MICROECONOMICS W/CONNECT >IC<
20th Edition
ISBN: 9781259890031
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 19, Problem 13DQ
To determine
Antitrust law and Misoft.
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Use the accompanying graph to answer the questions that follow. (LO1, LO2) a. Suppose this monopolist is unregulated. (1) What price will the firm charge to maximize its profits? (2) What is the level of consumer surplus at this price? b. Suppose the firm’s price is regulated at $80. (1) What is the firm’s marginal revenue if it produces 7 units? (2) If the firm is able to cover its variable costs at the regulated price, how much output will the firm produce in the short run to maximize its profits? (3) In the long run, how much output will this firm produce if the price remains regulated at $80?
6. The accompanying diagram shows the demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost of a monopolist. (LO1, LO3, LO5)
a. Determine the profit-maximizing output and price.
b. What price and output would prevail if this firm’s product were sold by price-taking
firms in a perfectly competitive market?
c. Calculate the deadweight loss of this monopoly.
8. The elasticity of demand for a firm’s product is –2.5 and its advertising elasticity of demand is 0.2. (LO8)
a. Determine the firm’s optimal advertising-to-sales ratio.
b. If the firm’s revenues are $40,000, what is its profit-maximizing level of advertising?
4. You are the manager of a monopoly, and your demand and cost functions are given by P = 300 − 3Q and C(Q) = 1,500 + 2Q2, respectively. (LO3, LO4)
a. What price–quantity combination maximizes your firm’s profits?
b. Calculate the maximum profits.
c. Is demand elastic, inelastic, or unit elastic at the profit-maximizing price–quantity combination?
d. What price–quantity combination maximizes revenue?
e. Calculate the maximum revenues.
f. Is demand elastic, inelastic, or unit elastic at the revenue-maximizing price–quantity combination?
6. The accompanying diagram shows the demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost of a monopolist. (LO1, LO3, LO5)
a. Determine the profit-maximizing output and price.
b. What price and output would prevail if this firm’s product were sold by price-taking
firms in a perfectly competitive market?
c. Calculate the deadweight loss of this monopoly.
8. The elasticity of demand for a firm’s product is –2.5 and its advertising elasticity of demand is 0.2.…
Chapter 19 Solutions
MICROECONOMICS W/CONNECT >IC<
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