MACROECONOMICS (LL)
21st Edition
ISBN: 9781260186949
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 5.A, Problem 2ARQ
To determine
The optimal size of project from the economic perspective.
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Suppose that friends Jennifer, Stephanie, and Megan cannot agree on how much to spend for a bouquet of flowers to send to a person who allowed them to use her beach house for the weekend. Jennifer wants to buy a moderately priced bouquet, Stephanie wants to buy an expensive bouquet, and Megan wants to buy a very expensive bouquet. Assuming no paradox of voting, majority voting will result in the decision to buy Multiple Choice an inexpensive bouquet. a very expensive bouquet. a moderately priced bouquet. an expensive bouquet. B
Which of the following is true?
a. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that There is no voting method that will satisfy a reasonable set of fairness criteria when there are three or candidates.
b. Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorem states that there is a voting method is completely resistant to strategic voting.
c. None of the given choices
d. May's Theorem states that the majority method will always have a winner.
Marie and Mike usually vote against each other’s party in the SSC elections resulting to negating or offsetting their votes. If they vote for their party of choice, each of them gains four units of utility (and lose four units of utility from a vote against their party of choice). However, it costs each of them two units of utility for the hassle of actually voting during the SSC elections.
Can you explain the scenario above?
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- Arrow's impossibility theorem states that under certain assumptions about preferences, no voting system exists that satisfies all of the following properties: • Unanimity • Transitivity • Independence of irrelevant alternatives • No dictatorsarrow_forwardExplain why majority rule respects the preferencesof the median voter rather than those of the averagevoter.arrow_forwardConsider the following two sets of individuals and their group preference rankings, aggregated using the same voting rule. 1: individual preferences: x>y>z>w, y>z>w>x, and z>w>x>y group preferences: x>Gy, z>Gx, w>Gx, y>Gw, y>Gz and z>Gw 2:individual preferences: y>z>x>w, y>w>x>z, and y>w>z>x group preferences: y>Gx, y>Gw, z>Gy, x>Gw, z>Gx, and z>Gw Question: Which of Arrow's conditions (P, D, I, or Transitivity) is violated by their group preferences? (hint: checking I requires comparing the outcomes in the two different groups to find a violation).arrow_forward
- Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 4 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 4 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 2 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -2, Mrs. Ward: -2 Mr. Ward: 2, Mrs. Ward: -4 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -4, Mrs. Ward: 2 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to (vote/not vote) and for Mrs. Ward to (vote/not vote) . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of ____ units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would increase utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash…arrow_forwardConsider the following voting game. There are three players, 1, 2 and 3. And there are three alternatives: A, B and C. Players vote simultaneously for an alternative. Abstaining is not allowed. Thus, the strategy space for each player is {A, B, C}. The alternative with the most votes wins. If no alternative receives a majority, then alternative A is selected. Denote ui(d) the utility obtained by player i if alternave d {A, B, C} is selected. The payoff functions are, u1 (A) = u2 (B) = u3 (C) = 2 u1 (B) = u2 (C) = u3 (A) = 1 u1 (C) = u2 (A) = u3 (B) = 0 a. Let us denote by (i, j, k) a profile of pure strategies where player 1’s strategy is (to vote for) i, player 2’s strategy is j and player 3’s strategy is k. Show that the pure strategy profiles (A,A,A) and (A,B,A) are both Nash equilibria. b. Is (A,A,B) a Nash equilibrium? Comment.arrow_forwardAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Assuming the following voter preferences: True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 4. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D. If the tax in C induces 100% compliance (everyone votes), did this tax…arrow_forward
- Mr. and Mrs. Ward typically vote oppositely in elections and so their votes “cancel each other out.” They each gain 6 units of utility from a vote for their positions (and lose 6 units of utility from a vote against their positions). However, the bother of actually voting costs each 3 units of utility. The following matrix summarizes the strategies for both Mr. Ward and Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward Vote Don't Vote Mr. Ward Vote Mr. Ward: -3, Mrs. Ward: -3 Mr. Ward: 3, Mrs. Ward: -6 Don't Vote Mr. Ward: -6, Mrs. Ward: 3 Mr. Ward: 0, Mrs. Ward: 0 The Nash equilibrium for this game is for Mr. Ward to and for Mrs. Ward to . Under this outcome, Mr. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility and Mrs. Ward receives a payoff of units of utility. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Ward agreed not to vote in tomorrow's election. True or False: This agreement would decrease utility for each spouse, compared to the Nash equilibrium from the previous part of the question. True…arrow_forwardBella Robinson and Steve Carson are running for a seat in the U.S. Senate. If both candidates campaign only in the major cities of the state, then Robinson is expected to get 80% of the votes; if both candidates campaign in only rural areas, then Robinson is expected get 75% of the votes; if Robinson campaigns exclusively in the city and Carson campaigns exclusively in the rural areas, then Robinson is expected to get 30% of the votes; finally, if Robinson campaigns exclusively in the rural areas and Carson campaigns exclusively in the city, then Robinson is expected to get 65% of the votes. (a) Construct the payoff matrix for the game. (Enter each percentage as a decimal.) Carson City Rural Robinson CityRural Is the game strictly determined? YesNo (b) Find the optimal strategy for both Robinson (row) and Carson (column). P = Q =arrow_forwardSuppose there are only five people in a society and each favors one of the five highway construction options in Table 16.2 (include no highway construction as one of the options). Explain which of these highway options will be selected using a majority paired-choice vote. Will this option be the optimal size of the project from an economic perspective?arrow_forward
- The above table shows the benefit to each voter if an issue passes. The cost per voter of the issue passing is $100. According to Majority Rules voting, will the issue pass? According to marginal analysis, should the issue pass?arrow_forwardA new government lottery has been announced. Each person who buys a ticket submits an integer between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose submission is closest to four-fifths of the average of all submissions. If ties occur, the price will be shared. If Chloe expects other players to select numbers randomly, what number should she choose? Chloe should choose the number (a)_____ if you expect all other players to exhibit the same depth of reasoning as Chloe, what number would you choose? you should choose the number (b)______arrow_forwardDebt as a means of mitigating the common-pool problem. (Chari and Cole, 1993.) Consider the same setup as in Problem 12.15. Suppose, however, that there is an initial level of debt, D. The government budget constraint is therefore (a) How does an increase in D affect the Nash equilibrium level of G?(b) Explain intuitively why your results in part (a) and in Problem 12.15 suggest that in a two-period model in which the representatives choose D after the first-period value of G is determined, the representatives would choose D > 0.(c) Do you think that in a two-period model where the representatives choose D before the first-period value of G is determined, the representatives would choose D > 0? Explain intuitively.arrow_forward
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