Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
9th Edition
ISBN: 9781259290619
Author: Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher: McGraw-Hill Education
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Question
Chapter 7, Problem 2CACQ
a
To determine
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) index of industry is to be ascertained.
b)
To determine
The four firm concentration ratio is to be calculated.
c)
To determine
Whether Department of Justice may block horizontal merger of two firms.
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Students have asked these similar questions
Based on United States Census Bureau data for 2017, for the utilities (electricity & gas) industry the four firm concentration ratio (C4) is 16.2 percent and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 161.4. Why might the actual concentration, and therefore market power enjoyed by a specific utility company in a state, be greater than what is indicated by these numbers? These ratios are calculated for the entire country, and not for a specific city or state. Explain & show work.
Smyth Industries operated as a monopolist for the past several years, earning annual profits amounting to $50 million, which it could have maintained if Jones Incorporated did not enter the market. The result of this increased competition is lower prices and lower profits; Smyth Industries now earns $10 million annually. The managers of Smyth Industries are trying to devise a plan to drive Jones Incorporated out of the market so Smyth can regain its monopoly position (and profit). One of Smyth's managers suggests pricing its product 50 percent below marginal cost for exactly one year. The estimated impact of such a move is a loss of $1 billion. Ignoring antitrust concerns, compute the present value of Smyth Industries' profits if it could have remained a monopoly when the interest rate was 5 percent.
Multiple Choice
$210 million
$200 million
$1.05 billion
$100 million
Q4
Industries X (production of plastic sheds in Canada) and Y (production of cardboard in Canada) both have four-firm concentration ratios of 16 percent, but the Herfindahl index for X is 102, while that for Y is 95. These data suggest
Multiple Choice
both industries are strongly oligopolistic.
both industries are experiencing diminishing returns.
greater market power in Y than in X.
greater market power in X than in Y.
that price competition is stronger in X than in Y.
Chapter 7 Solutions
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-hill Series Economics)
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- Suppose the European Union (EU) was investigated and proposed a merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists’ definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is −1 and that it costs $15.70 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch.Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor.Instructions: Do not round intermediate calculations. Enter your final responses rounded to the nearest penny (two decimal places).Pre-merger price: $ Post-merger price: $arrow_forwardWith an estimated market share of 37%, Atlas is the dominant company and the price leader in an oligopolistic steel industry. The remaining market share is distributed equally between seven companies. Suppose that one of those ten companies, Norton, attempts to gain market share by undercutting the price set by Atlas. Calculate the “Four Firm Ratio” and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index “HHI” in the above-described market and interpret your answer. What model can best resemble this market? Briefly explain this model. In your opinion, what will be the effect of Norton’s attempt described above on Atlas’s market share: will it increase, decrease, or not affected at all?arrow_forwardSuppose Fiat recently entered into an Agreement and Plan of Merger with Case for $4.3 billion. Prior to the merger, the market for four-wheel-drive tractors consisted of five firms. The market was highly concentrated, with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 3,085. Case’s share of that market was 11 percent, while Fiat comprised just 7 percent of the market. If approved, by how much would the postmerger Herfindahl-Hirschman index increase?arrow_forward
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