Bundle: Principles of Microeconomics, 7th + MindTap Economics, 1 term (6 months) Printed Access Card
Bundle: Principles of Microeconomics, 7th + MindTap Economics, 1 term (6 months) Printed Access Card
7th Edition
ISBN: 9781305135451
Author: N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 22, Problem 5CQQ
To determine

The application ofMedian voter theorem.

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Problem 2. The planning committee for a renewable energy trade show is trying to decide what city to hold their next show in. The votes are shown below. Numbers of Voters 9 19 11 8 1st choice Buffalo Atlanta Chicago Buffalo 2nd choice Atlanta Buffalo Buffalo Chicago 3rd choice Chicago Chicago Atlanta Atlanta   How many voters voted in this election? How many votes are needed for a majority? A plurality? Find the winner under the plurality method. Find the winner under the Borda Count Method. Find the winner under the Plurality with Elimination method. Find the winner under the Pairwise Comparison Voting method.
Ex. 4 Strength Can Be Weakness A three-person committee has to choose a winner for a prize. After some debate, there are three candidates still under consideration. Let's call these candidates a, b and c, and call those committee members 1, 2 and 3. The committee members only care about which candidate wins the prize, and their preferences as follows: member 1 prefers a to b and b to c; member 2 prefers c to a and a to b; and member 3 prefers b to c and c to a. The rules of the competition say that the committee should first apply majority vote (secret ballot, one member one vote) and the candidate with the most votes wins. If the vote is tied, that is, the majority rule select a unique winning candidate, then the winner will be the candidate for whom member 1 voted. Thus, it might seem that member 1 has an advantage. (1) Write down the strategic form of this voting game. [You may assign any number to the payoff of each voter, as long as it is consistent with her preference order.] (2)…
Ex. 4 Strength Can Be Weakness A three-person committee has to choose a winner for a prize. After some debate, there are three candidates still under consideration. Let's call these candidates a, b and c, and call those committee members 1, 2 and 3. The committee members only care about which candidate wins the prize, and their preferences as follows: member 1 prefers a to b and b to c; member 2 prefers c to a and a to b; and member 3 prefers b to c and c to a. The rules of the competition say that the committee should first apply majority vote (secret ballot, one member one vote) and the candidate with the most votes wins. If the vote is tied, that is, the majority rule select a unique winning candidate, then the winner will be the candidate for whom member 1 voted. Thus, it might seem that member 1 has an advantage. (1) Write down the strategic form of this voting game. [You may assign any number to the payoff of each voter, as long as it is consistent with her preference order.] (2)…
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