Suppose that every driver faces a 1% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $10,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $60,000 in the bank and those with $5,000 in the bank. Assume that individuals with $5,000 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank. What is the actuarially fair price of insurance? What price are individuals with $5,000 in the bank willing to pay for the insurance? Will those with $5,000 in the bank voluntarily purchase insurance? What is the effect of state laws forcing individuals to purchase auto liability insurance?

Suppose that every driver faces a 1% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $10,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $60,000 in the bank and those with $5,000 in the bank. Assume that individuals with $5,000 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank. What is the actuarially fair price of insurance? What price are individuals with $5,000 in the bank willing to pay for the insurance? Will those with $5,000 in the bank voluntarily purchase insurance? What is the effect of state laws forcing individuals to purchase auto liability insurance?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.6P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

Suppose the equilibrium price for good quality used cars is $20,000. And the equilibrium price for poor quality used cars is $10,000. Assume a potential used car buyer has imperfect information as to the condition of any given used car. Assume this potential buyer believes the probability a given used car is good quality is .60 and the probability a given used car is low quality is .40. Assume the seller has perfect information on all cars in inventory. If the seller sells the buyer a poor quality car, what is the net-benefit to the seller? a. A net gain of $6,000. b. A net loss of $20,000. c. A net loss of $6,000. d. A net gain of $10,000.
John wants to buy a used car. He knows that there are two types of car in the market, plums and lemons. Lemons are worse quality cars and are more likely to break down than plums. John is willing to pay £10, 000 for a plum and £2, 000 for a lemon. Unfortunately, however, he cannot distinguish between the two types. Sellers can offer a warranty that would cover the full cost of any repair needed by the car for y ∗ years. Considering the type and likelihood of problems their cars can have, owners of plums estimate that y years of guarantee would cost them 1000y, owners of lemons estimate that the cost would be 2000y. John knows these estimates and decides to offer £10, 000 if a car comes with y ∗ years of warranty, £2, 000 if a car comes without warranty. For which values of y ∗ is there a separating equilibrium where only owners of plums are willing to offer the y ∗ -years warranty? Clearly explain your reasoning.
Consider a city where everyone commutes to the city center and commuting cost per mile per month is $40. Each household occupies a 1,000-square-foot dwelling and has $7,000 worth of possessions in its dwelling. The probability that any particular household will be burglarized (involving the uninsured loss of all possessions) is 0.10 at the city center and decreases by 0.01 per mile (to 0.09 at one mile, 0.08 at two miles, and so on). The housing price is $1.00 per square foot at the city center. a) Draw the housing-price curve for locations up to five miles from the city center.
Portsmouth Bank has foreclosed on a home mortgage and is selling the house at auction. There are three bidders for the house, Emily, Anna, and Olga. Portsmouth Bank does not know the willingness to pay of these three bidders for the house, but on the basis of its previous experience, the bank believes that each of these bidders has a probability of 1/3 of valuing it at $600,000, a probability of 1/3 of valuing at $500,000, and a probability of 1/3 of valuing it at $200,000. Portsmouth Bank believes that these probabilities are independent among buyers. If Portsmouth Bank sells the house by means of a second- bidder, sealed- bid auction (Vicktey auction), what will be the bank's expected revenue from the sale?
