econ 522 hw 6 solutions S2024

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May 1, 2024

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Econ 522 – Law and Economics – Spring 2024 Homework 6 – More Contract Law – Solutions QUESTION 1 – Investing in Performance It’s Fall, and lots of people are selling used jet-skis. You decide to buy one, store it through the winter, and use it on Lake Mendota next summer. You find one you like; it’s worth $2,900 to you and $2,500 to its owner, and you sign a contract with the owner to buy the jet-ski for $2,750. Your friend has a truck and extra space in his garage, and says he’ll help you transport the jet-ski and store it at his place for free. However, your friend is not completely dependable, and if he forgets to show up, you’ll be unable to buy the jet-ski. (a) How much do you benefit from the contract to buy the jet-ski, assuming your friend shows up with his truck? How much does the seller benefit? You benefit $150 ($2900 - $2750), and the seller benefits $250 ($2750 - $2500). (b) Under a remedy of expectation damages, how much money would you owe the seller if your friend doesn’t show up? How much worse off would it make you if your friend didn’t show up, relative to if he did? You would owe the seller $250 , since this is the benefit they would have received. Your friend failing to show up therefore makes you $400 worse off , since you owe $250 in damages instead of receiving a benefit of $150. (c) Another buyer had offered the seller $2,550 for the jet-ski, but bought a different one after the seller accepted your offer. Under a remedy of opportunity cost damages, how much money would you owe the seller if your friend doesn’t show up and you don’t buy the jet-ski? How much worse off would it make you if he didn’t show up, relative to if he did? Now you would owe the seller $50 , since that’s the profit they would have received from selling to the other buyer. Under opportunity cost damages, if your friend doesn’t show up, it makes you $200 worse off , since now you lose $50 instead of getting a benefit of $150. If you don’t do anything, it’s 90% likely that your friend will show up. In addition, you could wake up extra early, drive out to where he lives, and pound on his door to remind him. This would make it 100% certain he would show up; but between the inconvenience of waking up early and the extra gas to drive to his place, this would cost you $25. Think of this as an investment in performance – it’s money you can spend to make it more likely you’re able to live up to the contract.
(d) How much social value is created by your friend showing up? Is the investment in performance efficient or inefficient? Your friend showing up creates $400 in social value. (You get a benefit of $150 and the seller gets a benefit of $250, so there’s combined value of $400, as opposed to combined value of zero if you can’t buy the jet-ski.) The investment would be efficient : it reduces the probability of breach (or increases the probability of performance) by 10%, creating additional expected social surplus of 10% x $400 = $40; and it has a social cost of $25. (e) Under a remedy of expectation damages, would you make this investment in performance? What about under a remedy of opportunity cost damages? Under expectation damages, you would choose to make this investment. Since you lose $400 when your friend doesn’t show up, reducing this probability by 10% gives you an expected private benefit of 10% x $400 = $40, more than the cost of the investment ($25). Under opportunity cost damages, you would not make this investment. Since you lose $200 when your friend doesn’t show up, reducing this probability by 10% gains you 10% x $200 = $20 in expected surplus, less than the cost of the investment. QUESTION 2 – Neighborly Conduct The following is apparently a true story, reported in a 1978 issue of Jet Magazine. A German couple, Demetrius and Traute Soupolos, wanted a child, but Demetrius was sterile (unable to have children). So they approached their neighbor Frank Maus, who was married with two children, and offered him $2,500 to impregnate Traute. After trying 72 times to get her pregnant, Maus went to a doctor and learned that he too was sterile; Maus’ wife then admitted to Maus that someone else was the father of their children. The story made the news when Demetrius and Traute sued Maus for breach of contract, demanding their $2,500 back since Maus had failed to impregnate Traute. Maus refused to return the money, claiming he had only promised to try to get Traute pregnant, and had never guaranteed success. Suppose it was determined at trial that in exchange for $2,500, Maus had in fact promised to get Traute pregnant, not just attempt to. (a) What would be the conceptual basis for calculating expectation damages in this case? (That is, what would expectation damages attempt to measure?) The value Demetrius and Traute expected to get from the contract, i.e., the value they attach to Traute being pregnant. (b) If Demetrius and Traute bought a crib and some baby clothes after signing the contract, would this affect the damages owed? Explain. This is a form of reliance. If it was foreseeable, then the added value would likely be included in expectation damages. If Maus did not (and should not have) anticipated it, then it would likely not affect damages.
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