LABOR ECONOMICS
8th Edition
ISBN: 9781260004724
Author: BORJAS
Publisher: RENT MCG
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Question
Chapter 6, Problem 14P
a)
To determine
Calculating the
The rate of discount, where each year of college costs $15,000, each year of post college work pays $60,000 and each year of non-college work pays $40,000.
b)
To determine
The rate of discount, where each year of college costs $15,000, each year of post college work pays $80,000 and each year of non-college work pays $35,000.
c)
To determine
The rate of discount, where each year of college costs $35,000, each year of post college work pays $60,000 and each year of non-college work pays $35,000.
d)
To determine
The rate of discount, where each year of college costs $15,000, the first year of post college work pays $60,000 but then increases by 5 percent per year and each year of non-college work pays $35,000 but then increases by 5 percent each year thereafter.
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