Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Access Card
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780136849513
Author: Acemoglu, Daron, Laibson, David, List, John
Publisher: PEARSON
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Question
Chapter 18, Problem 6P
(a)
To determine
Game tree for the extensive-form game between Michael and Sollozzo.
(b)
To determine
Michael will not meet Sollozzo in the given game.
(c)
To determine
Sequence of the game when the Bocchichhio family gets involved.
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We consider the following three-player strategic form game, where Alice's strategies are U, C, and D, and Bob's strategies are L, M, and R, and Carol's strategies are A and B. Carol's strategy consists of choosing which table will be used for the payoffs, Table A or Table B.Table A is below, where for each cell the first number is Alice's payoff, the second number is Bob's payoff and the third number is Carol's payoff..
L
M
R
U
8,11,14
3,13,9
0,5,8
C
9,9,8
8,7,7
6,5,7
D
0,8,12
4,9,2
0,4,8
Table A
Table B is below, where again, for each cell, the first number is Alice's payoff, the second number is Bob's payoff and the third number is Carol's payoff..
L
M
R
U
14,1,0
13,2,11
1,3,2
C
0,0,2
7,2,3
14,3,2
D
7,12,11
12,12,0
2,11,2
Table B
This game may not have any Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, or it may have one or more equilibria.How many Nash equilibria does this game have?
Suppose Antonio and Trinity are playing a game that requires both to simultaneously choose an action: Up or Down. The payoff matrix that follows
shows the earnings of each person as a function of both of their choices. For example, the upper-right cell shows that if Antonio chooses Up and Trinity
chooses Down, Antonio will receive a payoff of 7 and Trinity will receive a payoff of 5.
Trinity
Up
Down
Up
4,8
7,5
Antonio
Down
3,2
5,6
In this game, the only dominant strategy is for
to choose
The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Antonio chooses,
and Trinity chooses
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Suppose Carlos and Deborah are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Carlos chooses Right and Deborah chooses Right, Carlos will receive a payoff of 6 and Deborah will receive a payoff of 5.
Deborah
Left
Right
Carlos
Left
8, 4
4, 5
Right
5, 4
6, 5
The only dominant strategy in this game is for to choose .
The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Carlos chooses and Deborah chooses .
Chapter 18 Solutions
Pearson eText Microeconomics -- Access Card
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