Microeconomics - With Access (Custom)
20th Edition
ISBN: 9781259877551
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
expand_more
expand_more
format_list_bulleted
Question
Chapter 8, Problem 3RQ
To determine
Heuristics and biases.
Expert Solution & Answer
Want to see the full answer?
Check out a sample textbook solution
Students have asked these similar questions
Now suppose agent C can produce private information about the true realization x at t=1 at the cost γ=4. Suppose lA=lB=φA=φB=1 and x is either 40 or 100 with equal probability and w=70. - At t=1, agent B owns the bond. What is the maximum amount LB that agent B can borrow with probability 1?- At t=0, what amount LA can agent A borrow from agent B in a repo trade at t=0 and what is the haircut in equilibrium?
Abdul’s utility function is given by U A 5 M A 2 y M B , where M A is Abdul’s wealth level and M B is Benjamin’s wealth level. Benjamin’s utility function is given by (LO1) U B 5 M B 2 y M A . Suppose M A 5 M B 5 10 initially, and suppose there is a joint project that Ab dul and Benjamin can undertake that will generate an additional 10 units of wealth to divide between them. The project is neither pleasant nor unpleasant. What is the minimum payment Abdul must be given to secure his agreement to perform the project? What is the minimum payment Benjamin must be given? Will they perform the project? (LO1)
**Practice**
suppose that many insurance companies sell contracts of the following format:- The insurance premium P is the same for everyone in this market, regardless of the value of their cell phone. That’s because regulations prevent the companies from charging different premiums based on cell phone value.
- If the cell phone is stolen, they get the value of the phone back (that is, Anne would get$700 from the insurance company if her phone were stolen, and Bob would get $600)
Assume that the insurance companies are all risk-neutral and that market is competitive, and so the contract is such that the insurance companies have zero profits. Also assume that 50% of consumers in the market are identical to Anne, and 50% are identical to Bob. What is the actuarially fair premium and who buys the full insurance plan?a. The actuarially fair premium is 260 and only Bob buys itb. The actuarially fair premium is 130 and both Anne and Bob buy itc.The actuarially fair premium is 180 and both…
Chapter 8 Solutions
Microeconomics - With Access (Custom)
Knowledge Booster
Similar questions
- **Practice** suppose that many insurance companies sell contracts of the following format: - The insurance premium P is the same for everyone in this market, regardless of the value of their cell phone. That’s because regulations prevent the companies from charging different premiums based on cell phone value.- If the cell phone is stolen, they get the value of the phone back (that is, Anne would get $700 from the insurance company if her phone were stolen, and Bob would get $600) Assume that the insurance companies are all risk-neutral and that market is competitive, and so the contract is such that the insurance companies have zero profits. Also assume that 50% of consumers in the market are identical to Anne, and 50% are identical to Bob. Continue assuming that the insurance companies are risk-neutral and competitive, but now instead of assuming that the risks are correlated instead of independent. Specifically, suppose that with probability 0.2, a bandit group raids the city and…arrow_forward(Bets as insurance) Suppose that P1 = P2 = P, that P(Y = 1) = P(Y = 2) = ½, that if Y (ω) = 1, then (W1, W2)(ω) = (1, 0), and that if Y (ω) = 2, then (W1, W2)(ω) = (0, 1). Show that if u1 and u2 are strictly concave, increasing expected utility functions, there are acceptable bets making both strictly better off. Show that this is not true if u1 and u2 are linear.arrow_forward"Companies should use investment entry modes whenever possible because they offer the greatest control over business operations." Do you agree or disagree with this statement? Are there times when other market entry modes offer greater control? How (if at all) do you think a company's product influences the choice of entry mode? Cite the example of 2 products that would influence the choice of entry mode in a different way.arrow_forward
- 3. Suppose that individuals with a strong enthusiasm for technology are willing to pay $500 now for the latest iPhone, but only $350 if they must wait a year. Normal people are willing to pay $250, and their desire to purchase does not vary with time. Assume for simplicity that there are equal numbers of each customer type (strong enthusiasm and normal), that the MC of the iPhone is $100, ignore the time value of money, and there are only two years. (Hint: With discrete problems consider all the different options and evaluate each of them to determine the optimal strategy. In this case, there are only three prices given and two time periods, so a total of 6 pricing strategies exist but some of them will.) What is the highest profit level that can be achieved if the price for an iPhone is fixed for both years (uniform pricing)? What is the highest profit level that can be achieved if the price for an iPhone can be altered across the two years?arrow_forwardSuppose