1. There are two effort level for the agent and they are e", e". For the agent the cost for high effort is 500 and the cost for low effort is 0. The reservation utility for the agent is 500. When the agent is working for the principal, there can be three levels of profit and they are (x,x2x3) = ($1,000,000, $4,000,000, $9,000,000). The principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. The agent's utility from the wage, w, would be vw. The agent's total utility would be u = vw- c(ek) where k H,L. When the effort level is high the probabilities that each result would happen are (p",p, p") = G5. When the effort level %3D is low they are (ph, p%, p) = ÷.; 5. (1) In the ideal case where the principal can observe the effort level of the agent, what will be the wage system like? In other words, what will be (w,W2W3)?

1. There are two effort level for the agent and they are e", e". For the agent the cost for high effort is 500 and the cost for low effort is 0. The reservation utility for the agent is 500. When the agent is working for the principal, there can be three levels of profit and they are (x,x2x3) = ($1,000,000, $4,000,000, $9,000,000). The principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. The agent's utility from the wage, w, would be vw. The agent's total utility would be u = vw- c(ek) where k H,L. When the effort level is high the probabilities that each result would happen are (p",p, p") = G5. When the effort level %3D is low they are (ph, p%, p) = ÷.; 5. (1) In the ideal case where the principal can observe the effort level of the agent, what will be the wage system like? In other words, what will be (w,W2W3)?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter19: The Problem Of Adverse Selection

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1MC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Risk-neutral Icarus Airlines must commit now to leasing 1, 2, or 3 new airplanes. It knows with certainty that on the basis of business travel alone, it will need at least 1 airplane. The marketing division says that there is a 50% chance that tourism will be big enough for a second plane only. Otherwise, tourism will be big enough for a third plane. This, plus revenue information, yields the following table: Planes Tourism Revenue Expected Leased Light Heavy Profit 2 $90 million $60 million $75 million 3 $10 million $110 million $60 million Without additional information, Icarus Airlines would Select one: A. lease 2 airplanes in order to guarantee it avoids the worst outcome, $10 million B. lease 3 airplanes because $110 million is greater than $90 million C. lease 2 airplanes because $75 million is greater than $60 million. D. lease 3 airplanes because $60 million is greater than $10 million.
1. One time your company needs cash and plans to auction off subsidiaries to the highest bidder. Mention the type of auction that will maximize your company's revenue from the sale if:a. Bidder is neutral on risk and has independent personal judgment?b. Bidder is risk-neutral and has an affiliated valuation estimate? 2. A manager will use a business strategy so that in the long run the company's profits will increase. The entry of competitors has an impact on the unfavorable profitability of the company. To deal with the entry of new competitors, a manager can consider the limit pricing strategy.a. Explain what is meant by limit pricing!b. How can the limit pricing strategy be effective? 3. It is known that the demand function of "I like" brand dry food companies in the monopolistic competition market is P = 100 - 2Q, while the cost function is TC = 5 + 2Q. in this case P = price level, Q = output level, and TC = total cost.a. Determine the combination of prices and production levels…
Which of the following statements is correct? a. The outcome that maximizes the fully informed principal’s surplus is called the first best. b. The outcome that maximizes the principal’s surplus subject to the constraint that the principal is less well informed is called the second best. c. The outcome that maximizes the principal’s surplus subject to the constraint that the principal is less well informed and to an additional constraint is called the third best. d. All of the above.
Advertising can be a signal of qualitya. if advertising is freely available to all firms.b. if the benefit of attracting customers is greaterfor firms with better products.c. only if consumers are irrationally attracted toproducts they see advertised.d. only if the content of the ads contains credibleinformation about the products.
If a firm's marginal revenue is smaller than its marginal cost, then the firm should a. increase output to increase profit. b. decrease output to increase profit. c. keep output the same. d. collect additional information before taking any action.
Suppose you run a marketing survey and find you have two types of customers high-value customers willing to pay 16 and low-va consumers willing to pay just 10. Your survey tells you that there are equal numbers of high- and low- value customers. Obviously , have two possible options price high (16) and sell only to the high value group, or price low (10) and sell to everyoneThe costs incurred is 5 per unit and sales only happen to high -value consumers 50 % of the timeWhich price should you choose ? Select the correct response price high price low it depends price both high and low
A risk-neutral monopoly must set output before it knows the market price. There is a 40 percent chance the firm's demand curve will be P = 40- 2Q and a 60 percent chance it will be P = 80- 2Q. The marginal cost of the firm is MC = 4. The expected profit is....Multiple ChoiceO. $300.O. $450.O. $400O. $350.
Choice under uncertainty. Consider a coin-toss game in which the player gets $30 if they win, and $5 if they lose. The probability of winning is 50%. (a) Alan is (just) willing to pay $15 to play this game. What is Alan’s attitude to risk? Show your work.(b) Assume a market with many identical Alans, who are all forced to pay $15 to play this coin-toss game. An insurer offers an insurance policy to protect the Alans from the risk. What would be the fair (zero profit) premium on this policy? i need help with question B please.
Suppose there are two types of people, high risk (H) and low risk (L) with utility function U(c) = c0.5 Each has income (=consumption) of $100. The high risk people are 10% of the population and have a 75% chance of getting cancer in which case their income would be zero. The low risk people are the remainder of the population and have a 25% chance of getting cancer and hence zero income. The private insurance industry is perfectly competitive. (a) Suppose private insurers are able to distinguish the two types. What market price would emerge for each risk type? How much insurance would each type purchase?
2 Consider a owner-manager problem in which πgross = 2e + ε [manager has control over e, ε are factors outside of manager’s control, ε~N(0,σ2 )] The owner pays the manager a salary of s out of the gross profits. Manager’s cost of effort = e2 /2. Manager has constant risk aversion utility function. σ 2 = 4 A = 1 a) What is the first-best outcome for manager utility, manager effort, and net profits of the owner? b) Now consider that the owner cannot observe manager effort and offers a salary tied to gross profits: s(πgross) = a + b πgross What is the second-best outcome for manager utility, manager effort, and net profits of the owner?
7 Consider a supply chain with the manufacturer, the retailer and end-users, using a buy-back contract, as below cost-benefit & demand forecasting details: F=$120,000 ; c=$30 ; w=$75 ; b=$50 ; p=$122 ; s=$15; Demand 1,800 1,920 2,040 2,160 Probability 26% 27% 29% 18% Calculate the retailer’s marginal profit, retailer’s marginal loss, manufacturer’s marginal profit. Calculate the expected profit of the retailer and the manufacturer for 4 above-mentioned demand scenarios. Then, conclude on which production quantity Q to maximize manufacturer’s expected profit, which production quantity Q to maximize retailer’s expected profit.
An incumbent firm supplies a consumer by writing a contract in period 1 for delivery in period 2. The contract stipulates a price of $700 and a breach of fee of $500. The consumer values the good at $1000 and the incumbent’s cost equals $400. A potential entrant firm has uniformly distributed costs [0, 800]. If the entrant enters, there is Bertrand price competition. How much additional profit does the incumbent make because of the contract? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.