Statistics for Management and Economics (Book Only)
Statistics for Management and Economics (Book Only)
11th Edition
ISBN: 9781337296946
Author: Gerald Keller
Publisher: Cengage Learning
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Chapter 22.2, Problem 19E
To determine

Calculate the EVPI.

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Brown’s TV Production is considering producing a pilot for a comedy series for a major network.  While the network may reject the pilot and series, it may also purchase the program for 1 or 2 years.  Brown may produce the pilot or transfer the rights for the series to a competitor for $100,000.  Brown’s profits are summarized in the following payoff table (profits in thousands).     sate of nature     reject 1 year  2 years produce pilot -100 50 150 sell to competitor 100 100 100   If the probability estimates for the states of nature are, P(reject)=0.20, P(1 year)=0.30, and P(2 years)=0.5, what is the maximum Brown should be willing to pay for inside information on what the network will do?
True/False a. Consider a strategic game, in which player i has two actions, a and b. Let s−i be some strategy profile of her opponents. If a IS a best response to s−i, then b is NOT a best response to s−i. b. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS NOT a best response to s−i, then a does NOT weakly dominates b. c. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, IS a best response to s−i, SO IS a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. d. Consider the same game in (a). If a mixed strategy of i that assigns probabilities 13 and 23 to a and b, respectively, is NOT a best response to some strategy profile of her opponents, s−i, NEITHER is a mixed strategy that assigns probabilities 32 and 13 to a and b, respectively. e. Consider the same game in (a). If a IS a best response to s−i, SO IS any mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a. f. Consider the same game in (a). If a…
You hold an oral, or English, auction among three bidders. You estimate that each bidder has a value of either $40 or $50 for the item, and you attach probabilities to each value of 50%. The winning bidder must pay a price equal to the second highest bid. The following table lists the eight possible combinations for bidder values. Each combination is equally likely to occur. On the following table, indicate the price paid by the winning bidder. Combination Number Bidder 1 Value Bidder 2 Value Bidder 3 Value Probability Price ($) ($) ($) 1 $40 $40 $40 0.125      2 $40 $40 $50 0.125      3 $40 $50 $40 0.125      4 $40 $50 $50 0.125      5 $50 $40 $40 0.125      6 $50 $40 $50 0.125      7 $50 $50 $40 0.125      8 $50 $50 $50 0.125        The expected price paid is   .   Suppose that bidders 1 and 2 collude and would be willing to bid up to a maximum of their values, but the two bidders would not be willing to bid against each…
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