you must choose between the two prospects, (40,000, 0.025) or (1,000): The prospect of winning 40,000 with a probability of 2.5% or winning 1,000 with certainty. Suppose, too, that the following three graphs represent your utility function (according to expected utility theory) and your weighting and value scales (according to prospect theory). Finally, suppose that your current wealth is 20,000. d. Based on prospect theory, which prospect would you choose? Why? e. Why is your decision different under the two theories? (Hint: what is one of the common human traits that prospect theory captures that expected utility theory cannot?)arrow_forwardAre derivatives similar to insurance in that both have an indefinite life spans, allow for the transfer of risk from one party to another or allow for the transformation of the underlying risk itself? First explain why one or more of the options above are correct. Secondly explain why, if any of the remaining options are incorrect. Your justification/s should be one sentence for each of the points above, in bullet point format.arrow_forward
- The Financial Markets proficiency has been more inclined to interest rates productssuch as loans and term deposits in Zambia than structured products. With the adverseeconomic repercussions that countries, including Zambia experienced during theoutbreak of COVID-19, the market has moved to structured products provision such asoptions, forwards, to mention but a few. The implementation of risk mitigation strategicby most companies made the financial market to enhance structured products that aresuitable to hedge all risks arising from investments and business operations.Assuming Zambeef employees you as the Investment Hedging Director to manage theinvestment in Zambia, you approach your bank, Standard Chartered Bank to structurean option to help hedge Zambeef future shares transactions. You enter into a 5 yearscall option contract at an exercise price of K350 and paid option premium amounting toK50. Three years later, the company has an increase in operational needs and decidesto assess…arrow_forwardLet W0 represents an individual’s current wealth and U(W) is this individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index (or utility function) that reflects how s/he feels about various levels of wealth. Assume this individual marginal utility of wealth decreases a wealth increases. Which of the following statements is true? a. This individual will prefer to keep his or her current wealth rather than taking a fair gamble. b. For this individual, a 50-50 chance of winning or losing c dollars yields less expected utility than does refusing the bet. c. This individual is said to be risk averse. d. All of the above.arrow_forwardComplete the accompanying table and answer the accompanying questions. (L01, LO6, LO7) a. At what level of the control variable are net benefits maximized? b. What is the relation between marginal benefit and marginal cost at this levelof the variable? Control Variable Q Total Benefits B(Q) Total Cost C(Q) Net Benefits N(Q) Marginal Benefit MB(Q) Marginal Cost MC(Q) Marginal Cost MC(Q) 100 1200 950 60 101 1400 70 102 1590 80 103 1770 90 104 1940 100 105 2100 110 106 2250 120 107 2390 130 108 2520 140 109 2640 150 110 2750 160arrow_forward
- . Wood, the receiver of Stanton Oil Company, suedStanton’s shareholders to recover dividends paid to themfor three years, claiming that at the time these dividendswere declared, Stanton was in fact insolvent. Wood didnot allege that the present creditors were also creditorswhen the dividends were paid. Were the dividendswrongfully paid? Explainarrow_forwardMa3. The payoff matrix below shows the payoffs for Stefan and Imani in a two strategy game. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, Stefan will play strategy Up with a probability of 1/5 and strategy Down with a probability of 4/5, and Imani will play strategy Left with a probability of 2/5 and strategy Right with a probability of 3/5. What is Stefan's expected payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium? 10.6 5 4.56 10.4arrow_forwardSuppose that, holding yield constant, investors are indifferent as to whether they hold bonds issued by the federal govemment or bonds issued by state and local governments (that is, they consider the bonds the same with respect to default risk, information costs, and liquidity) Suppose that state governments have issued perpetuities (or consoles) with $78 coupons and that the federal govemment has also issued perpetuities with $78 coupons. If the state and federal perpetuites both have after-tax yields of 8%, what are their pre-tax yields? (Assume that the relevant federal income tax rate is 31.13%) * The pre-tax yield on the state perpetuity will be______________% * The pre-tax yield on the federal perpetuity will be_______________%arrow_forward
arrow_back_ios
SEE MORE QUESTIONS
arrow_forward_ios
Recommended textbooks for you
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...EconomicsISBN:9781305506381Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. HarrisPublisher:Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies an...
Economics
ISBN:9781305506381
Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris
Publisher:Cengage Learning