.
"Grim Trigger" strategies: Describe the "Grim Trigger" strategy profile of this game. Draw the finite automata representation of this strategy profile. Find the lowest value of delta for this strategy profile to form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Show all steps, please and thank you.
Chapter 18 Solutions
Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Access Card
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