EBK MICROECONOMICS
2nd Edition
ISBN: 9780134458496
Author: List
Publisher: VST
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Question
Chapter 13, Problem 12P
(a)
To determine
Nash equilibrium for a game between Pat’s and Geno’s.
(b)
To determine
The game tree when Pat’s is the first-mover in an extensive-form game.
(c)
To determine
The process of the extensive form game using backward induction.
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