Solve the following problem using an excel spreadsheet. A tobacco company isinterested in hiring a salesperson to promote smoking cigarettes in nightclubs. The position pays a flat salary of $50,000, regardless of sales levels. The firm has two applicants, Predictable Patty and Risky Ricky. Predictable Patty can produce with 100% certainty $100,000 a year in sales. Risky Ricky, on the other hand, can produce $300,000 with probability of 50%. But if he turns out to spend his time drinking and dancing in the nightclubs instead of making sales, he could actually cost the firm -$100,000 per year.a) During their first year on the job, what are the expected sales of Patty and Ricky? What are the firm’s expected profits on each worker?b) Now assume both workers are currently 25, and they will work until the retirement age of 65. The firm has the option to fire its new employee after one year based on sales, but can only hire one employee. Assume that it takes only one year to discover whether…
Suppose that every driver faces a 2% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $14,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $112,000.00 in the bank and those with $3,500.00 in the bank. Assume that individuals with $3,500.00 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank. Assume that both types of individuals are only slightly risk averse. In this scenario, the actuarially fair price of full insurance, in which all damages are paid by the insurance company, is . Assume that the price of insurance is set at the actuarially fair price. At this price, drivers with $112,000.00 in the bank likely buy insurance, and those with $3,500.00 in the bank likely buy insurance. (Hint: For each type of driver, compare the price of insurance to the expected cost without insurance.) Suppose a state law has been passed…
Suppose that every driver faces a 1% probability of an automobile accident every year. An accident will, on average, cost each driver $15,000. Suppose there are two types of individuals: those with $90,000.00 in the bank and those with $3,000.00 in the bank. Assume that individuals with $3,000.00 in the bank declare bankruptcy if they get in an accident. In bankruptcy, creditors receive only what individuals have in the bank. Assume that both types of individuals are only slightly risk averse. In this scenario, the actuarially fair price of full insurance, in which all damages are paid by the insurance company, is . Assume that the price of insurance is set at the actuarially fair price. At this price, drivers with $3,000.00 in the bank likely buy insurance, and those with $90,000.00 in the bank likely buy insurance. (Hint: For each type of driver, compare the price of insurance to the expected cost without insurance.) Suppose a state law has been passed…
An individual has the utility function U(I) = I^(1/2), where I is their net income. (Note that I to the exponent/power of 1/2 is the same as the square root of I.) The individual starts with $1600 in income. The individual has a 20% probability of being very sick, 30% probability of being slightly sick, and 50% probability of being healthy. If the individual is sick, they lose net income because they need to pay healthcare costs. The healthcare costs are $1600 if they are very sick, $700 if they are slightly sick, and $0 if they are healthy. Please use this information for the following parts of this question unless otherwise specified. What is the individual's expected utility? Suppose a health insurance company offers the individual a full insurance contract. What is the actuarially fair, full insurance premium for this individual? What is the individual's expected utility if they purchase a full insurance contract at the actuarially fair, full insurance premium?
Economic Epidemiology Suppose that some members of a population are infected with a sexually transmitted virus that causes disease X, and some are infected with another sexually transmitted virus that causes disease Y. Some members of the population may be infected with both viruses. While diseases X and Y are similar in that they are both sexually transmitted diseases, the disease X is much more harmful to its carriers than the disease Y is to its carriers. Condom use is highly effective in preventing the transmission of either disease. Suppose scientists discover a cure for the sexually transmitted disease X. This cure (a vaccination) will eliminate the virus causing the disease X from its carrier before its carrier can suffer any harm from the virus. Everybody is immediately given this vaccination against the disease X. a What do you expect to happen to the prevalence of the virus causing the disease X in the population? Draw a graph with time on the horizontal axis and prevalence…
Compare and contrast two quantitative tools for decision-making in conditions of certainty
A law school is trying to gain a better understanding of the determinants of bar passage rates. Suppose that they the following facts were uncovered: 1. The probability with which a randomly selected graduate has received an A in Economic Foundations of Legal Studies (EFLS) is 0.3;2. The probability with which a randomly selected graduate has passed the bar exam is 0.81;3. The probability with which a randomly selected graduate has received an A in EFLS and has passed the bar exam is 0.27. Which of the following statements is true regarding the events X and Y, defined as follows: X = “a randomly selected graduate having received an A in EFLS”; andY = “a randomly selected student having passed the bar exam”? A) X and Y are independent events, and this can be verified by noting that P(X|Y) = 0.3.B) X and Y are not independent events, and this can be verified by noting that P(X|Y) = 0.3.C) X and Y are not independent events, and this can be verified by noting that P(X|Y) =.333.D) X and Y…
Suppose the large number of bike accidents in a small town results in new legislation that requires all citizens of the town to wear specialized bike helmets when riding. These new helmets reduce the probability of head trauma by 25% during a bike accident. While the new helmets the probability of a serious head injury resulting from a bike accident, they also incentivize cyclists to ride safely, which could the number of bike accidents and thus head injuries to cyclists.