Economics: Principles, Problems, & Policies (McGraw-Hill Series in Economics) - Standalone book
20th Edition
ISBN: 9780078021756
Author: McConnell, Campbell R.; Brue, Stanley L.; Flynn Dr., Sean Masaki
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Chapter 4.A, Problem 1ADQ
To determine
Asymmetric information and insurance price.
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Suppose that the price elasticity for hip replacement surgeries is 0.2. Further suppose that hip replacement surgeries are originally not covered by health insurance and that at a price of $50,000 each, 10,000 such surgeries are demanded each year. LO24.2 a. Suppose that health insurance begins to cover hip replacement surgeries and that everyone interested in getting a hip replacement has health insurance. If insurance covers 50 percent of the cost of the surgery, by what percentage would you expect the quantity demanded of hip replacements to increase? What if insurance covered 90 percent of the price? If insurance covers 50 percent of the bill, just assume that the price paid by consumers falls 50 percent.) b. Suppose that with insurance companies covering 90 percent of the price, the increase in demand leads to a jump in the price per hip surgery from $50,000 to $100,000. How much will each insured patient now pay for a hip replacement surgery? Compared to the original situation,…
Complete the accompanying table and answer the accompanying questions. (L01, LO6, LO7)
a. At what level of the control variable are net benefits maximized?
b. What is the relation between marginal benefit and marginal cost at this levelof the variable?
Control Variable Q
Total Benefits B(Q)
Total Cost C(Q)
Net Benefits N(Q)
Marginal Benefit MB(Q)
Marginal Cost MC(Q)
Marginal Cost MC(Q)
100
1200
950
60
101
1400
70
102
1590
80
103
1770
90
104
1940
100
105
2100
110
106
2250
120
107
2390
130
108
2520
140
109
2640
150
110
2750
160
Abdul’s utility function is given by U A 5 M A 2 y M B , where M A is Abdul’s wealth level and M B is Benjamin’s wealth level. Benjamin’s utility function is given by (LO1) U B 5 M B 2 y M A . Suppose M A 5 M B 5 10 initially, and suppose there is a joint project that Ab dul and Benjamin can undertake that will generate an additional 10 units of wealth to divide between them. The project is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. What is the minimum payment Abdul must be given to secure his agreement to perform the project? What is the minimum payment Benjamin must be given? Will they perform the project? (LO1)
Chapter 4 Solutions
Economics: Principles, Problems, & Policies (McGraw-Hill Series in Economics) - Standalone book
Ch. 4.A - Prob. 1ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ADQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 2ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 3ARQCh. 4.A - Prob. 1APCh. 4 - Prob. 1DQCh. 4 - Prob. 2DQCh. 4 - Prob. 3DQ
Ch. 4 - Prob. 4DQCh. 4 - Prob. 5DQCh. 4 - Prob. 6DQCh. 4 - Prob. 7DQCh. 4 - Prob. 8DQCh. 4 - Prob. 9DQCh. 4 - Prob. 1RQCh. 4 - Prob. 2RQCh. 4 - Prob. 3RQCh. 4 - Prob. 4RQCh. 4 - Prob. 5RQCh. 4 - Prob. 6RQCh. 4 - Prob. 7RQCh. 4 - Prob. 1PCh. 4 - Prob. 2PCh. 4 - Prob. 3PCh. 4 - Prob. 4PCh. 4 - Prob. 5PCh. 4 - Prob. 6PCh. 4 - Prob. 7P
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