Microeconomics - With Access (Custom)
20th Edition
ISBN: 9781259877551
Author: McConnell
Publisher: MCG
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Chapter 8, Problem 4DQ
To determine
The connection between the heuristics and the bad publicity.
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Students have asked these similar questions
Teletronics reported record profits of $100,000 last year and is on track to exceed those profits this year. Teletronics competes in a very competitive market where many of the firms are merging in an attempt to gain competitive advantages. Currently, the company’s top manager is compensated with a fixed salary that does not include any performance bonuses. Explain why this manager might nonetheless have a strong incentive to maximize the firm’s profits. (LO4, LO5)
Newfoundland’s fishing industry has recently declined sharply due to overfish- ing, even though fishing companies were supposedly bound by a quota agree- ment. If all fishermen had abided by the agreement, yields could have been maintained at high levels. LO4
Model this situation as a prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are Company A and Company B and the strategies are to keep the quota and break the quota. Include appropriate payoffs in the matrix. Explain why overfishing is inevitable in the absence of effective enforcement of the quota agreement.
Provide another environmental example of a prisoner’s dilemma.
In many potential prisoner’s dilemmas, a way out of the dilemma for a would-be cooperator is to make reliable character judgments about the trustworthiness of potential partners. Explain why this solution is not avail-
able in many situations involving degradation of the environment.
Complete the accompanying table and answer the accompanying questions. (L01, LO6, LO7)
a. At what level of the control variable are net benefits maximized?
b. What is the relation between marginal benefit and marginal cost at this levelof the variable?
Control Variable Q
Total Benefits B(Q)
Total Cost C(Q)
Net Benefits N(Q)
Marginal Benefit MB(Q)
Marginal Cost MC(Q)
Marginal Cost MC(Q)
100
1200
950
60
101
1400
70
102
1590
80
103
1770
90
104
1940
100
105
2100
110
106
2250
120
107
2390
130
108
2520
140
109
2640
150
110
2750
160
Chapter 8 Solutions
Microeconomics - With Access (Custom)
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